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ABSTRACT
The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether Canadian whole farm
programs with both income-supporting and income-stabilizing attributes, which are consid-
ered as decoupled based on the WTO criterion, are actually decoupled from production. The
dissertation began with the review of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the
impact of programs designed to be decoupled payments on acreage response including studies
related to the wealth and insurance effects. The review revealed that previous studies lack
a detailed theoretical model of how acreage decisions will be affected by stabilizing the farm
profit (insurance effect) as well as the higher expected profit (wealth effect). Given the nature
of Canadian whole farm programs which attempt to smooth income, to examine the whole
farm programs, a model is needed to capture the insurance effect arising from these programs
as well as the wealth effect.
To address this gap, the theoretical framework developed by Chavas and Holt (1990) was
extended, in this dissertation, to incorporate the insurance effect into the farmers’ acreage
decisions under uncertainty. In particular, by developing theoretical restrictions, which con-
sider the relationship between income stabilization compensated and uncompensated acreage
decision functions, the insurance effect emphasized in the literature was explicitly derived
within the theoretical model. The acreage allocated to each crop was derived as a function
of expected crop profits, elements of the variance-covariance matrix of crop profits, expected
total wealth (initial wealth plus market profit), and variance of total wealth. The government
payments were incorporated into the model through truncation of the probability distribution
of profits. Specifically, the whole-farm programs truncated the total (farm) profit distribution
which affected the expected total wealth and variance of total wealth.
The theoretical model was then used to develop an empirical model. The econometric
model was applied to acreage data in the Canadian Prairies from 1970 to 2006 in order to
statistically test if the whole farm programs were really decoupled. The results revealed that
coefficients of expected total wealth (wealth effect) and variance of total wealth (insurance
effect) were statistically significant in the whole system, which implied the whole-farm pro-
grams were production and therefore trade distorting and were not actually decoupled, even
if they satisfied the WTO criteria. The statistically significant coefficients for expected total
wealth and variance of total wealth variables were then used to simulate the impact of recent
whole-farm programs—the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA), the Net Income Sta-
bilization Account (NISA) and the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS)—on
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crop choices.
The results suggested that the WGSA, NISA and CAIS programs have increased the
acreage allocated to spring wheat and peas (through both wealth and insurance effects,
although the insurance effect appears to dominate) while they have decreased the acreage for
barley (through the wealth effect), canola and hay (through the insurance effect) in the prairie
provinces. In general, the size of the wealth effect was quite small, while the insurance effect
was always significant. Specifically, the acreage allocated to wheat increased by 7.79 percent
on average across Prairies while canola acreage decreased by 8.86 percent under the CAIS.
Thus, the empirical results revealed that for Canadian whole-farm programs the impact of
the effects related to risk is important. Particularly, the results showed the inherent difficulty
in divorcing the stabilization effect received by Canadian whole-farm programs from farmers’
production decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
In the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the distor-
tionary effects of domestic farm programs figured high on the negotiating agenda. Along with
the export subsidies and market access, domestic farm policies were targeted for reductions in
support. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), domestic support is
classified into three categories or boxes according to their supposed impact on international
trade. According to URAA conventions, the Amber-Box contains the most distorting subsi-
dies, and, hence, limits to their use have been agreed. Blue-Box payments also cause some
distortion but are required to be production limiting. The Green-Box contains subsidies that
are classified as being minimally trade distorting. The subsidies in the Blue- and Green-
Boxes are excluded from all World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines and are expected
to have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects on production. Decoupled support
policies which are defined as payments that are financed by taxpayers and are not related to
current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility criteria are defined by a
fixed, historical base period, are categorized as Green-Box payments. Since they are exempt
from WTO disciplines, payments considered to be decoupled have been providing a growing
and important share of the total support to agriculture provided by governments, especially
in industrialized countries.
The extent to which exempted policies really are production and trade neutral has, how-
ever, recently come under increasing scrutiny. It is hypothesized that there are various
mechanisms by which decoupled payments may affect production decisions. The literature
addresses six major channels through which decoupled payments could affect production.
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They could ease credit constraints faced by farmers (when capital market are imperfect);
they could affect the labour allocation decisions of farm households (when labour market are
imperfect); they could alter land values, rents and land prices or influence the entry and exit
decisions of farmers; they could influence farmers decisions through expectations about future
payments; and they may affect the risk faced by farmers. In the latter case, Hennessy (1998)
developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of agricultural income support policies
under uncertainty. He showed that for decoupled payments which tend to increase expected
profit as well as to contract the variability of profit, decreasing absolute risk aversion is suffi-
cient to ensure an increase in production. He introduced two effects of decoupled payments
that would not arise in a certain world: the wealth effect and the insurance effect. The former
means that the higher average income arising from the support policy may affect producer
decisions. The latter refers to the income-stabilizing attribute that may affect optimizing
decision.
In Canada, over the past 50 years, governments have redistributed considerable amounts
of money to the grain sector which have taken different forms due to the combined effects
of government budget constraints, international trade negotiations, and economic and so-
cial objectives and pressures. The result has been a move from commodity specific and
price based programs towards programs that are intended to stabilize farm gross margin
or net income. Figure 1.1 shows the total receipts from direct payments in Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and Alberta from 1971 to 2006. As can be seen, direct government payments
to the Canadian agricultural sector in the Prairie Provinces have significantly increased from
$10,352,000 to $626,087,000 in Manitoba, from $9,912,000 to $1,267,192,000 in Saskatchewan
from $15,782,000 to $945,115,000 in Alberta over the period 1971-2006. With the increasing
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use of government payments for farm income protection, an important question, then, con-
cerns their economic implications. Examining this issue is important. Because finding that
payments have large effects on production would bring into question the underlying rationale
for the WTO non-actionable (Green Box category) supports in addition to the environmen-
tal consequences arising from increased crop production. More importantly, if the payments
have the effect of increasing crop production, then the payments are less effective in increas-
ing crop producer income, as increased production leads to lower market prices and returns,
transferring some of the benefits of the payments to consumers.
Since Canadian farm income stabilization and support policy has moved toward a whole
farm approach that targets net income and uses a moving average mechanism to temporally
smooth income, it possesses income-supporting (wealth effect) and income-stabilizing (insur-
ance effect) attributes. The existing literature controls for the wealth effect through changes
in average total income arising from government supports, however the insurance effect is
captured only through an ad hoc measure (Goodwin and Mishra, 2005, 2006; Sckokai and
Moro, 2006; Coyle, Wei and Rude, 2008). Given the nature of Canadian whole farm pro-
grams which attempt to stabilize producers’ income, to examine empirically the whole farm
programs, a model is needed to capture the insurance effect arising from these programs.
A measure is derived, in this dissertation, inside the theoretical framework to capture the
insurance effect of whole farm programs as well as the wealth effect.
1.2 Objective of the Study
The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether Canadian whole farm programs,
which are considered as decoupled based on the WTO definition, are actually decoupled.
To accomplish this goal, we follow the following steps which are, in fact, our secondary
objectives. First, we explore the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the impact
of programs designed to be decoupled payments on acreage response. Our review shows that
these studies lack a detailed theoretical model of how acreage decisions will be affected by
stabilizing the farm profit (insurance effect) as well as the higher expected profit (wealth
effect).
Second, to fill this gap, we extend the existing theoretical framework to incorporate the
insurance effect into the farmers’ acreage decisions under uncertainty. In particular, we derive
a measure inside the theoretical framework to capture the insurance effect of government
3
policies as well as the wealth effect.
Third, based on the theoretical model, an empirical model is presented in which a system
of equations is specified for crop acreage as a function of variables derived in the theoretical
framework.
Finally, we apply the econometric model to acreage data in the Canadian Prairies to
statistically test if the whole farm programs are really decoupled. By considering a system of
all major crops acreage, this model is also able to show the impact of government programs
on cropping patterns.
Meeting these objectives should result in a richer framework for examining whether and
how much government payments have had role on acreage response. Policy makers can use
this information as an input to the design of subsidies.
1.3 Methodology
Chavas and Holt (1990), by considering a farm household producing n crops and having pref-
erences represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, assume that the house-
hold maximizes expected utility of total wealth subject to budget and acreage constraints. By
solving the optimization problem, initial wealth, expected profits and second moments of the
distributions of profits are identified as factors affecting the optimal acreage decision. Then
using the relationship between wealth compensated and uncompensated acreage decision and
by substituting the wealth compensated slopes with respect to profit, the acreage equations
are specified as a function of expected total wealth (initial wealth plus expected total profit),
expected (own and cross) profits and the variance-covariance matrix of profits. The influence
of government programs on the subjective probability distribution of profits was considered
by truncation method. Hennessy (1998), however, analytically showed that the stabilization
of total income (insurance effect) increases production as well as the higher expected total
income (wealth effect) arising from the support policy. Although studies after Hennessy’s
work used an ad hoc measure for the insurance effect in their empirical model (Goodwin and
Mishra, 2005, 2006; Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Coyle, Wei and Rude, 2008), there is no study
in which the insurance effect is derived inside a theoretical framework.
By developing theoretical restrictions (i.e. by considering the relationship between income
stabilization compensated and uncompensated acreage decision functions), in this dissertation
we thus contribute to the literature on supply response by explicitly deriving the insurance
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effect (income stabilization) emphasized in the literature (Hennessy, 1998), which was ig-
nored by Chavas and Holt model (1990), within our theoretical model. The acreage response
equation is derived as a function of expected crop profits, elements of the variance-covariance
matrix of profits, expected total wealth (initial wealth plus market profit), and variance of
total wealth. The government payments are also incorporated into the model through trunca-
tion of the probability distribution of profits. Specifically, the whole-farm programs truncate
the total (farm) profit distribution which affect the expected total wealth and variance of
total wealth.
We specify a system of acreage equations as a function of variables derived in the the-
oretical model as well as lagged dependent variable to control for the cost of adjustment
in switching from one crop to another. Within this model, we discuss the expected sign
for the explanatory variables and the theoretical restrictions that should be imposed on the
coefficients.
To examine the effects of Canadian support programs on acreage decisions for major crops
in the prairie provinces over 1970-2006, the econometric model provided is applied to a system
of nine crop equations and all the relevant elasticities of acreage allocation with respect to
the exogenous variables are estimated. If the coefficient of expected total wealth and variance
of total wealth variables are statistically significant (insignificant) in the whole system, the
whole-farm programs are (are not) production and therefore trade distorting and are not (are)
decoupled. The statistically significant coefficients are then used to simulate the impact of
recent whole-farm programs—the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA), the Net Income
Stabilization Account (NISA) and the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS)—
on crop choices.
1.4 Organization of the Study
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The concept of decoupling and a history of de-
coupling in agricultural policies in the U.S., the EU and Canada, in particular, is presented
in chapter two. After reviewing the literature pertaining to modeling farmers’ acreage deci-
sions under uncertainty, chapter three presents a literature review pertaining to the impact
of decoupled payments on production decisions. Chapter four develops the theoretical frame-
work used to derive the acreage response equation determinants which captures the insurance
and the wealth effects. Incorporating the government payments into the theoretical model
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through the truncation method and developing an analytical framework to derive the ex-
pected signs for variables in acreage function are also presented in this chapter. Chapter five
provides data description and the empirical model, then it discusses the estimated results and
reports simulations for the Canadian whole-farm programs. Chapter six contains concluding
comments and lessons learned.
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Chapter 2
Decoupling: The Concept and Direct
Government Payments in Canada
The distortionary effects of domestic farm programs figured high on the negotiating agenda
in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Along with
the conventional focus on export subsidies and market access, domestic farm policies were
targeted for reductions in support. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA), domestic policies were classified based on the extent to which they were consid-
ered to be trade-distorting. Domestic policies that were considered to be minimally trade
distorting were classified as non-actionable (Green Box) policies and not subject to reduc-
tion. Decoupled support policies, defined as payments that are financed by taxpayers and
are not related to current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility criteria
are defined by a fixed, historical base period, are categorized as non-actionable (Green-Box)
payments. Since they are exempt from WTO disciplines, payments considered to be decou-
pled have been providing a growing and important share of the total support to agriculture
provided by governments as domestic agricultural policies are revised in light of Green Box
criteria. The extent to which exempted policies really are production and trade neutral has,
however, recently come under increasing scrutiny. It is hypothesized that there are various
mechanisms by which decoupled payments may affect production decisions.
This chapter first describes the ambiguity surrounding the definition of decoupling, then
presents the various channels through which decoupled payments could affect production and
finally outlines the Canadian agricultural stabilization and support programs after briefly
describing some practical experiences with decoupling of agricultural support in the U.S. and
the EU.
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2.1 The Concept of Decoupling
Agricultural production has a long tradition of being supported financially by governments.
There are at least two sets of motivating factors behind domestic subsidies to agriculture.
Economists argue that if prices are highly variable and producers are risk averse, then output
will be less than the social optimum. Under price uncertainty, producers make fewer long-
term investments that reduce production (Just, 1974). Therefore, reducing price uncertainty
can be Pareto improving and can increase overall economic welfare. Stabilization programs
can reduce price uncertainty, if they are designed with that objective. There are also political
reasons for introducing stabilization programs. Support to agriculture is often legitimized by
the argument that small family farms need income support in order to secure a fair standard
of living. The provision of agricultural products at reasonable prices to consumers is also used
as a supportive argument. Furthermore, as a consequence of existing agricultural policies,
farmers have been led to invest in certain areas, and it may be problematic to suddenly
remove agricultural support that could lead to bankruptcies in the agricultural sector.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) provided formal recognition that domestic subsidies to agriculture could adversely
affect trade and, for the first time in 1994, domestic subsidies to agriculture were brought
under the discipline of global trade rules. Member countries of the WTO decided to reduce the
distortions that were caused by current levels of domestic farm subsidies. Under the URAA,
domestic support is classified into three categories or boxes according to their supposed impact
on international trade. According to URAA conventions, the Amber-Box contains the most
distorting—actionable—subsidies, and, hence, limits to their use have been agreed. Blue-Box
payments also cause some distortion but are required to be production limiting. The Green-
Box contains non-actionable subsidies that are classified as being minimally trade distorting.
The subsidies in the Blue- and Green-Boxes are excluded from all WTO disciplines—are
excluded from the Aggregate Measure of Support—and are expected to have no, or at most
minimal, trade-distorting effects through their influence on production. Decoupled support
policies are categorized as Green-Box payments.
2.1.1 Definition of Decoupled Policies
A policy (or a package of policies) is said to be decoupled if it has no, or small effect on
the level of production and trade. In theory, the decoupled policy has no effect on output,
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while the coupled policy will affect the level of production (Andersson, 2004). The World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) have provided two prominent operational definitions of decoupled payments.
A fundamental difference between the two definitions is whether a policy is defined as decou-
pled ex ante, as in the legal definition in the URAA, or ex post as adopted by the OECD
(2001).
The ex ante definitions are criteria based, and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agri-
culture (URAA) of the WTO in Article 6 of Annex II provides a list, presented below, of
five criteria that payments should meet to be defined as decoupled. (a) Eligibility for such
payments shall be determined by clearly defined criteria such as income, status as a producer
or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and fixed base period. (b) The
amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the type
or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year
after the base period. (c) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related
to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken
in any year after the base period. (d) The amount of such payments in any given year shall
not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base
period. (e) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments. Based on the
above criteria for decoupled payments, Canadian whole-farm programs, discussed later, for
which eligibility criteria are defined by a fixed, historical base period, can be considered as
decoupled.
Figure 2.1 illustrates why the WTO considers farm programs satisfying the above criteria
as decoupled, i.e. those that do not distort production and trade. In this figure, the domestic
supply and demand are given by S and D, and P 0 and Q0 indicate the free trade prices
and output, respectively. If world price falls to P 1 for some reasons (including the use of
production subsidies by competitors), there is a welfare loss of area b. If the government
provides a price support of P 0 given a world price of P 1, the level of production increases
to Q0. Moreover, the welfare loss is given by area c. Now suppose that a farm program
which satisfies the WTO definition, instead of a price support program, is introduced (such
as payments based on the previous years’ average net income). Since in the absence of
government intervention producers lose the entire area a + b, governments must provide a
payment equal to area a+ b. Under this program, output will remain unchanged at Q1 and
thus trade will not be affected. Therefore, this kind of program is categorized as decoupled.
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Moreover, there are no welfare costs associated with decoupled programs, and therefore these
programs are more efficient than price support policies (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis, 2002).
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Figure 2.1: Trade and the Decoupling of Farm Programs
Another definition for decoupled policies is provided by the OECD, the ex post definition.
This definition is based on the outcome of the policy. A policy is fully decoupled if it does
not influence production decisions of farmers receiving payments. Under this definition,
the demand and supply functions remain unchanged when a package of policy measures is
introduced. The OECD (2001) discusses, however, the government payments (even those
that are considered as decoupled by the WTO) can affect the production decisions through
some indirect channels. Thus, it is obviously difficult to imagine a fully decoupled agricultural
policy in the real world. Rather than defining a fully decoupled policy, the OECD introduces a
more operational definition which is a degree of decoupling given by Cahill (1997)1. Defining a
degree of decoupling requires two references for comparison: full decoupling2 and full coupling.
If a policy package results in production that equals the level of production under a policy
package based on the level of production of the planted crop, the package is fully coupled.
The degree of decoupling would be a measure of the production and trade effects of a package
relative to those of a fully coupled policy.
1Cahill (1997) explores the concept of decoupling and measures a rate of decoupling achieved by the
compensatory payments package provided under the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
reform. In the analytical model, compensatory payments affect the revenue per hectare and whereby affect
acreage and therefore production. In particular, the author develops an expression for the change in output
as a function of price and compensatory payments changes, and acreage and yield elasticities. The model
is calibrated on 1991-1992 and rates of decoupling of CAP payments for five crops (rapeseed, soybeans,
sunflower, wheat, coarse grains) are obtained.
2A less restrictive concept is effectively fully decoupled. If a policy package results in production that does
not exceed the level that would exist without the policy, the package is effectively fully decoupled. Production
decisions by farmers could be affected through the effectively fully decoupled package, but in a way that does
not result in larger production. This means that equilibrium levels of production and trade are unchanged
but that the shape of the demand and supply curves can change.
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In this dissertation, decoupled payments refer to the WTO ex ante definition which are
defined by a fixed, historical base period.
2.2 Potential Impacts of Decoupled Payments on Pro-
duction
Although there has been a positive development, a move towards decoupled support away
from coupled support, consistent with the 1994 URAA, a number of potential links between
decoupled payments and farmers’ decisions have been identified in the literature. In an at-
tempt to decouple the agricultural policy, direct effects (which arise as a consequence of
changes in incentive prices or by quantitative restrictions) can be removed by e.g. providing
support through lump-sum transfers. However, indirect effects (arise broadly as a conse-
quence of, or expectations of, changes in income and wealth) may remain after the reform,
as agricultural support may induce indirect effects by the pure existence of the support. The
economics profession has recently addressed and delineated many of these potential links,
both with analytical conceptualizations and empirical investigations (OECD, 2001).
If credit markets are imperfect (for example the existence of a significant gap between
borrowing and lending rates and/or the presence of binding debt constraints for the farmer
willing to invest), decoupled payments have the potential to increase the liquidity of credit
constrained farmers and so will affect investment decisions. The payments may also increase
land values and rents, which also improves the credit worthiness of credit-constrained farm-
ers and lead to keeping land in agricultural production. Decoupled payments affect farmer
expectations by linking current decisions to future payments. Support programs that are
directly based on previous production, e.g. output last year, have a built-in dynamic aspect,
since the farmer can directly affect next year’s payments with today’s production decision.
If labour markets are imperfect (for example a wage gap between on-farm and off-farm re-
turns), decoupled payments can affect labour markets by influencing the on- and off-farm
labor supply decisions and so will affect agricultural production.
In the presence of uncertainty, decoupled payments can affect the total wealth of the
farmer and this change in wealth can affect the farmers’ attitude to risk (risk aversion).
The way in which wealth affects risk aversion depends on assumptions concerning the utility
function. Hennessy (1998) shows that if absolute risk aversion is reduced by the wealth effect
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(decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption), farmers will be willing to assume more risk
and therefore will produce more. Decoupled payments may affect the degree of risk faced by
the farmer. The idea is that a policy reducing the risk faced by the farmer will have a positive
effect on production. It can be proved that a government scheme that increases payments
when prices fall and reduces payments when prices rise will increase production if there is
partial income compensation for the price movements.
In general, decoupled payments may indirectly influence farmers’ decisions. Therefore,
the implementation of decoupled programs calls into question the current definition of the
non-actionable (Green-Box) payments in the WTO.
2.3 Experiences of Decoupling in Agricultural Policies
Numerous reforms of agricultural support have been made over the years. This section
presents some experiences with decoupling of the agricultural policies and reforms in the EU,
the U.S. and Canada.
2.3.1 The EU
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) came into force in 1962. Since the policy
was developed in the years after the Second World War, it was constructed to secure the
availability of supplies of agricultural products for consumers. The official objectives were
to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, increase agricultural pro-
ductivity, to stabilize the markets, and to maintain and increase food production. Recent
reforms emphasised rural development, protection of the environment and competitiveness.
The initial CAP’s major policy avenue was to increase farm prices.
The MacSharry reform of the CAP in 1992 reduced price support for arable crops (cere-
als, oilseeds and protein crops), and for beef and veal, and farmers were compensated for the
resulting loss of income by direct payments. The reductions in price supports were compen-
sated by a per hectare payments (which were based on historical yields and historical acreage)
in the case of cereals, and increased premium payments for beef cows and cattle. The 1992
reform introduced a set-aside scheme in the arable sector which allowed the Commission to
curtail the quantity of arable land in production and curtail the growth of surpluses in that
sector.
In 1999, the second major reform of the CAP was adapted as part of the Agenda 2000.
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The reform was a deepening of the MacSharry reform and focused on increasing the compet-
itiveness of agricultural products. Price support to crops was further reduced and the direct
payments were increased and realigned across crops. The reference year for payments was
also changed in some countries. In this reform rural development was given a higher priority.
In 2003, the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the CAP was agreed upon. This reform requires
at least 75 percent of payments to be decoupled in the arable sector. Single Farm Payments
(SFP) will be based on historic entitlements and linked to land rather than production. Under
the MTR reform, a single farm payment will replace the existing crop-specific area payments.
Eligibility for payments is subject to cross-compliance with a variety of EU environmental,
animal welfare and food safety standards (European Commission, 2003).
2.3.2 The U.S.
The New Deal farm program in the 1930s attempted to control farm prices by offering pro-
ducers payments in return for voluntarily reducing the acreage devoted to crops and taking
surplus production off the market. The total payment was equal to the yield per acre mul-
tiplied by a farm’s eligible payment acreage. In 1954, the flexible price support program
provided for direct payments to farmers in return for reducing their acreage of major sup-
ported crops and required that they leave fallow the land removed from production. This
portfolio of policy instruments were the primary means of price support for the major field
crops for decades up to the 1980s.
The 1985 Food Security Act set a new trend for the major field crop sector by dropping
the price supports and reducing the role of acreage set-asides and public stock holding, which
had the purpose to decouple payments from current yields and link them to historical yields.
Coupled direct payments on fixed quantities of products were based on average yields between
1981 and 1985.
The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) of 1996 signaled a transi-
tion toward a new policy environment characterized by diminished government involvement
in agricultural markets. Under the FAIR Act, agricultural subsidies (market price support
and deficiency payments) were replaced with fixed payments to farmers based on historical
production, which has been called a Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) or Agricultural
Market Transition Act (AMTA) payments, and with a loan deficiency payment program
(LDP) with the aim to establish minimum support prices for program crops. AMTA pay-
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ments were intended to decline each year until the FAIR Act expired in 2002. However,
as prices fell sharply in the 1990s, the government intervened to avoid farm bankruptcies
and Congress passed supplemental, ad hoc payments to farmers. These payments, known
as Market Loss Assistance (MLA), were also decoupled since they were paid on the basis of
historical base acreage and thus carried no current production requirements. However, these
payments were tied to market prices since they were a response to poor market conditions.
In the 2002 Farm Bill, the Food Security and Rural Improvement Act (FSRIA), the PFC
payment were replaced with direct payments for crops (DPC) which also are higher than the
PFC payments. The DPC was also set at a constant level over 2002-2007 while the PFC, as
stated above, were scheduled to decline. The disaster payments that were paid on an ad hoc
basis since 1998 are also formally brought into farm legislation in the 2002 Farm Bill in the
form of counter cyclical payments (CCPs). The farmers are also allowed to update their base
acres and yield, which determine the payments (Baffes, 2004).
2.3.3 Canadian Agricultural Stabilization and Support Programs
Canadian agriculture has a long history of government involvement in programs designed
to stabilize prices and incomes. From the time of Confederation in 1867 until the 1930s,
identifying and attracting quality immigrants was a significant feature of national policy for
agriculture. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the simultaneous droughts and insect
damage throughout the North American Great Plains led to action by the federal government.
In January 1935, the Canada government announced reforms which implied government in-
tervention (as control and regulation) and, in turn the development of a policy for agriculture
in Canada. From 1950s, government activities were transformed from simply control and reg-
ulation to direct provision of subsidies (Hedley, 2007). During the period 1955-1970, a major
program was the Temporary Wheat Reserve Act. This program resulted in a major income
transfer to Prairie farmers. During that period, Canada accumulated large grain stocks. Un-
der the Temporary Wheat reserve Act, farmers were partly compensated for on-farm storage
charges by payments to elevator companies. In what follows, we will review agricultural
stabilization and support programs in Canada starting in 1950.
After the Agricultural Products Board Act 1951, which stated that government should
have a role to play in supporting agricultural prices and incomes, the federal government put
into effect the Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA) in 1958. The ASA was the first Act in
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Canada which allocated direct payments to farmers that were fully funded by the Canadian
government based on a specific formula to stabilize the low prices of a predetermined set
of farm commodities. Under this Act, the federal government provided direct subsidies for
nine commodities (cattle, hogs, sheep, butter, cheese, eggs, wheat, oats and barley) when
the annual average price for them dropped below 90 percent of the average price over the
three preceding years1. The amount of money paid under the ASA to farmers was initially
small but started to grow during a period of inflation in Canada starting in 1975. Since
western farmers felt that price stabilization under ASA was not sufficient (in many years, the
Canadian Wheat Board quotas for wheat, barley and durum were constraining, thus farmers
could not deliver and get stabilization payments for all of their production), the WGSA was
put in place to help prairie farmers stabilize their crop income. After the introduction of the
Western Grain Stabilization Act in 1976, western grains were removed from the Agriculture
Stabilization Act.
A second important policy was put in place through the Crop Insurance Act, 1959. Based
on this Act, the Federal Government provided funds to the provinces to operate subsidized
crop insurance programs within each province. The Crop Insurance Act was the first agri-
cultural support program which introduced the concept of cost sharing between the federal
and provincial governments. Protection offered under the crop insurance program only in-
sured 60 percent of long-term yields. In 1966, the Federal Crop Insurance Act was amended
in an attempt to increase farmer participation in the program. Since 1966, the insurance
yield coverage level available to farmers had been increased from 60 percent of the long-term,
average-area yield to 80 percent of the long-term, average-area yield. Also, the federal con-
tribution to farmer premiums increased from 20 percent to 25 percent. In 1973, participation
in the crop insurance program increased dramatically, with the federal and provincial gov-
ernments increasing their combined share of the premiums from 25 percent to 50 percent and
expanded coverage to include hail spot-losses 2. Since all crop insurance contracts guarantee
a price, in 1996 governments began to offer insurance to farmers that was based on a futures
1Later, the support price for industrial milk and cream was based on 190% of the five-year average market
price while for the beef sector was 95% (Rosaasen and Schmitz, 1984).
2The next amendment to the Act, in 1973, provided two options for the federal-provincial-producer cost-
sharing arrangements. In one option, the federal and provincial governments each contributed 25 percent of
total premiums and 50 percent of administrative costs. In the other option, the federal government contributed
a total of 50 percent of premiums and the provinces paid all administrative costs. In the 1990 amendment,
the maximum coverage was increased to 90 percent for low risk crops. Furthermore, the single cost-sharing
formula was adopted, where the federal government and provinces each pay 25 percent of total premiums and
50 percent of administration costs (Giraldez et al., 1998). In recent years, federal and provincial governments
combined share of premiums has increased to about 60 percent.
15
price.
In 1976, the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA) was passed to provide crop income
stability for western grains and oilseeds. Under the WGSA, the total value of payout to all
farmers in a given year was based on the aggregate net cash flow of prairie grain producers1.
Payment were made when aggregate net cash flow (cash receipts minus cash variable costs)
from eligible grain (wheat, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, canola and mustard seed; from 1988 nine
crops are added to the seven previously covered triticale, mixed grains, sunflower, safflower,
buckwheat, peas, lentils, fababeans, canary seed) sales were less than the average net cash flow
over the previous five years. Individual farmers voluntarily entered into the program, which
was funded through both farmer levies and federal government contributions. Participating
farmers contributed a percentage of their gross sales to the stabilization fund (the farmer
levy ranged between one and four percent of gross sale depending on the balance of the
stabilization fund), an amount that was matched by the federal government in addition to a
further contribution equivalent to two percent of gross sales (Fulton, Rosaasen and Schmitz,
1989). The individual farmer’s share of this payout was then determined by comparing the
farmer’s contributions to the program (levies) in the current and the previous two years with
total levies of all farmers over the same period. The WGSA was the first support program
with fixed producer-federal government shares, and a composite of commodities; not support
for each specific commodity. Under the WGSA the payouts were not large until after the
grain trade wars of 1985. The program built up a large surplus in the early 1980s. In 1984,
the payout triggers were changed to allow greater payouts to producers. However, the large
payouts in the late 1980s led to a deficit in the WGSA fund. It was subsequently replaced
with a new program called the Farm Income Protection Act (which had three components,
the Gross Revenue Insurance Program, the Net Income Stabilization Account, and Crop
Insurance).
As a result of the low grain prices in 1986, the government of Canada announced a new
program called the Special Canadian Grains Program. Under this program, payments of $1
billion in 1986 and $1 billion in 1987 were made to producers. With several years of ad hoc
programming experience and little improvement foreseen by governments, the federal and
provincial governments began a major policy review in 1989. The economic difficulty felt
1In response to criticism directed at the program, Bill C-33 was passed to amend the WGSA in June 1984.
The amendment was intended to make the program more responsive to crop production volume changes.
Therefore, the new trigger was based on a per-unit of net cash flow. Under the new mechanism, payouts were
triggered whenever the per-ton net cash flow fell below its simple average over the preceding five years.
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by governments was that farmers in the crops sector were increasingly making planting and
crop choice decisions based on governmental programming rather than market signals. The
product of these debates was the Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) in 1991.
The Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) was the first program introduced under
the Farm Income Protection Act. In GRIP, farmers were guaranteed a per acre gross return
on whatever crop they grew1. A farmer would pay a premium to insure the gross revenues
of a crop at a certain level, and he/she would receive an indemnity when area revenues fell
below the coverage level. Premiums were subsidized (typically producers would pay 1/3
of the insurance premium). There were two payouts that compromised GRIP: (1) revenue
insurance and (2) crop insurance. The program guaranteed producers their long-term average
yield. The guaranteed price was set by an indexed moving average price. This index was
an average of prices from the previous fifteen years, lagged by two years, indexed by a farm
input price index which was used to index the grain price by a cost of production formula. As
shown in figure 2.2, revenue insurance provided revenue protection between the level offered
by crop insurance and the target revenue set by GRIP. Crop insurance provided a production
guarantee equal to 70 percent of the producer’s normal production times the price listed in
the crop insurance contract. To collect the revenue insurance, the market revenue had to be
below the target revenue.
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Figure 2.2: The Mechanics of the GRIP (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis, 2002)
Saskatchewan withdrew from the program just eighteen months after it was implemented,
because it was considered too expensive for the province and it was poorly designed. By
1999, the only province still participating in GRIP was Ontario.
The Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA), which had tripartite (federal, provincial
1Note that the rules for administration of GRIP differed across provinces.
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and farmer) funding, was the second program introduced in the Farm Income Protection
Act. The stated purpose of the NISA program of 1991-2002 was to encourage farmers to
save more funds in high income years for use in low income years, so as to smooth incomes
over time (this is similar to the objective of the WGSA. Unlike WGSA, each participant had
an individual NISA account). NISA was a voluntary farm income safety net scheme, where
farmers could set aside money (after tax) in individual accounts which is then matched
by federal and provincial government. A farmer could contribute up to three percent of
eligible net sales as savings to a Fund “one”NISA account and the federal and provincial
governments generally make a matching contribution to a Fund “two”NISA account for the
individual (two percent from the federal government and one percent from the provincial
government). Matching funds would earn a competitive interest rate, but the farmer’s own
deposits received a three percent interest bonus paid by government. The maximum net sales
for the qualifying matching government contribution was set at Cdn $250,000 per farm. In
addition, a farmer could contribute up to an additional 20 percent of eligible net sales to
his Fund one NISA account. These additional farmer contributions were not matched by
government, but they would earn the three percent interest bonus from government. Farmer
contributions were not tax deductible. All interest from both accounts was accumulated in
Fund two which is taxable upon withdrawal.
In years of declining income, farmers could withdraw funds from their NISA accounts
in amounts determined by either one of two trigger mechanisms. Under the stabilization
trigger, if, in the tax year, farm income fell below 70 percent of the previous three-year
average, a farmer could withdraw money from his NISA account. Under the second trigger,
if the farmer’s net farm income fell below Cdn $10,000, the farmer could choose to withdraw
his money from his NISA account. In all cases, a farmer’s NISA account could not be in
deficit. This trigger was increased in 1999 to Cdn $20,000 per farm or Cdn $30,000 for cases
in which the NISA account was held as a partnership.
In response to the drop in grains and oilseed prices, in 1998, the federal government
introduced a temporary farm income support program called Agricultural Income Disaster
Assistance (AIDA). This program was designed to meet the criteria of the WTO Annex for
Green Box. When farmers’ net income fell below 70 percent of their three-year, moving-
average net income they become eligible for a pay-out (net income below zero is not included
in the averaging process)1. The cost share on this program was 60 percent from the federal
1Note that the rules for administration of AIDA differed across provinces.
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government and 40 percent from the provincial government. Since AIDA was costly in terms
of the number of accountants and government employees needed to manage the individual
farmers’ AIDA application (which result in farmers receiving less than the full benefits of the
program), the Canadian government in 2001 announced the Canadian Farm Income Program
(CFIP). Even though CFIP replaced AIDA, it was similar to it.
The Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS), which is now Canada’s single
safety net program, was approved in late 2003 in place of the Net Income Stabilization
Account (NISA), Canadian Farm Income Plan (CFIP) and related provincial programs. A
production margin is intended to reflect revenues and expenses that are directly related to
production for the firm and is calculated by subtracting farmer’s total allowable expenses
from his total allowable income. A reference production margin is an average of the five
previous production margins for the farmer, excluding the high and low margins. A CAIS
payment is triggered when a farmer’s program year production margin declines below his
reference margin (CAIS payouts are based on farm specific losses relative to reference margin
rather than on a regional measure of loss as in the Western Grain Stabilization Act). The
greater the decline in the margin, the greater the payment. Payments are financed from
farmer deposits and government contributions, and shares vary with the difference relative to
the reference margin, the amount of government funds the farmer will receive is determined
by the extent of his margin decline.
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Figure 2.3: The Mechanics of the CAIS (CAIS Program Handbook)
As shown in figure 2.3, the program measures the extent of farmer decline using three
tiers, with Tier 1 representing the smallest decline and Tier 3 representing the largest decline.
If the program year margin is between 85-100 percent of the reference margin, government
pays fifty percent of the decline (Tier 1). If the program year margin is between 70-85 percent
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of the reference margin, government pays seventy percent of the decline (Tier 2) in addition
to the Tier 1. If the program year margin is between 0-70 percent of the reference margin,
government pays eighty percent of the decline (Tier 3) in addition to the Tier 1 and Tier 2.
In an unlikely case when production margin is negative, the government pays sixty percent
of loss. The share of a farmer is inversely proportional to loss. Farmer deposits must be a
minimum of 14 percent of the current reference production margin; these deposits are not a
premium and the farmer gets the money back.
Growing Forward is a new commitment to Canada’s agriculture sector (AAFC, 2007).
AgriInvest, AgriStability, AgriRecovery, and AgriInsurance are the first programs available
under Growing Forward and form a new suite of business risk management programs for
farmers. AgriInvest has replaced the coverage under the Canadian Agricultural Income Sta-
bilization (CAIS) program for margin losses of 15 per cent or less. Through government and
farmer contributions to producer accounts, it will provide producers with flexible coverage
for small income declines as well as support for investments to mitigate risks or improve mar-
ket income. Under this program, producers who make a deposit to their AgriInvest account
will receive a matching government contribution based on a percentage of allowable net sales
of eligible commodities. AgriStability is a margin-based program that will provide farmers
with assistance for larger income declines. It replaces the coverage previously available under
CAIS, compensating producers for larger declines relative to the reference margin (a decline
of greater than 15 percent). AgriRecovery provides disaster relief for smaller natural disas-
ters that are regional in scope and have a relatively small impact on the Canadian industry.
These types of disasters jointly fund on a 60/40 federal/provincial-territorial basis.
In general, numerous reforms of agricultural support have been made over the years across
countries. This chapter presented some experiences with decoupling of the agricultural poli-
cies and reforms in the EU, the U.S. and Canada. The extent to which decoupled payments
are truly decoupled from production decisions has recently come under debate. Various mech-
anisms by which decoupled payments may affect production decisions have been identified in
the literature. The next chapter reviews the studies concerning measurement of the effects
of decoupled payments on acreage decisions.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
This chapter provides a literature review pertaining to the impact of government direct pay-
ments on acreage decisions and agricultural production. The review is organized as follows:
the first section presents a review of the literature pertaining to modeling farmers’ acreage
decisions. This section focuses on studies that attempt to estimate the acreage decision
determinants (which are essential to farm policy decision makers) under uncertainty. The
procedures for calculating expected net returns and variance of net returns as the two main
factors affecting acreage decisions have been extended after Nerlove’s seminal paper in 1958.
Future prices or adaptive expectations, and the weighted three-year moving average of vari-
ances are primarily used as proxies for expected prices and expected variance-covariance of
prices, respectively. Then, since single commodity studies, which do not consider all alterna-
tive uses of land and theoretical constraints, are potentially incomplete, studies that try to
estimate a system of acreage decision equations are presented.
Coupled payments affecting prices and net returns (and therefore agricultural production,
and acreage) have been examined, and price elasticities estimated, for use in forecasting under
government intervention. Furthermore, in the wake of domestic subsidies to agriculture being
brought under the discipline of global trade rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 1994 (because of their trade-distorting effects), many farm programs are shifting towards
policies that fit the WTO definition for non-actionable subsidies. Although programs fitting
the non-actionable criteria are expected to have no direct effect on production decisions, it is
argued that there are some possible ways that these payments indirectly affect agricultural
production (Westcott and Young, 2002). In other words these supposedly decoupled payments
do, indeed, affect production albeit indirectly. To the extent that programs expand domes-
tic production, the impacts can be partially transmitted to world markets through increased
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exports and lower prices. Therefore, the second section examines the studies concerning mea-
surement of the effects of payments compliant with the non-actionable definition—hereafter
denoted as decoupled—on acreage decisions. Decoupled payments may affect farm operators’
production decisions by altering their access to capital (credit constraints effects), their expec-
tations of future payments (expectations effects), their production costs’ coverage (farmers
entry/exit effects), or their risk preferences and income variability (wealth and insurance
effects). Studies related to the wealth and insurance effects are closely examined.
3.1 Literature Review Pertaining to Acreage Response
One of the most commonly researched areas in agricultural economics is acreage response
analysis. The factors which determine the amount of acres farmers allocate to various crops
are essential to farm policy decision makers. Thus, agricultural economists have focused on
modeling acreage response1. In what follows we review some of the past research done on
acreage response.
The estimation of farmer supply response was considerably improved by Nerlove’s seminal
paper on partial adjustment and adaptive expectations in 1958. In the Nerlove model, farmer
acreage decisions were influenced by price expectations (the Nerlove model assumes that past
prices govern expectations about the normal level of future price levels, with more recent
prices having a greater weight) and production adjustments. Since that time, a large body
of literature has modified and revised the Nerlove model when examining supply response
(Askari and Cummings, 1977). Some of the acreage response literature extending the basic
Nerlovian framework are examined below.
Some studies have considered alternative price expectation specifications ranging from
naive expectations or a simple one-period lag (Bailey and Womack, 1985; Duffy, Richardson
and Whlgenant, 1987; Chembezi and Womack, 1992) to the weighted geometric lagged func-
tion of the previous years’ market price (Chavas and Holt, 1990; Massow and Weersink, 1993;
Krause and Koo, 1996), futures prices (Gardner, 1976; Morzuch, Weaver and Helmberger,
1980; Wu and Adams, 2001; Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal, 2004; Goodwin and Mishra,
2006; Lin and Dismukes, 2007), a combination of cash and futures prices (Chavas, Pope and
1For estimating crop production, previous literature consists of a larger number of acreage response models
compared to supply response models . This is due to the fact that planting decisions are independent of the
subsequent weather conditions and, therefore, provide an accurate forecast of planned production compared
with observed output (Coyle, 1993).
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Kao, 1983). Table 3.1 summarizes some related studies analyzing the impacts of expected
prices on acreage response.
Table 3.1: Some Studies related to the Impacts of Expected Prices on Acreage Response
Papers Type of Price Expectation Focus of Study Method
Gardner (1976) Futures prices As expected price in supply anaylsis OLS
Morzuch et al. (1980) Futures prices Wheat acreage response OLS
Chavas et al. (1983) Cash and futures prices Corn and soybean acreage response OLS
Bailey and Womack (1985) Simple one-period lag Wheat acreage response OLS
Duffy et al. (1987) Simple one-period lag Cotton acreage response GLS
Chavas and Holt (1990) Weighted avg of past prices Corn and soybean acreage response SUR
Chembezi and Womack (1992) Simple one-period lag Acreage response to gov’t programs GLS
Massow and Weersink (1993) Weighted avg of past prices Production effects of gov’t programs SUR
Krause and Koo (1996) Weighted avg of past prices Program crops responses Tobit
Wu and Adams (2001) Futures prices Environmental effects of gov’t programs SUR
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) Futures prices Land acquisition effects of gov’t programs Probit
Lin and Dismukes (2007) Futures prices Production effect of gov’t program SUR
Note: OLS, SUR and GLS represent ordinary least square, seemingly unrelated regression and generalized least square.
Some other studies have extended the Nerlove model by incorporating the role of risk in
acreage allocation. In these studies, risk typically enters the Nerlove model through expected
utility optimization by a farmer. The empirical evidence suggests that risk variables are
often significant in explaining agricultural production decisions (e.g. Just, 1974). Gabriel
and Baker (1980) indicated that there are two major sources of risk in farms: (1) unstable
agricultural markets that affect price variability and (2) environmental factors that influ-
ence yield variability. Studies incorporating the effect of price risk on crop acreage have
considered alternative measures for price variances ranging from a simple three-year moving
average of squared deviations between expectations and realized prices (Behrman, 1968) to
a weighted three-year moving average of squared deviations between expectations and real-
ized prices (Lin, 1977; Traill, 1978; Sengupta and Sfeir, 1982; Chavas and Holt, 1990; Coyle,
2005; Sckokai and Moro, 2006), an adaptive expectations measure of the variance of price
(Just, 1974, 1976; Pope and Just, 1991; Antonovitz and Green, 1990), time-varying variance
within the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) framework (Aradhyula and
Holt, 1990; Holt, 1993). Studies examining the effect of both price and yield risk on acreage
response (Massow and Weersink, 1993; Duffy, Shalshali and Kinnucan, 1994; Lin and Dis-
mukes, 2007) have considered the variance measure of yield using moving weighted average
of squared deviations between crop yields and their trend yields. Some studies analyzing the
impacts of risk on acreage response are summarized in table 3.2.
The Nerlove model has also been extended by considering the role of government programs.
Examples are Houck and Ryan (1972), Morzuch, Weaver and Helmberger (1980), Duffy,
Richardson and Whlgenant (1987), McIntosh and Shideed (1989), Chembezi and Womack
(1992), Massow and Weersink (1993), Coyle, Wei and Rude (2008), Sckokai and Moro (2006),
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Table 3.2: Some Studies related to the Impacts of Risk on Acreage Response
Papers Type of Risk Focus of Study Method
Behrman (1968) Simple 3-yr moving avg p var Rice, kenaf, corn and cossava acreage response ML
Lin (1977) Weighted 3-year moving avg r var Wheat acreage response ML
Sengupta and Sfeir
(1982)
Weighted 3-yr moving avg p and y var Risk aversion impact on supply response OLS
Chavas and Holt
(1990)
Weighted 3-yr moving avg p var-cov Corn and soybean acreage response SUR
Pope and Just (1991) Adaptive expectations p var-cov Risk structure in potato supply response OLS
Massow and Weersink
(1993)
Weighted 3-yr moving avg r var-cov Production effects of gov’t payments SUR
Duffy et el. (1994) Weighted 3-yr moving avg p var-cov Program crops responses SUR
Coyle (2005) Weighted 3-yr moving avg p var Investment effects of gov’t farm programs OLS & GMM
Sckokai and Moro
(2006)
Weighted 3-yr moving avg p var-cov Production effects of decoupled payments ML
Notes: p, y and r var-cov denote price, yield and return variance-covariance matrix, respectively. ML and GMM represent
maximum likelihood and generalized method of moments, respectively.
Lin and Dismukes (2007). This concept will be examined in greater detail in the next section.
A major portion of the acreage response literature focuses on modeling a single com-
modity, for instance, Houck and Ryan (1972), Ryan and Abel (1973), Lidman and Bawden
(1974), Morzuch, Weaver and Helmberger (1980), Reed and Riggins (1981), Bailey and Wom-
ack (1985), Duffy, Richardson and Whlgenant (1987), Ahouissoussi, McIntosh and Wetzstein
(1995), Govindasamy and Jin (1998). Single commodity studies are potentially incomplete
because they fail to incorporate all alternative uses of land. Moreover, single-equation mod-
els, unlike multiple-equation models, fail to capture the interaction among the error terms.
Since acreage decisions are made among competing commodities, a system framework is the
appropriate modeling technique. Such a technique incorporates contemporaneous covariance
of disturbances across the equations and yields efficient estimators (Banerjee, 2004). There
have been relatively few papers extending the Nerlove model or other acreage response mod-
els to a system of multiple crops. Binkley and McKinzie (1984), Kraker and Paddock (1985),
Bewley, Young, and Colman (1987), Barten and Vanloot (1996), Holt (1999), and Coyle
(1999) are examples.
Since a system of equations provides information about the allocation of land (which is
fixed in supply) to any one use and its substitutability to other uses, Binkley and McK-
inzie (1984) specify a system of crop acreage demands as a function of expected net returns
and government programs. However, Binkley and McKinzie’s analysis has some serious lim-
itations. Even though they consider behavioural constraints such as convexity and linear
homogeneity, they fail to discuss separability, adding-up, duality and assumptions necessary
for symmetry in an acreage demand model. Moreover, Binkley and McKinzie discuss symme-
try conditions, but do not use or test for symmetry in their empirical analysis. The system
approach typically can accommodate behavioural constraints and imposing such theoretical
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restrictions as symmetry, homogeneity, and curvature (say, convexity in prices of the profit
function) which are important for two reasons. First, these testable restrictions may be used
to validate the theoretical framework. Second, imposing these restrictions may be useful in
improving the efficiency of estimation, as well as improving the usefulness of empirical results
for policy analysis.
Since a system of crop acreage models deals with allocation of land for multiple outputs,
the shares allocated to each of the crops (which act as probabilities) are non-negative and they
all add up to unity. In the literature, a multinomial logit functional form has been adopted
for acreage demands so that predicted shares are non-negative for all possible prices. Kraker
and Paddock (1985), and Bewley, Young and Colman (1987) have all used the Theil’s (1969)
multinomial extension of the linear logit model to specify a system of crop acreage demands
conditional on all crop output prices and total crop acreage. However, they do not highlight
behavioral foundations for a system of acreage demands through the links, for example,
between acreage demands and a behavioral model such as competitive profit maximization.
Moreover, some disadvantages with the multinomial logit approach are that the multinomial
logit models tend to become increasingly complex with an increase of the number of crops
(while other functional forms such as translog share equations yield positive predicted shares
over the sample period), each logit equation must share a common term, coefficients in
individual share equations are not identified, and any variable having a significant influence
on one share must have a significant influence on all shares (Bewley, Young and Colman,
1987).
Since model diagnostic issues such as multicollinearity are common in multiproduct mod-
els of the acreage response system, crop acreage demands are commonly misspecified by
adopting highly restrictive functional forms. In doing so, acreage response models have omit-
ted many of the possible cross-price effects between crops (e.g. Burt and Worthington, 1988).
Coyle (1993) presents an alternative approach to the specification of systems of crop acreage
responses by adopting restrictions on coefficients implied by fundamental behavioral theory.
Given the assumption of weak separability between broad groups of enterprises (crops and
livestock), Coyle’s two-stage aggregation model specifies a linear system of acreage equations
as a function of all product prices, all variable input prices, levels of quasi-fixed capital and
total amount of crop acreages by assuming (expected) profit maximization and by applying
duality theory. The effects of multicollinearity in the system are reduced because of separa-
bility and dynamic specifications. Further, the model developed by Coyle (1993) is based on
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formal economic models, and therefore it takes into account the reciprocity, homogeneity and
adding-up restrictions. From the standpoint of behavioral consistency, Coyle’s dual approach
to estimate area allocation decisions is a significant addition to the previous contributions by
Binkley and McKinzie (1984) and Bewley, Young and Colman (1987).
The constraints imposed by total acreage have not been incorporated into acreage demand
models specifications reported in the literature (as they have been for other agricultural supply
models, for instance, by Chambers and Lee, 1986) and estimates of acreage scale elasticities
defined as the response of a particular crop area to an increase in total agricultural land
typically have not been reported. Barten and Vanloot (1996) by emphasizing scale elasticities
derive a system of (linear) acreage allocation models using the basic mean-variance utility
framework. The system they estimate represents a first-order differential acreage allocation
model. The authors show that estimates of price and scale elasticities may be readily obtained
from their model. The Barten and Vanloot’s specification is useful in estimating acreage
response with time-series data but has limited application to cross-sectional or panel data.
Holt (1999) extends Barten and Vanloot’s analysis to deal with cross-sectional and panel
data by showing that a levels version of the basic Barten and Vanloot’s acreage allocation
model is readily attainable, and derives an acreage allocation model as a function of total
acreages available, expected net returns and state-specific dummy variables. Holt uses the
same framework as Barten and Vanloot, which is consistent with certainty equivalent profit
maximization and constant absolute risk aversion, and so his model is useful for maintaining
the theoretical properties of homogeneity, symmetry and adding-up.
The acreage response models that incorporate risk effects have been modeled for com-
modities on a single equation basis, for instance, by Traill (1978), Just (1974), and Krause,
Lee and Koo (1995). The single equation nature of these supply models can only be a par-
tial representation of the more complete supply system that may represent the agricultural
producer’s decision problem. Thus, generalizing risk response models to system of equations
may be desirable, and it has been pursued by Chavas and Holt (1990), Coyle (1999), and Lin
and Dismukes (2007).
Under assumptions of certainty or risk neutrality, complete supply systems are commonly
applied using flexible functional forms for dual representations of technology (such as profit
and cost functions). Coyle (1999) has extended this dual approach under risk which greatly
simplifies the derivation of coherent systems of output supply and input demand equations.
His analysis, however, relies on a mean-variance objective function and this approach, which
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is consistent with constant risk aversion and normality of profit distribution, is an approxima-
tion to the more general expected utility model. Chavas and Holt (1990) developed a system
of acreage supply response models under general expected utility maximization. They found
that the acreage decision is a function of expected net returns for the own and compet-
ing crops, variance-covariance of the net returns, and farm household wealth. Chavas and
Holt’s framework is also useful for maintaining the theoretical constraints of homogeneity
and symmetry.
In general, reviewing the literature pertaining to acreage response shows that future prices
or adaptive expectations, and the weighted three-year moving average of variances are the
main proxies used for expected prices and expected variance-covariance of prices, respectively.
Moreover, since single commodity studies fail to incorporate all alternative uses of land, the
importance of considering risk in a multicrop framework and cross-commodity risk effects is
apparent.
3.2 Literature Review Pertaining to the Impact of De-
coupled Payments on Acreage Response
By recognizing that domestic farm support programs could distort trade, in the 1994 Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), member
countries of the WTO decided to reduce the trade distortions that are caused by domestic
farm subsidies. As a result, members were provided with incentives to shift their supports
for farmers toward decoupled income support by defining these subsidies as non-actionable.
The impact of any type of government payments on acreage decisions depends on the
nature of the program through which support is provided, the incentives that it creates and
the behaviour of farmers in response to those incentives. If government payments affect
the relative profitability of alternative crops, profit maximizing farmers are likely to adjust
their production plans in response to such payments. In the short run, farmers’ responses
are likely to be reflected in the amount of land allocated to alternative crops and amounts
of variable inputs (such as fertilizer and labour). In the long run, farmers’ responses are
likely to be reflected in the level of investment in machinery and other quasi-fixed assets (and
possibly in the total amount of land in production). If the amount of government payments
increases with the volume of production and the additional revenue obtained from expanding
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production (the returns obtained from selling the crop plus government payments) exceeds
the additional costs of that production, then the above effects (changes in the amount of land
allocated to alternative crops in the short-run and in the level of investment in machinery
and other quasi-fixed assets in the long-run) would be apparent.
Farm programs are thought of as being coupled if there is a strong or direct link between
the determination of the program benefit and the farmer’s production and market conditions
(such as prices). In contrast, farm programs are thought of as being decoupled if program
benefits do not depend on the farmer’s production or market conditions. Although decou-
pled payments are determined based on existing information pertaining to the commodities
production, actual production in the current year does not affect the level of payments. The
figures used to determine payments relate to historical data. Thus, decoupled payments do
not depend on current production or on actual market prices. Considering this, it seems that
it would be unlikely to find evidence of an effect of decoupled payments on acreages response.
However, there are several mechanisms in which decoupled payments can indirectly affect
agricultural production (OECD, 2001; OECD, 2004). These are as follows: first, if farmers
are constrained by credit limitations, then the additional income generated by decoupled
payments may increase their access to borrowed capital. With the opportunity to borrow
more funds, a farm operator’s profit maximizing production levels could increase1. If farmers
face capital constraints, then decoupled payments may relax these constraints by influencing
the supply of loans to agricultural producers. If the additional income is provided by a known
stream of future decoupled payments (rather than the uncertain stream of producers’ market
returns), lenders consider the risk of non-repayment to be lowered and so they will be more
willing to lend to farmers. Also, decoupled payments may increase the value of fixed assets,
particularly land, which represents an increase in farmers’ equity. Hence, the farmers’ ability
to secure loans may be increased.
Second, decoupled payments could affect farmer expectations by linking current decisions
to future payments. Expectations about future payment changes could alter current pro-
duction decisions. If a farmer believes future decoupled payments will be based on current
production, they may increase the production of those crops for which they expect to receive
1Although decoupled payments have the potential to increase the liquidity of credit constrained farmers,
for this to apply, firstly there has to be a market failure in capital markets. Imperfect capital markets provide
an insufficient supply of capital to agricultural borrowers. Also, imperfect capital markets provide a supply
of capital at a price (interest rate) which exceeds its opportunity cost in other uses. Secondly, farmers have
to use the funds provided by decoupled payments in investment for enhancing production rather than for any
other uses.
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the future payments1.
Third, if production is unprofitable at prevailing market prices, then the additional income
provided by decoupled payments may enhance the ability of farmers to cover fixed and variable
production costs and, therefore, decoupled payments may increase production in the short
run2. Also, the existence of decoupled payments may prompt some farmers to remain in
agriculture, rather than exiting the industry. In this case, the provision of decoupled payments
would result in production of supported crops being maintained at a higher level than the
case when decoupled payments are not provided. Moreover, farmers may be operating on
the downward part of their average total cost curve, i.e. under increasing returns to scale. In
this case, it would be economically rational to use some or all of the additional revenue from
decoupled payments to expand production.
Fourth, decoupled payments may accrue to landowners through higher land rents and
land values. This can lead to land remaining in agriculture. If the farmer is the landowner,
this can make credit more accessible to farmers, and therefore can affect production.
Fifth, decoupled payments that serve to increase wealth may lead to changes in the risk
preferences of farm operators. If farmers are risk averse, the increase in wealth created by
the payments may make farmers less risk averse and cause them to expand production by
planting more risky crops (wealth effect). Moreover, if decoupled payments vary inversely
with market prices, since this would reduce income variability, these payments may lead the
farm operator to increase production (insurance effect).
Therefore, decoupled payments may affect farm operators’ production decisions by al-
tering their access to capital, their expectations of future payments, their production costs’
coverage, or their risk preferences and income variability. These relationships all posit that
decoupled payments indirectly affect production decisions. Some researchers find little ev-
idence of decoupled payments influencing production (Goodwin and Mishra, 2005), while
others claim that the relationship may be significant (Hennessy, 1998). In what follows, we
review six sets of available literature about how decoupled payments affect production. We
briefly3 review the available literature on how decoupled payments affect production by re-
laxing the capital constraints faced by farmers, by altering farmers’ expectations of future
1For there to be a link between current payments and these production decisions, farmers have to believe
that the existence of payments today is a predictor of payments in the future, or they have to believe that
current levels of payments provide an indication of what future payment levels would be.
2For this to apply, farmers must choose to use decoupled payments to cover production costs, rather than
to increase their consumption or savings.
3See Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) for more details.
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payments, by reducing farm exits, and by increasing land values. Then, we assess the studies
which examine the affect of decoupled payments on production in general. We end with
a focus on the literature regarding the effects of decoupled payments on risk attitude and
income variability, and therefore the production changing effects of decoupled payments.
3.2.1 Credit Constraints Effects
Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor (2000) test the “pecking order theory of firm investment” in
the context of farm businesses. This theory predicts that firms initially prefer to use lower
cost internal funds to finance investments, followed later by higher cost external funds as
necessary. More specifically, they examine whether the investment decisions of farms oper-
ating in imperfect financial markets (where there are gaps between a farm’s costs of internal
and external sources of investment funds) are sensitive to the availability of internal funds.
They use farm-level panel data for 1990-1994 from the state of Illinois and estimate a si-
multaneous farm financial system—a system of long term debt, short term debt, investment
and leasing payments equations with cash flow (which includes the government payments) as
an exogenous variable in the system among other variables—using a GMM procedure. The
results support the pecking order theory, indicating that a strong cash flow leads farmers to
increase investment while reducing debts or refraining from borrowing. An additional dollar
of cash flow in the full sample of farms leads to about 0.60 dollar in additional investment.
By splitting the sample into high credit risk farms and low credit risk farms, the authors
find that an additional dollar of cash flow leads to about 0.70 dollar in additional investment
among high credit risk farms and about 0.50 dollar in additional investment among low credit
risk farms.
Roe, Somwaru, and Diao (2003) examine whether the production flexibility contract pay-
ments (PFC)—an instrument of the U.S. 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
(FAIR) Act—to farmers have intertemporal effects on resource allocation and production
decisions to the extent that they may be trade distorting. They consider this issue in an
intertemporal and economy wide context. First, the authors examine the link between PFC
payments and land values by a simple regression analysis using data from statistical reporting
districts in Minnesota for the period 1994 to 2000. Their results suggest a positive correlation
between government payments and land value, a ten percent change in government payments
led to a 3.24 percent change in land values between 1994 and 2000. This appreciation in
30
land values affects investment by increasing farmer’s access to credit as land is used as col-
lateral. Next, the authors examine the effects of PFC payments on resource allocation and
production under perfect and imperfect capital markets using an intertemporal three sector
general equilibrium (GE) model of the U.S. economy based on the year 1997. PFC payments
are incorporated in the model as a lump-sum transfer from urban households to the rural
households who own land and undertake agricultural production. PFC payments are assumed
to be 6.11 billion dollars in 1997 and are paid to farmers in each period of time from 1997
in perpetuity. The steady state solutions of the model with and without (considered as the
benchmark) the PFC payments are compared. The results indicate that if agricultural capital
markets are complete, then the key effects of payments over time are to increase the value of
land (the 6.112 billion dollars payment, in the short run, causes land values to exceed their
values in the benchmark by almost 9 percent, and by about 8.3 percent in long-run), but they
have no effect on production. If capital markets are not complete (or liquidity constraints
prevail in agriculture), there are production effects, but they are small (0.18 percent) in the
short run1. In the long run, payments cause no resource allocation and output effects2 and
the only long-term effect of payments is to increase land values and land rental rates. Table
3.3 summarizes papers related to the credit constraint effects of decoupled payments.
Table 3.3: Some Studies related to the Credit Constraint Effects of Decoupled Payments
Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Barry et al. (2000) To examine the sensitivity of
farm investment decisions in im-
perfect financial markets to the
availability of gov’t payments
Farm-level panel data for 1990-
1994 from Illinois is used to esti-
mate a simultaneous farm finan-
cial system by GMM method
An additional dollar of cash flow
leads to about 0.60 dollar in ad-
ditional investment
Roe et al. (2003) To examine the production effect
of PFC
An intertemporal 3-sector GE
model is applied to 1997 U.S.
data
Increase in PFC (decoupled pay-
ment) by $6.11 bn leads to in-
crease in production by 0.18 %
and decrease in rental rate on
capital by 0.1%
3.2.2 Expectations Effects
Tileu and Roberts (1998) analyze decoupled payments in the U.S. and European Union.
They argue that farmers, based on their past experience, may be justified in believing that
establishing a basis of high production may provide the basis for higher payments under future
1In this case, direct payments tend to cause capital deepening (the rental rate of capital in agriculture
declines by 0.1 per cent in the first 10 years as compared to the benchmark), to increase the employment of
labour, and to increase the value of land.
2In the long run, the differences in the rental rates of capital within agriculture and within the rest of the
economy are arbitraged away and there is convergence to the benchmark.
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supports, and this would give them an incentive to expand output. Therefore, expectations
about the impact of current production decisions on future support could reduce the extent
of possible decoupling and lead to market distortions. If a farmer believes that a future
government payment will update a crop base acreage based on how much crop is produced
today, he/she may substitute the production of a currently more profitable crop for the
production of a program crop.
Lagerkvist (2005) examines how agricultural policy uncertainty affects farmland invest-
ment incentives. He considers two types of uncertainty related to 2003 Mid Term Review
(MTR)1 reform of the direct payment system within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
of the European Union area payment: (i) uncertainty about the timing of the reform; and
(ii) uncertainty about the level of post-reform payment. Lagerkvist develops a dynamic
stochastic programming model of the short-term required rate of return (RR) for farmland
investment to capture farmland investment incentives and then derives solutions for the ad-
justment of the RR of farmland, based on expectations about the timing of an area payment
reform and the size of the post-reform area payments. Numerical analysis based on survey
data from a sample of Swedish farmers, designed to assess the subjective probability beliefs
(expectations) of farmers concerning reform of the CAP area payment system, indicates that
the pre-reform RR taking into account timing uncertainty is less than the RR with complete
certainty. Moreover, the pre-reform RR under both timing and post-reform area payment
uncertainty and a non-positive correlation between the timing of the reform and the post-
reform payment is found to be less than the RR when only timing uncertainty is considered.
Generally, Lagerkvist suggests that lack of complete information causes inefficiency by induc-
ing farm operators to over-invest before the reform date if they expect a reform that is likely
to reduce their area payment.
Sumner (2003) analyzes, among other things, the implications of the Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRIA)2 for crops production. The most interesting change
in the FSRIA is the updating of the base areas and base yields from the fixed 1981-1985 bases
in the old law. This updating in the 2002 Farm Bill caused farmers to revise estimates of
the probability of future updating. This means that, in deciding what to plant on payment-
base acres, the effect of current production on the present value of future payments becomes
1In 2003 the European Council agreed upon a new reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This
reform was decided in the context of a mid-term review of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform.
2The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 was superseded by the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002.
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a more important factor. If farmers expect a large effect from current area and yield on
the base used for future payments, then they will plant more of the program crop now to
build a program base for the future (i.e. a link between current production decisions and
anticipated payments). Sumner constructs the degree of linkage between payments with
potentially updated bases and current production and evaluates how much a current update
affects that degree of linkage. The degree of linkage depends on the probability that the
program remains operative in the future, the probability that an update occurs, how the new
base affects payments compared to how the current program operates in that regard and
other factors (the expected future payment rate relative to the current payment rate and the
expected marginal effect of current area planted on the new base). The degree of linkage is
sensitive to the probabilities and discount factor used. A high degree of linkage implies that
payments such as the decoupled direct payments with potentially updated bases in the future
have a strong link to current production.
McIntosh, Shogren and Dohlman (2007) examine two features of the U.S. Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002: (i) the prospect of earning countercyclical
payments (CCPs) on the farmer’s endowment of historically produced base crop acreage
when prices of these crops fall below predetermined target prices; and (ii) the option for
farmers to update the allocation of base crops—from which direct payments (DPs) and CCPs
are determined—to reflect recent (1998-2001) production history. They use experimental
economics to study the effects of CCPs and base acre updating on supply response under
price and policy uncertainty. Each participant is endowed with a fixed number of tokens
(i.e., acres) and asked to allocate them to a Blue option (representing a program crop) and
a Red option (representing a non-program crop or a crop that has not been planted earlier).
These allocation decisions are made under three policy situations, each incorporating direct
payments (DPs): (a) price uncertainty without CCPs; (b) price uncertainty with CCPs;
and (c) price uncertainty as well as uncertainty regarding base acreage updating (policy
uncertainty) with CCPs. The authors explore the panel data allocation choices using a
random-effects model and the results indicate that with CCPs, laboratory decision makers
increased their investment in the the program crop (Blue option) relative to the absence
of CCPs, despite payments being decoupled from current production decisions. When base
acreage updating and policy uncertainty is added, they continued to allocate more acres
toward the program crop than under a more policy-neutral environment1. These results
1There was a 5.43 per cent shift in base acres towards the program crop with the CCPs case. Under the
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provide evidence that both the CCPs and the possibility of future base updating introduce
new incentives for farmers that make cropping decisions based on government payments,
rather than expected market returns.
Coble, Miller and Hudson (2007), also, analyze the impact of two instruments of the
U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRIA), direct and counter-cyclical
payments, on the producer expectations for base acreage and yield updating (and therefore
on incentives to alter production decisions). They use survey data from Iowa and Mississippi
farmers during 2005 to assess the value that producers place on the opportunity to update
base acres and program yields using a contingent valuation approach and to gain insight
into the subjective expectations of farmers for base updating and whether these expectations
might influence current plantings. In the survey, they ask questions regarding the probability
of base and program yield update occurring for direct and counter-cyclical payments, whether
payment rates will change or remain the same and if farmers made any adjustments in current
acreage to affect future program payments. Results suggest that on average producers think
that the chance of updating in direct and counter-cyclical payments is about 40 per cent,
and only 17 per cent of these producers indicate making adjustments to acreage or yields
in anticipation of updating. Moreover, the authors use a censored probit model with the
dependent variable as the willingness to accept (WTA) a buyout of a potential base updating
opportunity (which captures the value that farmers place on the opportunity to update base
acres) and independent variables as expectation of an update, age, risk aversion, farm income,
etc. They find that the WTA increases with a greater expectation of an update and a higher
percent of farm income. Based on the regression results, the mean WTA across both states
is 48.16 dollars per acre. Table 3.4 summarizes papers related to the expectation effects of
decoupled payments.
3.2.3 Farmers Entry/Exit and Structural Change Effects
Chau and de Gorter (2005) examine the effects of decoupled payments on exit decisions by
farmers, and therefore on production. They address the question as to whether decoupled
payments subsidize production and at times cross-subsidize exports. Using the two-stage
profit maximization problem of a producer (first stage, whether or not to incur the fixed cost;
and second stage, the choice of an output level given input prices, target price for domestic
consumption and world prices), the authors develop a generalized theoretical model of cross-
policy risk case there was a shift of 7.92 per cent in base acres towards the program crop.
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Table 3.4: Some Studies related to the Expectation Effects of Decoupled Payments
Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Lagerkvist (2005) To examine farm investment ef-
fects of area payments under
timing and support uncertainty
through a dynamic stochastic
programming model
Numerical analysis based on sur-
vey data from a sample of
Swedish farmers
Expected decrease in area pay-
ments leads to over-invest
McIntosh et al. (2007) To examine the production effect
of CCPs under price and policy
uncertainty
Estimation of a random-effects
model using data obtained from
an experiment
Policy uncertainty leads to a
shift of 7.92% in base acres to-
wards the program crop
Coble et al. (2007) To examine the effect of occur-
ring base acreage updating for
CCPs and to analysis the ef-
fect of these expectations on the
value that farmers place on the
opportunity to update base acres
A censored probit model using
survey data from Iowa and Mis-
sissippi farmers in 2005
A greater expectation of an up-
date leads to increase in willing-
ness to accept a buyout of the
right to update
subsidization in which farmers receive both coupled and decoupled support. The size of
coupled and decoupled taxpayer financed income support is modeled by an ad valorem subsidy
(which is incorporated in the model through the unit revenue farmers receive for exports)
and a lump sum subsidy (which is incorporated in the model through a fixed revenue),
respectively. There are farmer-specific fixed costs and variable costs. From the second stage
of profit maximization, the authors obtain the result that decoupled payments do not affect
farm level output decisions, but these payments can impact aggregate output by distorting the
exit incentives in the first stage of profit maximization. Decoupled payments allow farmers to
incur fixed costs, and thus allow those with higher fixed costs to stay in production. Otherwise
these farmers would have exited the industry. The authors employ their theoretical framework
in an empirical example using the production and cost structure of the U.S. wheat sector to
show the comparative effects of loan deficiency payments (LDPs)—as a coupled payment—to
production flexibility contract (PFC) payments—as a decoupled payment. The results are
broadly consistent with their analytical findings, and indicate that in the long run with the
possibility of exits, totally removing PFC payments leads three per cent of the farmers to
exit the industry, and leads to a reduction in production and exports.
Gaisford and Kerr (2001) look at the effects of decoupled payments on long-run entry
and exit decisions. Subsidies based on historic output levels increase long-run output above
the level that otherwise would have prevailed, because they are typically designed to keep
some farmers in business that would otherwise go bankrupt and have an incentive to exit the
industry. As a result, imports will be lower or exports will be higher than would otherwise
have been expected.
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3.2.4 Land Markets Effects
Schertz and Johnston (1998) conduct a study in four major U.S. agricultural regions, the
Great Plains, the Corn Belt, the South and California, based on the responses of farm man-
agers or operators to the production flexibility contract payments (PFC) as an instrument
of the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act. Based on the survey
results, the authors conclude that the PFC payments inflate land prices and land rents be-
cause of their non-stochastic nature. In the case of cash leases much of the payments pass
on to the landowner by increased rents. In the case of crop share leases, payments create
incentives for the landowner to adjust the lease to take advantage of the PFC payments, for
example in some cases landowners shifted to cash leases.
Gohin, Guyomard, and le Mouel (2000) provide a theoretical framework for analyzing
the agricultural supply responses (land and production) to various support policy instru-
ments and examine whether the Green Box specific criteria for decoupled income support are
well-designed (no or minimal trade distortion effects). They use a static partial equilibrium
model with two perfectly competitive mono-product sectors (with a constant returns to scale
production technology) using a variable input, a specific factor and a fixed allocatable factor
such as land. They consider domestic support instruments such as output subsidies, variable
input subsidies, and decoupled payments based on the specific factor, and on land. Optimal
output supply and derived input demands are determined by a two-stage profit maximization
process1. Land prices are determined endogenously by the market clearing condition for land.
Land prices are computed under two alternative assumptions: land homogeneity and hetero-
geneity. Comparative static analysis indicates that production effects induced by a policy
instrument depend on whether this instrument is applied only in one sector or in both sectors,
whether this instrument is implemented alone or in conjunction with other instruments and
whether the production technology is different. When a same direct support instrument (or
a same set of instruments) is applied in two countries with different agricultural production
technologies and factor mobility situations, it may lead to very different production effects2.
Hence, since the Green Box decoupling criteria do not take into account these aspects related
to production conditions (which vary widely across countries), they may prove to be insuffi-
1In the first stage, the output and variable input optimal quantities are determined for a given land
allocation. In the second stage, optimal land allocation is determined by considering the price of land in
optimization.
2Comparative static analysis shows that land-based direct payments affect land prices, land allocation and,
hence, output supplies. Thus, such a policy instrument may not be considered as decoupled from production.
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cient both to ensure decoupling and to take account of the relative degree of decoupling of
various income support instruments.
Dewbre, Anton and Thompson (2001) employ the policy evaluation matrix (PEM) model
to examine both analytically and empirically the effects of direct payments on trade and
income transfer efficiency. The authors consider the four main categories of support provided
to crop producers in OECD countries: market price support, area payments or payments
based on land use (one requiring production for eligibility and the other that land be kept in
arable use), payments based on use of purchased inputs, and output payments. The analysis
is based on a two-region (OECD countries and rest of the world) model of equilibrium in the
world market for a representative crop. Analytical solutions to this model are developed to
compare the production, trade, and income effects of the different support measures. The
paper focuses exclusively on the effects of support measures produced through their incidence
on relative prices. These relative prices measure the effect on production, trade, and farm
income of a given change in support provided by any one of the three categories of direct
payments, relative to the estimated impact on production, trade and farm income of the
same monetary change in market price support. The effect of area payments on production,
trade and farm income, which arises because of their impact on land prices, is compared with
market price support as the reference category. The analytical results show that there is a
decreasing marginal impact on production, trade, and farm income for all support measures
studied when there is a large initial rate of support. In theory, depending on the initial
patterns of support and the size of the country in trade, any ranking of policy measures is
possible. Then, the authors employ a policy simulation analysis of the model using data from
two base years—1987 and 1998—and parameter estimates derived mainly from reviews of
published studies. The results from model simulation indicate that the area payments are a
less trade distorting way of supporting farm incomes as compared to the other three forms
of support. Within the area payments, the one requiring only land remain in agricultural
use has a smaller effect on trade than the one which requires production of eligible crops1.
Input subsidies have a larger impact on trade as compared to the market price supports.
Results obtained in the analysis show that input subsidies prove to be the most inefficient
form of support in terms of providing income support while area payments prove to be the
most efficient.
1In 1998, production impacts ratios of area payments (requiring land be kept in arable use) with respect
to market price support are 0.09 in U.S., 0.06 in EU and 0.10 in Canada.
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Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) examine the effect of government payments (the
production flexibility contract payments (PFC), loan deficiency payments (LDP) and other
payments) on land rents (and consequently on production) using data from the 1992 and
1997 U.S. Agricultural Census across 75,858 farms. Based on the economic theory that land
rents should equal expected returns less payments for factors other than land (and including
government payments), the authors regress land rents on net returns and government pay-
ments. Results of fixed-effect model indicate that government payments had a significant
impact on land rents. For the 1997 cross section, rents increase between 0.33 dollar and 1.55
dollars for each government payment dollar (in 1997 PFC payments were the major govern-
ment payments). For the 1992 cross section, the effect on land rents is smaller reflecting the
transitory component of government payments in that year.
Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magne (2003) use U.S. data to estimate the effect of gov-
ernment payments on farmland values for 13,606 farms from 1998 to 2001. The net present
value of a farmland is the sum of expected future cash flows discounted according to the risk
of these cash flows. Cash flows from the same source have the same discount factor. The au-
thors consider three sources of future cash flows: market returns, government payments and
the non-agricultural returns to land. In their regression models, they consider determinants
of land rents as follows: market price index, returns (excluding government payments) to the
typical acre of land, and the normalized yield indicator (showing the inherent profitability
of one farm relative to other farms) that represent agricultural returns from the market; the
total value of housing permits issued in the county in which the farm is located, population
density, and population growth rates that represent the capital gains inherent in land in areas
facing non-agricultural demands for agricultural land at the rural-urban interface; produc-
tion flexibility contract payments (PFC), loan deficiency payments (LDP), disaster assistance
payments, conservation reserve program payments (CRP), and an aggregate of other farm
program payments. In the regression analysis, each government program has been considered
separately as programs differ according to support provided. Also, the uncertainty associ-
ated with each program differs. The result of probability-weighted bootstrapping approach
confirms that government payments affect land values. For example, PFC payments have a
positive and significant effect on farmland values, with a dollar increase in PFC payments
leading to an increase in land values of 4.94 dollars per-acre .
Frandsen, Gersfelt and Jensen (2003) employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model to analyze the production and trade impacts of decoupling income supports of the
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more recent reform (Agenda 2000) of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU.
The benchmark model is constructed for the period 1997-2013 and captures the structure
of the domestic support in the EU. The benchmark model is compared with the scenario
where all domestic support is converted into a single region specific decoupled payment to
land (among two other scenarios). Under this scenario, there is a substantial increase of 75.1
per cent in land prices for the EU as a whole. If all EU countries are treated individually,
land prices also increase. Moreover, the results indicate a decrease in the production of
wheat, other grains, oilseeds, bovine animals, and cotton by 6.9, 5.6, 8.9, 11, and 63 per cent
respectively. These decreases reflect the high level of domestic support for these commodities
under Agenda 2000. The authors conclude that the existing domestic support payments in the
EU affect production decisions and, hence, distort trade. Further, the value of this support
is capitalized in significantly higher European land prices than would otherwise prevail.
Gohin (2006) employs a static, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
of the EU15 economy with perfect competition in all markets and constant returns to scale
to analyze the production impact of the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Mid Term
Review (MTR). Using 1995 data to calibrate the technological and political parameters, the
author adopts two different assumptions about the modeling of Agenda 2000 direct payments.
Under the first assumption, arable crop direct payments will be fully capitalised in the land
rental price at the 2008 projection (the capitalisation rate is 100 per cent) and beef premiums
are not constrained by any maximum limit, which represents current modelling of Agenda
2000 direct payments in different studies and is called the standard approach. Under the
second assumption, arable crop direct payments are partly capitalised in land (by 50 per
cent) at the 2008 projection and beef premiums are only paid on a limited number of animals.
They call this the alternative model. Under both assumptions, direct payments are based
on land use and therefore increase land rents by 164 per cent under the first assumption and
38.5 per cent under the second, and the direct payments seem to have a moderate degree of
coupling. The 2003 MTR reform requires the decoupling of direct support by the creation of
a Single Farm Payment (SFP). In his simulation, Gohin assumes that the CAP MTR entails
Agenda 2000 arable crop direct payments are reduced by 90 per cent, the slaughter premium
on adult animals is reduced by 80 per cent and the suckler cow premium and the special beef
premium are reduced by 50 per cent and 90 per cent respectively. It is also assumed that the
SFP has no market effects. The simulation results indicate that under both assumptions, land
rents decrease by at least 80 per cent. There are also negative impacts on arable crop and
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beef production. The results of the standard model indicate soft wheat and beef production
decrease by 1.6 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively (similar to the other studies). The
results of the alternative model (which acknowledges imperfections in the land market as
well the eligibility rules of beef premiums) are in the same direction but the magnitude of
the impact differs with a decrease of 7.3 per cent in soft wheat production and a 1.2 per cent
decrease in beef production. The varying results in the two models suggest that the impacts
of the CAP MTR are sensitive to the modeling of the Agenda 2000 direct payments. Table
3.5 summarizes papers related to the land market effects of decoupled payments.
Table 3.5: Some Studies related to the Land Market Effects of Decoupled Payments
Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Gohin et al. (2000) To analyze theoretically the agri-
cultural supply responses (land
and production) to various sup-
port policy instruments includ-
ing direct payments based on
land
Comparative static analysis us-
ing a static partial equilibrium
model
Land-based direct payments af-
fect land allocation and so out-
put supplies
Dewbre et al. (2001) To examine the production and
trade effects of area payments
(among other forms of support)
using their effects on land prices
A policy simulation analysis of
the policy evaluation matrix
(PEM) model in OECD coun-
tries using data 1998
In 1998 production impacts ra-
tios of area payments (requiring
land be kept in arable use) with
respect to market price support
are 0.09 in U.S., 0.06 in EU and
0.10 in Canada
Roberts et al. (2003) To examine the effect of govern-
ment payments (PFC, LDP and
other payments) on land rents
(and therefore on production)
Estimating fixed effect model (of
land rents equal to expected
returns less payments for fac-
tors other than land and includ-
ing government payments) using
data from the 1992 and 1997 U.S.
Agricultural Census across 75858
farms
In 1997 cross section, for each
government payment dollar (in
1997 the production flexibility
contract payments were the ma-
jor government payments) rents
increase between 0.33 dollar and
1.55 dollars
Goodwin et al. (2003) To estimate the effect of U.S.
government payments on farm-
land values
Estimation of the net present
value model of a farmland which
includes government payments
using probability-weighted boot-
strapping approach for 13606
farms from 1998 to 2001
A dollar increase in PFC pay-
ments leads to an increase in land
values of 4.94 dollars per-acre
Frandsen et al. (2003) To analyze the production and
trade impacts of decoupling in-
come supports of the Agenda
2000 of the CAP in the EU
Employ a multi-regional, static
computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model which captures the
features of the domestic support
in the EU for the period 1997-
2013
Under the scenario that all do-
mestic support is converted into
a single region specific decoupled
payment to land, there is a sub-
stantial increase of 75.1% in land
prices for the EU as a whole
Gohin (2006) To analyze the production im-
pact of the 2003 Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) Mid Term
Review (MTR)
Employs a static, multi-sector
computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model of the EU15 econ-
omy and policy simulation based
on the 1995 data as an initial
point
Agenda 2000 area payments in-
crease land rents by 38.5% and
the 2003 MTR single farm pay-
ments decrease land rents by
81.8%
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3.2.5 General Effects
Adams, Westhoff, Willott and Young (2001) study empirically the production effect of fixed
production flexibility contract payments (PFC) and market loss assistance (MLA) payments
as two instruments of the U.S. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of
1996. They examine the effect of PFC and MLA payments on the total area planted to wheat,
corn, sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, rice and soybeans in eleven states using data for the years
1997-2001. Two hypotheses of whether the PFC and MLA payments have an impact on total
area planted to the major crops and whether the PFC and MLA payments (as decoupled
payments) have a different impact on total area planted than do returns from market sales
and marketing loans (as coupled payments) are tested. For the first hypothesis, the authors
estimate two econometrics equations, in one equation total area is regressed on state dummy
variables and sum of expected real gross per acre market returns (by assuming naive expecta-
tions) and loan programs, in another equation the sum of four income sources (gross market
returns, marketing loans, PFC payments, and MLA payments) is added to the first equa-
tion as a single independent variable. The results indicate that PFC and MLA payments do
have some direct effect on the area planted (the estimated elasticity on PFC/MLA payment
variable is 0.026). For the second hypothesis, the authors also estimate two econometrics
equations, in one equation total area is regressed on state dummy variables and the sum of
four income sources, in another equation the sum of PFC and MLA payments is added to the
first equation as a single independent variable. The results do not provide a clear indication
whether PFC and MLA payments have different effects on area planted than market returns
and marketing loans. The authors conclude that although the results in this study provides
weak evidence that PFC and MLA payments do affect directly the total area devoted to crop
production, there are some indirect mechanisms by which acreage decisions could be affected
by decoupled payments. It should be noted that the results in the study are based on the
assumptions that the elasticities are the same across states and on naive expectations on part
of the farmers’ in the computation of expected market returns and expected MLA payments.
Guyomard, Le Mouel, and Gohin (2004) analyse and compare four agricultural income
support programs (an output subsidy, a land subsidy, and decoupled payments with and
without mandatory production) according to their ability to support farmer’ incomes, in-
crease the number of farmers, reduce negative externalities arising from non-land input use
and minimize trade effects (four policy objectives). To compare the impacts of the four
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income support programs, they are standardised to an equal budget cost basis. For each
policy objective, one program is considered to be more efficient than another if for the same
budget cost, the impact of the first program on this objective is greater than the impact
of the second program on the same objective. The authors’ one sector static model under
certainty is based on three equilibrium equations, representing equilibrium in the output mar-
ket (with aggregate supply equal to domestic demand and exports), equilibrium in the land
market (with aggregate supply equal to aggregate demand) and an exit/entry condition. The
exit/entry decisions depend on decoupled payments with mandatory production and so they
appear in the exit/entry condition and they increase the number of farmers. The decoupled
payments without mandatory production does not enter the three equilibrium equations. It
has thus no impact on the output price, the land price or the number of producers. It has a
positive impact on the individual profit of a producer and so on total profit, but no impact
on the other three policy targets. Two main conclusions from the analysis are obtained;
firstly, none of the four income support programs dominates others for the four policy goals.
Second, for each policy target, the ordering of the four income support programs depends on
conditions—elasticity of output supply with respect to land used and/or the derived demand
elasticity of land with respect to output—that cannot be predicted by theory alone. The
analytical results also indicate that the decoupled payments without mandatory production
is most efficient way of supporting farmers’ income with the least distortion of trade while
the decoupled payments with mandatory production are the most efficient in maintaining or
increasing the number of farmers.
Serra, Zilberman, Goodwin, and Hyvonen (2005b) assess the impact of decoupled pay-
ments on the use of crop protection inputs by analyzing the effect of the post-MacSharry
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms in the EU on the use of pest control inputs
(that have potentially negative effects on the environment) in two sectors - the cereal, and
oilseed and protein crop (COP) sectors. By decomposing the profit maximization problem
into two main problems: profit maximization and abatement cost minimization, optimal
crop supplies, input demands, and land allocations are obtained by applying the Hotelling-
Shephard lemma to the optimization problem. Using a two-step process, damage abatement
functions are specified to capture the contribution of the pest control inputs in reducing crop
damage in the first step, and the parameters of the crop protection products demand among
the two sectors are estimated. In the second step, the direct effect of area payments on
a system of crop supplies and land allocations is estimated. The optimal use of pesticides
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depends on output and land allocation which are directly affected by area payments. There-
fore, the authors derive the elasticity of demand for pest control inputs with respect to price
support measures and area payments. They hypothesize and find that the input response
to decoupled (area) payments is less than their response to price support measures, using
a sample of French farms over the period 1994 to 1999 (elasticity estimates with respect to
area payments is 0.35 and to price support is 1.04 for cereals, and to area payments is 0.39
and to price support is 1.20 for oilseeds and protein crops). It is suggested that the 1992
CAP reforms involved a certain degree of policy decoupling. However, decoupled payments,
though less distorting than price supports, continued to influence farmers’ decisions. Based
on the estimated parameters, the authors simulate the effects of shocking the model in ac-
cordance with the changes introduced by Agenda 2000 (decrease in cereal intervention prices
and increase in its area payments, and reduction in area payments for oilseeds and protein
crops) and the 2003 Mid-Term Review (combination of a number of direct payments such
as area payments into a single farm payment—SFP). The implementation of Agenda 2000
results in a reduction in the use of crop protection inputs slightly more than 3 per cent, and
a shift in land allocation away from oilseed and protein crops to cereals. Implementation
of the 2003 Mid-Term Review suggests the use of crop protection inputs declines by 11 per
cent, and cereal acreage and production fall while oilseeds and protein crops acreage remains
almost constant.
An alternative approach by Bastian et al. (2008) and Nagler et al. (2009) uses experimen-
tal economics techniques (laboratory markets) to assess the impacts of a decoupled policy
alternative called a buyout bond scheme on production decisions. Under the buyout bond
scheme, producers in receipt of a buyout bond would garner a guaranteed stream of income
during a transition period of fifteen to twenty five years in exchange for giving up all future
government program subsidies. This bond would have financial value and could be sold over
its life, allowing producers to receive income annually or in a lump sum. Data from five
experiment treatments, no policy, deficiency payment (i.e. coupled price-support treatment),
annually paid bond subsidy, and lump-sum bond subsidy, were analyzed through simple de-
scriptive statistics, using a standard convergence model, and graphically. The convergence
model provides a way to describe mean convergence levels over time and compare differences
in these convergence levels across experimental treatments. The results indicate that pro-
duction under the traditional deficiency-payment program treatment is higher than with no
policy in effect. In combined-policy scenarios where bond payments were preceded by cou-
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pled deficiency payments production drops to at or near levels with no policy in place. These
results suggest, in laboratory markets, bond schemes will act as fully decoupled programs
and will not introduce production distortions into the market. However, it should be noted
that these studies do not take into account the indirect impacts of a bond scheme policy such
as expected changes in income and wealth. Table 3.6 summarizes some papers related to the
general effect of decoupled payments.
Table 3.6: Some Studies related to the General Effect of Decoupled Payments
Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Adams et al. (2001) To examine empirically the pro-
duction effect of fixed produc-
tion flexibility contract payments
(PFC) and market loss assistance
(MLA) payments
OLS estimation of the total area
planted to 8 crops in eleven
states from 1997 to 2001 on PFC
and MLA (among other vari-
ables)
Acreage increases by 0.026
Guyomard et al. (2004) To examine the effect of decou-
pled payments with and without
mandatory production on farm-
ers’ income, number of farmers,
non-land input use and trade
Analytical one sector static
model under certainty based
on three equilibrium equa-
tions: equilibrium in the output
market, equilibrium in the
land market and an exit/entry
condition
Decoupled payments with
mandatory production increase
number of farmers and de-
coupled payments without
mandatory production increase
individual profit of farmers and
so total profit
Serra et al. (2005b) To assess the impact of decou-
pled payments on the use of crop
protection inputs in the cereal,
and oilseed and protein crop sec-
tors
By decomposing the profit max-
imization problem into two main
problems: profit maximization
and abatement cost minimiza-
tion, optimal crop supplies, in-
put demands (optimal use of pes-
ticides depends on output and
land allocation which is directly
affected by area payments), and
land allocations are obtained and
then estimated using SUR for a
sample of French farms observed
from 1994 to 1999
The input response to area pay-
ments is less than their response
to price support measures, elas-
ticity estimates with respect to
area payments is 0.35 and to
price support is 1.04 for cere-
als, and to area payments is 0.39
and to price support is 1.20 for
oilseeds and protein crops
3.2.6 Wealth and Insurance Effects
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2000) study the indirect links between decoupled pay-
ments and production in the United States, Canada, and Mexico through the mechanism of
risk reduction. They use a three country computable general equilibrium model (CGE) and
incorporate risk into the model by quantifying variance in returns and farmers’ subjective
risk averse preferences as a risk premium. The risk premium is a function of an absolute risk
aversion coefficient, real farm income including government payments and the coefficient of
variation of real returns per acre for each crop. Risk premiums are like taxes that reduce the
optimal output of risk averse producers below that of risk neutral farmers. In this framework
that the effect of increased decoupled payments on production is captured through a decrease
in the risk premium farmers are assumed to respond to risk in returns only through their
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production decision1. Farmers in the United States and Canada are assumed to tolerate risk
twice as much as farmers in Mexico2. This is because subsistence agriculture is common in
Mexico. Using time series data from 1979 to 1995 on prices, yields, area, and the 1997 real
farm programs (the most recent year for which OECD subsidy data were available by as-
suming farmers received the real, 1997 level of payments throughout 1979-1995), the authors
consider Production Flexibility Contract payments (PFC) in the United States, Net Income
Stabilization Accounts (NISA) in Canada and Procampo in Mexico and calculate risk pre-
miums in 1997 for corn, wheat, feed grains and oilseeds. They examine the effect of a 50 per
cent increase in decoupled payments from 1997 levels of real expenditure on PFC, NISA and
Procampo on risk premiums. Although risk premiums decrease, the effects of a 50 per cent
increase in direct payments on output via the decreased risk premiums are relatively small in
all three countries, and impacts vary by country and by crop depending on differences among
crops in variability of returns. U.S. output of oilseeds rises by 1.1 per cent and output of
wheat rises by 0.5 per cent. Mexican output of wheat and feed grains increase by 0.7 per
cent, while the output of oilseeds, a crop characterized by a low risk premium, declines by
0.3 per cent, as resources shift into more risky crops. The effects of increased payments on
output of corn and feed grains in Canada are close to zero.
Young and Westcott (2000) examine the production impact of production flexibility con-
tract (PFC) payments (that are not related to current farm-level production or market prices
and requiring compliance with conservation, wetland, planting flexibility provisions, and keep-
ing the land in agricultural uses) and other program payments (such as crop and revenue
insurance, marketing loans and disaster assistance payments) in the U.S. They suggest that
the potential for PFC payments to change the production decision depends largely on the
strength of the wealth effects. The authors calculate the production impact of PFC payments
(which were over $36 billion) on corn, barley, oats, sorghum, rice, wheat and upland cotton
over the period 1996-2002 by assuming wealth elasticities of acreage between 0.087 and 0.270,
which were taken from the Chavas and Holt (1990) study. PFC payments increased aggregate
acreage by 180,000 to 570,000 acres annually. The increased acreage is allocated across crops
by market returns. Production of riskier crops and production in riskier regions also occurs.
Serra, Zilberman, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2005a) study the impact of U.S. decou-
1There are actually many other channels through which farmers can reduce risk such as hedging or off-farm
employment.
2In the United States and Canada, it is assumed that farmers tolerate loss in one of five years, while in
Mexico farmers are assumed to tolerate loss in one of ten years.
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pled payments mandated by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act
(in which price supports were reduced in favor of Production Flexibility Contract (PFC)
payments) on agricultural production decisions taken both at the intensive and extensive
levels. They develop a theoretical model of production under price uncertainty and analyze
non-risk neutral farmers’ responses to decoupled government payments. It is suggested that
farmers make their production decisions with the aim of maximizing the expected utility of
their wealth (market revenue plus lump sum payments as decoupled transfers). By assuming
that the coefficient of risk aversion is a function of a farm’s expected wealth, the authors
derive the elasticity of production with respect to decoupled payments. It is shown that
an increase in decoupled government transfers increases decreasingly absolute risk aversion
farmers’ willingness to assume more risk, which in turn stimulates production (i.e. a change
in decoupled transfers leads to risk preference adjustment and hence a change in production).
The elasticity of production with respect to stochastic price is also derived. It is shown that
higher prices influence production by increasing marginal income and by reducing risk (while
decoupled payments only influence producers’ behavior through reducing risk).
In order to predict the magnitude of the effects of decoupling, the authors specify a single
aggregate output produced through a Cobb-Douglas production function using two variable
inputs, chemical inputs and fertilizers. They estimate jointly risk preference and technology
parameters using the full information maximum likelihood (ML) method based on farm-
level data for the years 1998-2001 from Kansas, and national level aggregate data. Results
show that though lump sum payments are not fully decoupled in the presence of risk and
uncertainty, their effects on agricultural production are likely to be of a very small magnitude
(the decoupled payment elasticity of output is near zero, 0.006, and smaller than the price
elasticity). Moreover, a reduction in price supports compensated exactly by an increase
in decoupled payments leads to a small reduction in agricultural output. The decoupled
payments elasticity of chemical inputs and fertilizer are 0.0064. Finally, the elimination of
PFC payments would cause the abandonment of almost 6 per cent of the farms (effect of
decoupled payments on the extensive margin).
Serra, Zilberman, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2006) analyze the impact that decoupled
payments have on input use and on output mean and variance when farmers face both output
and price risk. It is assumed that producers maximize their expected utility of wealth which
includes market revenue and decoupled payments. By totally differentiating the first-order
conditions of the expected utility maximization problem, the effects of decoupled payments
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on input use, mean output and output variability are analytically determined. For the sin-
gle output, single input model, under the assumption of a decreasingly risk averse producer
(DARA) and a risk-increasing input (like fertilizers) an increase in decoupled payments in-
creases the demand for the input, and the output mean and variability. This happens because
the impact of decoupled payments on input use is determined by an interaction between the
wealth effect (caused by the change in the coefficient of risk aversion as a result of a change
in wealth) and the effect of the impact of a change in input use on the variability of wealth.
Specifically, decoupled transfers reduce the degree of DARA farmers’ aversion to risk. If the
input is risk increasing in the sense that it increases output variability, it will also increase
the variability of wealth. Thus, by introducing the decoupled payments, decreasingly abso-
lute risk averse (increasingly absolute risk averse) farmers who are now more (less) willing to
assume more risk, will respond by increasing (decreasing) the use of inputs and consequently
increasing (decreasing) the output mean and variability. If the input is risk decreasing (like
irrigation), the effect of decoupled payments on input use is indeterminate. The effect of an
increase in price on input demand, and output mean and variability is also indeterminate
under any of the assumptions.
Using a model with three inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, and a composite input that com-
prises other variable inputs such as seeds and fuel oil), the authors estimate a system encom-
passing the technology structure and the three first order conditions of the utility maximiza-
tion problem (using non-linear three-stage least-squares) for assessing the effects of the U.S.
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 (in which price supports
were reduced in favour of Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments) on production
decisions taken by a sample of Kansas farmers for the period 1998-2001.
The estimated parameters indicate that all inputs are risk increasing and farmers in the
sample exhibit decreasingly absolute risk averse preferences. Decoupled payments elasticities
for the three inputs (pesticides is 3.46E-6, fertilizer is 3.90E-6 and other variable inputs—
seed, gas, fuel oil, etc.—is 5.79E-6), and the output mean (3.92E-6) and variance (4.56E-6)
are positive, but statistically insignificant. Price elasticities for the inputs are positive, though
only the elasticities for pesticide (0.57) and fertilizer (1.48) are statistically significant. Price
elasticities for output mean (1.24) and variance (1.29) are positive and statistically significant.
Therefore, from the empirical results it is concluded that for the sample of Kansas farms, a
reduction in price support compensated by a decoupled payment may result in a decrease in
output mean and variance by reducing the use of risk-increasing inputs.
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Goodwin and Mishra (2006) evaluate empirically the effects of decoupled payments on
acreage decisions (and also the purchase of new land) by analyzing the U.S. production
flexibility contract (PFC) payments and market loss assistance (MLA) payments using farm-
level data taken from four years of the USDA survey—1998-2001—for three acreage equations
(corn, soybeans and wheat) in the Corn Belt region. The analysis is reinforced by an aggregate
analysis of county level acreage allocations. The empirical framework is based on expected
utility maximization of wealth which is given by initial wealth plus market profits, direct
government payments and non-farm activities. The optimal acreage response is derived as a
function of lagged acreage, stochastic output price, input price, payments based on market
conditions (such as market loss assistance payments), direct decoupled payments and the
farm’s wealth (calculated as total assets less total debts).
By emphasizing the risk mechanism and the credit constraints mechanism as indirect
ways by which decoupled payments affect production, the authors include in the model not
only PFC and MLA payments directly but also the farmer’s level of risk aversion and credit
constraints. A farmer’s level of risk aversion is proxied by the ratio of his insurance expen-
ditures over his total expenses. The PFC-insurance interaction term in the model captures
the effect that PFC payments can have on risk aversion, and therefore on acreage decisions.
Credit constraints are proxied by the debt-to-asset ratio of the farm. The PFC-debt-to-asset
ratio interaction term in the model captures the effect that PFC payments might have on the
farm’s financial leverage, and therefore on acreage decisions.
The results indicate that although the direct effects of PFC payments on acreage decisions
are positive and significant (except in the wheat acreage decision), the effects are small.
The debt to asset interaction terms are not statistically significant in any equations. This
may suggest that the existence of credit constraints does not affect acreage decisions. The
coefficient of the PFC-insurance term in every case is negative but insignificant. Thus the
exact mechanism—wealth effects, risk, capital constraints—by which PFC payments affect
acreage is not identified. The overall elasticities, including both the insurance and debts-
to-assets ratio interaction effects, are 0.0344, 0.0246, and 0.0333 for corn, soybeans, and
wheat, respectively. MLA direct effects on corn acreage are stronger than the direct effect of
PFC payments, though the effect on soybeans and wheat are not significant. Moreover, by
considering probit models of the acquisition of new land for 1999, the authors find that PFC
payments lead to less idling land, but no significant impact on land transactions.
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Goodwin and Mishra (2005) extend the research of Goodwin and Mishra (2006)1 using
more recent farm-level data for the years 2002 and 2003 to examine the effect of the U.S.
counter-cyclical payments (CCP) and decoupled payments on acreage decisions. This study
is able to condition recent acreage allocations on farms’ historical base acreages (measured
as average disaster payments 1994-2001 per acre). The authors estimate an updated version
(using many of the same variables) of the acreage-response equations evaluated by Goodwin
and Mishra (2006) and the results confirm the findings of earlier research that the effects of
decoupled payments on acreage are small.
The authors also consider responses to a number of survey questions regarding factors
that influence acreage decisions and the allocation of decoupled payments receipts among
farm and nonfarm uses. The percentage of the farmers indicated counter-cyclical payments
and decoupled payments as important factors in their acreage decisions are 12.3 per cent
and 21 per cent, respectively. Farmers note the cost of inputs as the most important factor
influencing their production decisions. Crop rotation issues and the expected commodity
price are the second most important factors.
The authors use a Tobit model with double censoring to relate a number of farm charac-
teristics to the proportion of direct payments that farmers indicate they use on the farm. The
results indicate that the highly leveraged operators are more likely to use decoupled payments
on the farm. This is consistent with the argument that decoupled payments may indirectly
affect production through their effect on credit-constrained farmers. Highly risk-averse op-
erators are less likely to allocate direct payments to the farm while wealthy farm operators
are more likely to use decoupled payments on the farm. This is consistent with arguments
that wealth increases may result in risk-averse farmers being willing to accept more risk by
expanding their farm operation.
Meilke and Weersink (1990) examine the effects of government stabilization programs on
total crop area and the allocation of that area to individual crops in eastern and western
Canada over the time period 1972 to 1988. For eastern Canada, a system of area response
equations for the five crops (barley, soybeans, oats, corn and wheat) are estimated using seem-
ingly unrelated regression. In eastern Canada, since the Agricultural Stabilization Act and
provincial programs are generally targeted to specific crops, expected government payments
are explicitly incorporated into the price expectations for each crop. Naive expectations are
1Note that Goodwin and Mishra’s study in 2005 is an extension to their earlier research in February 2006,
although the earlier research was later published.
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assumed for these government payments. Each crop acreage in eastern Canada is specified
as a function of own crop return, other crops’ returns, and variability in net returns1, among
other factors.
For western Canada, a system of area response equations for the seven crops (barley,
bread wheat, canola, oats, flax, rye and durum wheat) are estimated. In western Canada,
the Western Grains Stabilization Act (WGSA) payments are based on average previous five
years net cash flow for a market basket of grains. As it is difficult to include the effect
of WGSA in the returns expectations for each individual crop, it is specified as a separate
variable in the western Canada model. Each crop acreage in western Canada is specified as a
function of own crop return, other crops’ returns, variability in net returns2 and the expected
WGSA payments3, among other factors.
The estimated coefficients are simulated under two scenarios to determine the effect of
government programs on crop area. In the first scenario, government payments are only
excluded from the calculation of the risk measure while, in the second scenario, the payments
are also excluded from expected returns. In eastern Canada, removing government payments
from the risk measure reduces total area by 0.5 percent with the majority of the reduction
occurring in corn area. Total area harvested would be reduced by 1.4 percent on average with
a complete removal of government support. In western Canada, the increase in the variability
of measured returns, resulting from the elimination of WGSA payments, leads to a reduction
in total harvested area by an average of 0.02 percent, while removing WGSA payments from
expected returns, as well as the risk measure, reduces total area by 1.59 percent with the
largest absolute decrease for bread wheat.
Miranda, Novak and Lerohl (1994) examine the effect of the Canadian Western Grains
Stabilization Act (WGSA) on acreage response. They estimate a nonlinear rational expecta-
tions model of aggregate acreage supply (for six major grain crops) for the Canadian Prairie
between 1976 and 1990 by accounting directly for a structural model of the WGSA in their
1A risk measure which is common to all crops is defined as a weighted average of the squared deviations
of the actual returns (the sum of the market price and the government payment per unit of crop, expressed
in real terms by dividing by the input price index, multiplied by the crop yield) and expected returns (a
weighted average of past annual returns) for the past three periods.
2A risk measure which is common to all crops is defined as a weighted average of the squared deviations of
the actual returns (the weighted average of the actual returns for each crop where the weights are the average
area planted to each crop from 1972 to 1988) and expected returns (the weighted average of the expected
returns for each crop where the expected returns for each crop is a three year distributed lag of the annual
returns) for the past three periods. This risk variable is adjusted for government payments.
3The expected WGSA payments are the fitted values in the regression of the net WGSA payments on the
expected returns in the current year, the average of the returns in the previous five years, and the ratio of
actual marketings to actual production in the current year as compared to the previous five years.
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estimation framework. An aggregate acreage supply equation is considered as a function of
expected revenue and the variance of revenue. A system of grain market equations includ-
ing grain price, grain marketings, on-farm dispositions, and yield is estimated. Using the
estimated parameters which give the western Canadian grain market equations and nine de-
terministic structural equations which describe WGSA payouts, rational ex ante expectation
and variance of per-hectare revenues are computed by Gauss-Hermite numerical integration
methods. Then, the effect of ex ante means and variance of per-hectare revenues on acreage
response is estimated. Finally, using the estimated coefficients, the impact of the WGSA on
acreage decisions was simulated by computing ex ante means and variance of revenues under
factual scenario (with WGSA implementation) and counterfactual scenario (without WGSA
implementation). The results indicate that the WGSA increased acreage planted to eligible
crops by over 4 per cent during its 15 years of operation. Most of this increase (2.4 per cent)
was related to the risk (variances of revenue) reduction effects of the program, the remainder
(1.7 per cent) to increases in expected revenues.
Chavas and Holt (1990) study the impact of U.S. price support programs on acreage de-
cisions under risk, for corn and soybeans from 1954 to 1985. They develop an acreage supply
response model under expected utility maximization of total wealth for a farm household
subject to budget and acreage constraints and derive the household’s optimal acreage deci-
sion as a function of expected net returns for the own and competing crops, second moment
of the distribution of the net returns, and initial wealth. Then, through examining theoret-
ical restrictions, total wealth (initial wealth plus market returns) as well as expected crop
net returns and variance-covariance of crop prices appears in the model specified for estima-
tion. The effect of the government price support program is incorporated into the model by
truncation of the the price distribution.
Variances and covariances of crop prices (risk) are found to be statistically significant in
most cases. Elasticities with respect to initial wealth are statistically significant and 0.087
for corn and 0.270 for soybeans. The hypothesis of constant absolute risk aversion over the
period of analysis for corn and soybean farmers is rejected and the positive wealth effect
is consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion. In order to show the importance of
considering risk in a multicrop framework, the authors simulate the acreage response models
at various price support levels for corn and soybeans. Due to the truncation effects, changing
the support price levels will influence the means, variances and covariances of prices. The
model simulations indicate that there is some range over which increasing the support price
51
for corn will result in more acres planted to soybeans because the risk reducing effect of a
price support program influencing acreage substitution dominates the mean price effect. This
result emphasizes the importance of cross-commodity risk effects and the risk-reducing role
of government support payments.
Massow and Weersink (1993) assess the impact of government support programs on
acreage response under price and production risk in the province of Ontario in Canada from
1965 to 1990. Following Chavas and Holt (1990), they start from the maximization of the
expected utility of wealth and derive the optimal acreage decisions as a function of initial
wealth, expected profit for the own and competing crops, and the expectations of the higher
moments of the profit distributions. In order to incorporate the effect of government pro-
grams, the authors truncate the subjective price and yield distributions at the support level.
Estimation of the system of acreage response functions for white beans, corn, soybeans and
winter wheat indicates that the signs of variables are generally consistent with theory. The
change in acreage of all four crops due to changes in the expected variability of the revenues
is less than acreage changes due to changes in levels of expected revenues, which shows the
impact of risk relative to expected returns (for example, elasticity with respect to own revenue
for winter wheat is 0.158 and with respect to own-variance is -0.018).
The null hypothesis that farmers are risk-neutral is rejected which indicates the need
to include some measure of risk in acreage response models. The constant absolute risk
aversion hypothesis is also rejected which implies the need to include a wealth variable in
acreage response estimations. Using the estimated coefficients, the authors simulate various
government policy scenarios over 1980-1989 to measure how any scenario will affect the
average expected revenue and variability of revenue, and therefore the crop acreages. The
results indicate that the National Tripartite Stabilization Program (NTSP) had the most
potential to affect acreage decisions, considerably increasing the level of white bean acreage
by 24.3 per cent. The Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA) increased average corn acreages
by 2.9 per cent at the expense of the portfolio of alternative crops (soybeans and winter wheat
acreages decreases by 2 percent and 7 percent, respectively). Although the Gross Revenue
Insurance Program (GRIP) had the least potential for misallocation of land among crops
since it provided a consistent measure of support to all of the crops, it produced an acreage
response of 3.6 per cent, on average.
Lin and Dismukes (2007) examine whether the Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) in the
U.S. 2002 Farm Act have an impact on farmers’ acreage decisions. Following the theoretical
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framework developed by Chavas and Holt (1990), the acreage response model—both the linear
acreage and acreage share specifications—under risk is estimated using SUR for major pro-
gram crops (corn, soybeans, and wheat) in the North Central region (including Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan) during 1991-2001. Truncated
means, variances and covariances of per unit crop prices are used to reflect government price
support provided to farmers through commodity loan programs. The results indicate that
the expected net returns for corn and soybeans are statistically significant with expected
signs for own and cross effects under both the linear and acreage-share specifications. The
expected net return for wheat has the expected sign and is statistically significant in both
model specifications. Of all the revenue variance and covariance variables (i.e. risk variables)
considered, only the coefficients of soybean revenue variance in soybean linear acreage and
acreage-share equations are statistically significant. Soybeans’ own-variance risk elasticity
ranges from -0.043 (linear acreage model) to -0.050 (acreage share model).
The null hypothesis that coefficients of all risk variables in each acreage equation are
jointly zero is rejected in the soybean equation suggesting the importance of risk in farmers’
soybean acreage decisions. It is not rejected in the corn and wheat acreage equations. The
null hypothesis that all coefficients of the initial wealth variable are jointly zero is rejected in
both the linear and acreage-share models, which shows that wealth has an important effect
on farmers’ acreage decisions. Overall, an increase in initial wealth will lead to an increase
in acreage planted to all crops, which implies that farmers exhibit decreasing absolute risk
aversion. The effect of initial wealth on individual field crops varies, positive for soybeans
(0.136 to 0.163) and negative for corn (-0.037 to -0.051) and wheat (-0.190 to -0.201).
Using the estimated coefficients in a linear acreage model, the authors simulate the ef-
fects of counter-cyclical payments on acreage decisions for 2005 in major field crops in the
North Central region by comparing two scenarios: market conditions without counter-cyclical
payments, and market conditions with counter-cyclical payments. In the absence of CCPs,
truncation of the commodity price distribution is limited to commodity loan programs. In
contrast, CCPs add another truncation to commodity price distributions (in addition to that
of commodity loan programs), which is conditioned on the expected farm price. The trun-
cation point of CCPs is determined by apportioning CCPs (which are calculated from the
2003 base acreage) to planted acreage that is estimated from the linear acreage model using
1991-2001 data. The effect of counter-cyclical payments on acreages appears to be small,
with an increase of 80,000 acres for corn and 50,000 acres for wheat while soybean acreage
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remains unchanged. However, the authors mention that the effects of CCPs may go beyond
their short-run effects on farmers’ acreage decisions; longer term, there may be structural
implications to the extent that these payments keep farmers in business.
Hennessy (1998) develops a theoretical framework to show the production effects of de-
coupled programs in stochastic environments (in addition to coupled programs). He models
a risk-averse farmer, maximizing expected utility from profit. The farmer earns support-
adjusted profit which is the summation of stochastic profit from the market and a decoupled
payment. The model decomposes the production impacts of decoupled programs under uncer-
tainty into wealth and insurance effects. Under the conditions that: (i) farmer’s preferences
display decreasing absolute risk aversion; (ii) the risk faced by the farmer reduces his optimal
level of the choice variable so that a risk-reducing policy can mitigate the choice variable-
depressing impacts of risk; (iii) support-adjusted profit increases with risk and; (iv) the
decoupled payment reduces the risk faced by the farmer, the optimal choice of the farmer in-
creases as the magnitude of support increases. The decoupled programs reduce the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion by increasing expected income (wealth effect) as well as reducing the
degree of risk faced by farmers by lowering the variability of income (insurance effect). The
author also shows that under constant absolute risk aversion and conditions (ii), (iii) and,
(iv), the optimal choice of the farmer increases as the magnitude of support increases. In this
case, wealth effects are absent and the optimal choice is only influenced by insurance effects
due to the reduced income variability induced by the increase in government supports. A
decoupled program must be invariant to the source of uncertainty for the insurance effect to
be absent (for example a deterministic lump sum payment rather than an income-contingent
payout) and in this case government support will induce a pure wealth effect for preferences
that do not reflect a constant absolute risk aversion. Thus, income support policies that are
assumed to be decoupled are not, in fact, decoupled and may affect production decisions.
Moreover, in order to obtain some measure of the magnitudes of the wealth and insurance
effects of a target price program based on fixed yield (i.e. a decoupled structure), Hennessy
conducts empirical simulation for a 400-acre corn farm in Iowa. The results indicate that
an increase in the magnitude of support programs could increase input use (nitrogen) by a
maximum of 15 per cent (through both wealth and insurance effects), while the increase in
production is small with a maximum of 2.75 per cent (through both wealth and insurance
effects). By controlling for the wealth effect, it seems that the insurance effects are much
larger than wealth effects.
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Following Hennessy (1998), Sckokai and Moro (2006) examine the impact of the new
Mid-Term Review single farm payment of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP) on acreage decisions by considering both the insurance and wealth effects of policy
changes. By assuming that risk arises due to uncertain prices and that farmers display con-
stant relative risk aversion preferences, and by adopting nonlinear mean-variance risk prefer-
ences, the dual expected utility function is specified and then output supply, input demand,
and land allocation equations are derived (using Hotelling Lemma) as a function of initial
wealth, expected output prices, input prices, variance-covariance of prices, and crop-specific
area payments, among other variables. The authors use farm level data from the Italian Farm
Accounting Data Network to empirically estimate a ten equation system of output supply
(corn, durum wheat, other cereals, oilseeds), input demand (seeds and chemicals, and other
inputs), and land allocation (land to corn, land to durum wheat, land to other cereals, land
to oilseeds) over 1993-19991. As both expected cereal prices and the corresponding elements
of the variance-covariance matrix are influenced by the existence of the guaranteed minimum
prices for cereals during the period of 1993-1999, the price distribution at the minimum price
level is truncated.
The null hypothesis that all variance and covariance coefficients are jointly equal to zero
is rejected which implies a rejection of risk neutrality. The estimated results indicate that
the fraction of significant elasticities with respect to the risk-related explanatory variables
(output price variances-covariances and initial wealth) is around 50 per cent. The area
payments elasticities with respect to output (acreage) are 0.014 (0.014) for corn, 0.072 (0.056)
for durum wheat, 0.087 (0.088) for other cereals 0.015 (0.005) for oilseeds. The parameters
estimated over the 1993-1999 period are then used to simulate the effects of the combination
of the Agenda 2000 and the 2003 Mid-Term Review (MTR) reforms, through a scenario with
a decrease in cereal intervention prices partially compensated by an increase in cereal area
payments, which have been transformed, together with oilseed payments, into a single farm
payment (SFP). Under this scenario, the insurance effect has been derived by shocking the
model with the change in income/wealth variability only, the relative price/payment effect by
1Since many farms in the sample do not produce some of the crops, the problem of corner solutions for
some outputs exists. The fraction of farms not producing ranges from a minimum of 41 percent to a maximum
of 62 percent for the five outputs. To deal with corner solutions, the authors use the two-step estimation
procedure. In the first step, the five probit models (one for each output) are estimated using the level of some
quasi-fixed inputs (capital, family labor, and land) and two sets of dummy variables representing geographical
location (North, Center, and South) and altitude (mountains, hills, and plains) as explanatory variables. In
the second step, the first-stage probit estimates of the corresponding parameters are used in a new form of a
system of ten simultaneous equations.
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shocking the model with the changes in prices and payments only, and the wealth effect by
shocking the model with the change in wealth (resulting from the discounted value of future
payments guaranteed by the MTR reform, SFP) only. The simulation results show that the
introduction of the non-stochastic SFP reduces income variability and offsets the impact of
the increased price variability due to reduction in the intervention price. While the size of
the wealth effect is positive but quite small, the insurance effect may generate up to a 7 per
cent increase in acreage, which implies that the size and direction of acreage are strongly
influenced by the impact of CAP reforms on farm income/wealth variability.
Coyle, Wei and Rude (2008) study the hypothetical impacts of the Canadian Agricultural
Income Stabilization (CAIS) program on crop production under risk aversion and output
price uncertainty for wheat, barley, canola and other crops (oats, rye, flax) in Manitoba over
1966-2002 (which is prior to CAIS implementation). First, an autoregressive distributed lag
crop yield model is specified as a function of expected price (which includes crop specific
government payments related to Crop Insurance and Gross Revenue Insurance Program and
an index of net transportation costs) and price variance1, initial wealth (which is defined as
the sum of value of capital stock in crop production minus related debts. Initial wealth also
includes various government payments for crops that are not commodity specific), weighted
mean and variance of weather stations, and the covariance between government payments and
crop market prices (to capture an insurance effect resulting from government payments in-
cluding Net Income Stabilization Account program, Agriculture Income Disaster Assistance,
Western Grains Stabilization Act program, Western Grains Transportation Act program).
Note that since the production homogeneity condition implied by constant relative risk aver-
sion CRRA states that output supply is homogeneous of degree zero in expected output price,
input price, price variances, and initial wealth, all monetary variables are normalized by an
input price index and variance-covariance elements are normalized by squared price. Then,
a static econometric model of Manitoba crop acreage (share) demands conditional on yields
is also estimated as a function of expected revenues and variance-covariance in revenues2
per acre for own and competing crops, initial wealth, a variance of weather indexes (serving
as a proxy for weather/yield uncertainty), and variable input price indexes. All monetary
variables in acreage equation are normalized by a Tornqvist revenue per acre index for other
1By assuming disjoint technologies (and similar capital/acreage ratios across crops), crop yield can be
modelled independently of cross price effects.
2By assuming that only prices are stochastic, an adaptive expectation scheme is used to calculate expected
prices and variance-covariance elements.
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crops and variance-covariance elements are normalized by squared revenue index. Long run
impacts on output are the sum of long run impacts on yields plus long run impacts on acres.
The authors develop an analytical model of crop production response to CAIS over 1966-
2002. In farm maximization problem, they consider the expected farm wealth as the expected
value of the summation of initial wealth, market income and total payouts under the CAIS.
Then, expected effective prices and initial wealth are derived using the first order conditions.
Since increases in current income reduce current payouts under CAIS, CAIS has a substantial
impact on expected effective prices for outputs and inputs. It is calculated that CAIS leads to
approximately seven percent increases in expected effective output prices relative to effective
input prices. Under CRRA, CAIS leads to the substantial change in effective prices relative
to nominal wealth which implies a substantial increase in relative wealth by 33 percent.
Moreover, under CAIS relative price uncertainty is calculated to increase by 14 percent.
Using estimated elasticities of the econometric models, calculations show that under CRRA
assumption, annual crop production increases by six per cent for wheat, nine per cent for
barley, and decreases by one per cent for canola for a hypothetical implementation of CAIS
over 1966-20021. Table 3.7 summarizes some papers related to the wealth and insurance
effects of decoupled payments.
1The authors consider the standard program of Gross Revenue Insurance program (GRIP) as a bench-
mark for the CAIS. After calculating the percentage change in farm level crop output prices due to GRIP
(indemnities minus farmer premiums) relative to market prices, and correlations of total indemnities with
a Divisia index of market prices for all crops, the econometric models is used to simulate the impacts of
the price support and insurance effects of GRIP on output. By comparing the effects of GRIP and CAIS,
for wheat and barley, CAIS impacts on long run yields arising from increases in relative effective prices and
increases in normalized wealth are less substantial than the simulated impacts for the historical GRIP, which
provided large and transparent subsidies to crop prices.
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Table 3.7: Studies related to the Wealth and Insurance Effects of Decoupled Payments
Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Chavas and Holt (1990) To study corn and soybeans
acreage response to the U.S.
price support programs under
risk
Expected utility maximization
model and incorporating govern-
ment programs into the model
by truncation technique, and es-
timation of a SUR model from
1954 to 1985
Acreage elasticities with respect
to wealth are statistically signifi-
cant and 0.087 for corn and 0.270
for soybeans, and with respect to
variances-covariances (risk) are
-0.001 for corn and -0.017 for
soybeans
Massow and Weersink
(1993)
To assess acreage response to
government support programs
under price and production risk
in Ontario
Used the same framework as
Chavas and Holt for white beans,
corn, soybeans and winter wheat
from 1965 to 1990
The results indicate that the
National Tripartite Stabilization
Program had the most potential
to affect acreage decisions, con-
siderably increasing the level of
white bean acreage by 24.3 per
cent.
Miranda et al. (1994) To examine acreage response to
the Canadian Western Grains
Stabilization Act (WGSA) in
Canada
Using four equations which de-
scribe the western Canadian
grain market and nine determin-
istic structural equations which
describe WGSA payouts, the ra-
tional ex ante expectation and
variance of per-hectare revenues
are computed by Gauss-Hermite
numerical integration methods.
Then, the effect of ex ante means
and variance of per-hectare rev-
enues on acreage response is esti-
mated for six major grain crops
for the Canadian Prairies be-
tween 1976 and 1990
The WGSA increased acreage by
over 4 per cent, most of this in-
crease (2.4 per cent) was related
to the risk (variances of revenue)
reduction effects of the program,
the remainder (1.7 per cent) to
increases in expected revenues
Hennessy (1998) To develop a theoretical frame-
work to show the production ef-
fects of decoupled programs in
stochastic environments
Modelling a risk-averse farmer,
maximizing expected utility from
profit and proposing that decou-
pled programs reduce the coef-
ficient of absolute risk aversion
by increasing expected income
(wealth effect) as well as reduce
the degree of risk faced by farm-
ers by reducing the variability
of income (insurance effect) and
therefore increase optimal choice
of the farmer, and simulating a
target price program based on
fixed yield (i.e. a decoupled
structure) to a single 400 acre
continuous corn farm in Iowa
An increase in the magnitude of
support program could increase
input use (nitrogen) by a max-
imum of 15 per cent (through
both wealth and insurance ef-
fects), while the increase in pro-
duction is small with a maximum
of 2.75 per cent (through both
wealth and insurance effects)
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Table 3.7: Continued
Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Burfisher et al. (2000) To study the indirect links be-
tween decoupled payments and
production in the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico through the mecha-
nism of risk reduction
Using a computable general equi-
librium model (CGE) with a risk
premium and simulating the ef-
fect of a 50% increase in decou-
pled payments from 1997 levels
of real expenditure on produc-
tion flexibility contract payments
(PFC) in the U.S., net income
stabilization accounts (NISA) in
Canada and Procampo in Mex-
ico on risk premiums
U.S. output of oilseeds rises by
1.1% and output of wheat rises
by 0.5%. Mexican output of
wheat and feed grains increase
by 0.7 % and the output of
oilseeds (a crop characterized by
a low risk premium) declines by
0.3%. The effects of increased
payments on output of corn and
feed grains in Canada are close
to zero
Young and Westcott
(2000)
To examine the production im-
pact of production flexibility
contract (PFC) payments in the
U.S.
Calculating the production im-
pact of PFC payments of $36 bil-
lion over the period 1996-2002
by assuming wealth elasticities of
acreage between 0.087 and 0.270
from Chavas and Holt (1990)
PFC payments increased aggre-
gate acreage by 180000 to 570000
acres annually
Serra et al. (2005a) To study the impact of U.S.
Production Flexibility Contract
(PFC) payments on production
decisions taken both at the inten-
sive and extensive levels in the
presence of price uncertainty
Developing a theoretical model
of production under price uncer-
tainty by considering that farm-
ers take their production de-
cisions with the aim of maxi-
mizing the expected utility of
their wealth (market revenue
from sales of a single output
and decoupled payments), and
estimating jointly risk preference
and technology parameters by
Full Information Maximum Like-
lihood using farm-level data for
the years 1998-2001 from Kansas
An increase in decoupled gov-
ernment transfers increases de-
creasingly absolute risk aversion
farmers’ willingness to assume
more risk, which in turn stim-
ulates production. The decou-
pled payments elasticity of out-
put is 0.006, the decoupled pay-
ments elasticity of chemical in-
put and fertilizer are 0.0064, and
the elimination of PFC payments
would cause the abandonment of
almost 6 per cent of the farms
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Papers Focus of Study Method Result(s)
Serra et al. (2006) To analyze analytically and em-
pirically the impact that decou-
pled payments have on input use
and on output mean and vari-
ance when farmers face both out-
put and price risk
Using a model with three in-
puts (pesticides, fertilizers, and
seeds and fuel oil), a system of
the technology structure and the
three first order conditions of the
utility (of wealth which includes
market revenue and decoupled
payments) maximization prob-
lem is estimated for assessing the
effects of the U.S. Production
Flexibility Contract (PFC) pay-
ments on production decisions
taken by a sample of Kansas
farmers for the period 1998-2001
Decoupled transfers reduce the
degree of DARA farmers’ aver-
sion to risk. If the input is
risk increasing in the sense that
it increases output variability, it
will also increase the variabil-
ity of wealth. Thus, by intro-
ducing the decoupled payments,
decreasingly absolute risk averse
farmers who are now more will-
ing to assume more risk, will re-
spond by increasing the use of in-
puts and consequently increasing
the output mean and variability.
Decoupled payments elasticities
for pesticides is 3.46E-6 for fer-
tilizer is 3.90E-6 and for other
variable inputs-seed, fuel oil etc.-
is 5.79E-6, and for the output
mean is 3.92E-6 and for the out-
put variance is 4.56E-6, but sta-
tistically insignificant
Goodwin and Mishra
(2006)
To evaluate empirically the ef-
fects of the U.S. production flex-
ibility contract (PFC) payments
on acreage decisions
Maximizing the expected util-
ity of wealth and including into
the model not only PFC and
MLA payments directly but also
the farmer’s level of risk-aversion
(proxied by the PFC-insurance
interaction term) and credit con-
straints (proxied by The PFC-
debt-to-asset ratio interaction
term) using farm level data from
1998 to 2001 for three acreage
equations (corn, soybeans and
wheat) in the Corn Belt region
The acreage overall elasticities
with respect to decoupled pay-
ments, including both the in-
surance and debts-to-assets ra-
tio interaction effects, are 0.0344,
0.0246, and 0.0333 for corn, soy-
beans, and wheat, respectively
(and not statistically significant)
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Sckokai and Moro (2006) To examine the impact of the
new Mid-Term Review single
farm payment of the European
Union’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) on acreage deci-
sions by considering both the in-
surance and wealth effects of pol-
icy changes
Using the dual expected utility
function under uncertain prices
and constant relative risk aver-
sion preferences and estimating
a ten-equation system of out-
put supply (corn, durum wheat,
other cereals, oilseeds), input de-
mand (seeds and chemicals, and
other inputs), and land alloca-
tion (land to corn, land to durum
wheat, land to other cereals, land
to oilseeds) over 1993-1999 using
farm level data from the Italian
Farm Accounting Data Network,
and then simulating the effects of
the combination of the Agenda
2000 and the 2003 Mid-Term Re-
view (MTR) reforms
The area payments elasticities
with respect to output (acreage)
are 0.014 (0.014) for corn, 0.072
(0.056) for durum wheat, 0.087
(0.088) for other cereals 0.015
(0.005) for oilseeds. The simu-
lation results show that by in-
troduction of the non-stochastic
SFP the size of the wealth effect
is positive but quite small, and
the insurance effect may gener-
ate up to a 7 per cent increase in
acreage
Lin and Dismukes (2007) To examine the acreage response
to the Counter-Cyclical Pay-
ments (CCPs) of the U.S. 2002
Farm Act
Estimating the acreage response
model-both the linear acreage
and acreage share specifications-
under risk using SUR for major
program crops (corn, soybeans,
and wheat) in the North Central
region from 1991 to 2001 by con-
sidering the truncation effect of
government price supports pro-
vided to farmers through com-
modity loan programs, and then
simulating the effects of counter-
cyclical payments on acreage de-
cisions for 2005
The effect of initial wealth on in-
dividual field crops are 0.136 for
soybeans and -0.037 for corn and
-0.190 for wheat. The null hy-
pothesis that coefficients of all
risk variables in each acreage
equation are jointly zero is re-
jected in the soybean equation
while it is not rejected in the corn
and wheat acreage equations.
The simulation results show that
the effect of counter-cyclical pay-
ments on acreage appears to
be small, with an increase in
acreage of 80,000 acres for corn
and 50,000 acres for wheat while
the soybeans acreage remains un-
changed.
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Coyle et al. (2008) To study the hypothetical im-
pacts of Canadian Agricultural
Income Stabilization (CAIS)
program on crop production
An autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) crop yield model and a
static econometric model of crop
acreage (share) demands are es-
timated in Manitoba for wheat,
barley, canola and other crops
(oats, rye, flax) over 1960- 2002,
long run impacts on output are
the sum of long run impacts
on yields plus long run impacts
on acres, and then hypothetical
impacts of CAIS on crop out-
puts are simulated over 1966-
2002, which is prior to CAIS
Under constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), it is calculated
that CAIS leads to 7 percent in-
creases in relative expected ef-
fective prices. CAIS leads to
the substantial change in effec-
tive prices relative to nominal
wealth which implies a substan-
tial increase in relative wealth
by 33 percent. Moreover, under
CAIS relative price uncertainty
is calculated to increase by 14
percent. Using estimates elas-
ticities of the econometric mod-
els, calculation shows that an-
nual crop production increases
by 6 per cent for wheat, 9 per
cent for barley, and decreases by
1 per cent for canola due to hypo-
thetical implementation of CAIS
over 1966-2002.
In general, the literature pertaining to the impact of government payments on acreage
decisions through risk mechanisms clearly shows that support policies that are decoupled in
a deterministic world can affect the decisions of the risk averse producers when there is un-
certainty. However, theoretical studies on impact of decoupled payments on acreage response
lack a detailed theoretical model of how acreage decisions will be affected by stabilizing farm
profit as well as the higher expected profit. In the next section, we try to fill this gap by
modelling the farmers’ acreage decisions under uncertainty and deriving a measure inside the
theoretical framework to capture the insurance effect of government policies as well as the
wealth effect.
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Chapter 4
Theoretical Framework
This chapter provides the theoretical basis for an empirical analysis on the effect of govern-
ment crop payments on acreage decisions. The chapter is organized as follows. First, by
applying the literature on risk and uncertainty to agriculture, we examine the optimal level
of farmers’ choice variables under uncertainty and show how government payments affect this
optimal choice. In this section, different types of uncertainty in agriculture including price
and production risks as well as technological and policy risks, are explained. Then, in order
to understand how risk affects production decisions, following Hennessy (1998) a producer
who maximizes the expected utility of random profit, as a function of a vector of choices
such as input use by the producer, a vector of exogenous parameters including government
payments and input prices, and a single random variable representing the uncertainty such
as output price, is considered. Using the first-order condition under uncertainty, the optimal
level of choice variables is determined. Similarly, by maximizing the profit function, the op-
timal choice under certainty is also determined. The solution under uncertainty is compared
with the solution when uncertainty is removed and it is shown that uncertainty reduces the
level of the choice variable selected by a risk averse decision maker. Next, the government
payments impact on the farmer’s optimal choice is investigated. It is shown that under an
uncertain environment there are three channels through which governments payments can
influence farmer’s decision: (1) the coupling or direct (price) impacts that influences the
optimal choice by increasing the marginal effect of input on profit (through changes in out-
put/input prices); (2) the wealth impacts arising from the higher average profit resulting
from the government payments; (3) the insurance impact that influences the optimal choice
because it stabilizes profit.
Second, the optimal acreage decisions under uncertainty, which includes three main factors
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demonstrated in the previous section, are derived and specified. The three factors are price,
wealth and insurance. Hence, the model is able to incorporate the effect of government
payments on acreage decisions through all three of these channels. In this section, following
Chavas and Holt (1990), a farm household maximizing expected utility of total wealth (initial
wealth plus profit from different crops) subject to budget constraint and acreage constraint
is considered. From the first-order condition, an optimal acreage choice for each crop as
a function of initial wealth, expected profits and variance of profits (profit distributions
determinants) is derived. Following this derivation, the properties of the optimal acreage
decision, including symmetry and homogeneity, are discussed.
However, Chavas and Holt’s model is not able to capture the insurance effect (i.e. the
stabilization of total income) which has been emphasized in the literature. Since Canadian
farm income stabilization and support policy has moved toward a whole farm approach that
targets net income and uses a moving average mechanism to temporally smooth income,
it possesses income-supporting (wealth effect) and income-stabilizing (insurance effect) at-
tributes. The existing literature controls for the wealth effect through changes in average
total income arising from government supports, however the insurance effect is captured only
through an ad hoc measure. Given the nature of Canadian whole farm programs which at-
tempt to stabilize producers’ income, to examine empirically the whole farm programs, a
model is needed to capture the insurance effect arising from these programs. To solve this
problem, through the theoretical restriction channel, we contribute to the literature by incor-
porating the insurance effect (income stabilization) ignored by Chavas and Holt (1990) into
our theoretical model. Based on the theoretical discussions regarding the role of insurance
effect in acreage decisions, the theoretical restrictions examined by Chavas and Holt (1990)
are extended, which enables us to include this effect in our model specification. Next, using
a first-order Taylor series expansion and based on our modification, we have a specification
different from the one by Chavas and Holt (1990), i.e. the optimal acreage choice for each
crop is specified as a function of total wealth; i.e. initial wealth plus total profit (wealth
effect), individual crop expected profits and variances (coupling/price effect), and variance
of total profit (insurance effect). Government payments are incorporated into the model by
the truncation of the profit distributions such that crop-specific programs can influence the
acreage decisions by coupling (price), wealth and insurance effects and whole farm programs
can influence the acreage decisions by wealth and insurance effects.
Finally, the expected signs for explanatory variables are analytically derived based on the
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portfolio theory.
4.1 Decision Making under Uncertainty
Two important concepts in the economic modelling of individual choice are optimization (the
rational behavior of economic agents) and equilibrium (the balancing of individual claims
in a market setting). When uncertainty exists, application of both of these concepts raises
modelling problems (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). In optimization under uncertainty, in
particular, one needs to determine what exactly is being optimized. Although a universally
satisfactory answer to this question is not accessible, the major analytic tool for solving
decision problems under uncertainty is the expected utility model. The expected utility
hypothesis states that the individual assigns a utility value to each mutually exclusive activity
with an associated probability distribution that is an outcome of a decision. The preferred
choice has maximum expected utility.
The expected utility theorem provides a complete theory of choice under uncertainty1;
therefore, it is widely used by economists to formally describe individual decisions under
risk and uncertainty2. It was Bernoulli who first formulated the expected utility theorem in
1738, when he postulated that an extra dollar has more value to a poor man than to a rich
man3. Using a set of behavioral axioms, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) extended
the concept to the case of an expected utility model, where a representative agent maximizes
expected utility subject to an endowment constraint. In the expected utility framework,
maximizing the expected utility of consequences is equivalent to the problem of selecting the
action that induces the most preferred probability distribution. The expected utility model
allows us to capture the notion of risk aversion as a fundamental feature of the problem of
choice under uncertainty by assuming concavity of the utility function. In Appendix A, the
expected utility theory and the risk aversion definition are briefly presented (See Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green, 1995, chapter 6, for details).
1However, note that despite its normative appeal, the expected utility framework is not able to describe
some features of individual behavior under risk and, therefore, it has recently come under intense scrutiny
and a number of generalizations of the expected utility model have been proposed (Quiggin, 1993).
2According to Knight (1921), there is a distinction between uncertainty and risk. Risk arises when the
stochastic elements of a decision problem can be characterized in terms of numerical objective probabilities,
whereas uncertainty refers to decision making with random outcomes that lack such objective probabilities.
With the widespread acceptance of probabilities as subjective beliefs, Knight’s distinction between risk and
uncertainty is meaningless and we will ignore it in this study. Thus, the notions of uncertainty and risk are
interchangeable here.
3See the translation by Somer (1954).
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4.2 Agricultural Decision Making under Uncertainty
In this section, by applying the literature of risk and uncertainty to agriculture, we specifi-
cally examine the optimal level of farmers’ choice variables under uncertainty and show how
government payments affects this optimal choice. First, we briefly present the main sources of
uncertainty in agriculture. Then, we show how the existence of uncertainty affects the opti-
mal choice by the farmer. Finally, the effect of government payments through three channels,
coupling, wealth and insurance, on the farmer’s optimal choice is examined.
4.2.1 Uncertainty in Agriculture
It is useful to start by outlining the main sources of uncertainty in the agriculture sector.
First, in agriculture the amount and quality of output that will result from a given bundle
of inputs are not known with certainty, i.e., the production function is stochastic. This pro-
duction uncertainty is due to the fact that uncontrollable elements, such as weather, play a
fundamental role in agricultural production. As long production lags are dictated by the bio-
logical processes that underlie the production of crops and the growth of animals, time itself
plays a particularly important role in agricultural production. Hence, the effects of uncontrol-
lable factors are heightened in agriculture. Although there are parallels in other production
activities, production uncertainty is an important feature of agricultural production.
Price uncertainty is also a standard attribute of agricultural activities. Due to the biolog-
ical production lags mentioned above, production decisions have to be made far in advance of
realizing the final product, so that the market price for the output is not known at the time
these decisions have to be made. Moreover, price uncertainty exists because of the inherent
volatility of agricultural markets. Such volatility may be due to demand fluctuations, which
are particularly important when a sizable portion of output is destined for the export market.
Also, production uncertainty, as discussed earlier, contributes to price uncertainty because
price needs to adjust to clear the market. In this process some typical features of agricultural
markets (a large number of competitive producers, relatively homogeneous output, and in-
elastic demand) are responsible for considerable price volatility, even for moderate production
shocks.
When longer-term economic problems are considered, additional sources of uncertainty
are relevant to agricultural decisions. Technological uncertainty in agricultural production
relates to the evolution of production techniques that may make quasi-fixed past investments
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obsolete. It is clear that the randomness of new knowledge development affects production
technologies in all sectors. However, what makes it more relevant to agriculture is the fact
that technological innovations in agriculture are the product of research efforts carried out
elsewhere, for instance, by firms supplying inputs to agriculture, such that competitive farm-
ers are captive players in the process. Policy uncertainty also plays an important role in
agriculture. Economic policies have impacts on all sectors through their effects on taxes,
interest rates, exchange rates, regulation, provision of public goods, and so on. However,
because governments in many countries intervene in agriculture sector, and because in re-
cent times, revisions to these policy interventions are needed (examples include the recent
WTO commitment induced changes in key features of the agricultural policies of the United
States and the European Union, or the emerging concerns about the environmental impacts of
agricultural production), this source of uncertainty creates considerable risk for agricultural
activities.
4.2.2 Agricultural Decisions under Uncertainty
The main risks that a typical farmer faces are due to the fact that output prices are not
known with certainty when production decisions are made and that the production process
contains sources of uncertainty which include factors that are important for production but
are outside the complete control of the farmer such as weather conditions, pest infestations,
and disease outbreaks. Therefore, it is important to understand how these main sources of
risk affect production decisions.
As mentioned earlier, in decision making under uncertainty the problem of selecting the
action that induces the most preferred probability distribution reduces to that of maximizing
the expected utility of consequences. Therefore, as suggested by Hennessy (1998), consider
a producer who maximizes expected utility of random profit and faces a profile of profit
opportunities z(a, β, ε˜) where a is a vector of choices (actions) such as input use by the
producer, β is a vector of exogenous parameters including government payments and input
prices, and ε˜ is a single random variable such as output price that follows the cumulative
distribution function F (ε) and ε ∈ [0, 1]. The objective of a risk-averse producer is written
as:
max
a
E[U(z)] =
∫
U(z)dF (z) (4.1)
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then,
max
a
∫ 1
0
U [z(a, β, ε)]dF (ε) (4.2)
where U(.) is increasing and concave, profit z(.) is assumed to increase in ε (this condition is
necessary to ensure monotonicity of utility in ε or this assumption combined with Uz(.) ≥ 0,
indicates that higher values of the random variable are preferred to lower values.), and the
objective function is concave in a to satisfy the second-order condition, ∆ ≡ E{Uzz[.][za(.)]2+
Uz[.]zaa(.)} < 0. The first-order condition is
Ω =
∫ 1
0
Uz[z(a, β, ε)]za(a, β, ε)dF (ε) = 0 (4.3)
with parameterized solution at the value a∗ = a[F (ε), β].
To examine how uncertainty affects the level of the choice variable selected by a risk
averse individual, following Kraus (1979) and Katz (1981), we will compare the solution
under uncertainty with the solution when uncertainty is removed by setting the random
element equal to its mean (i.e., setting ε˜ = ε¯). When uncertainty is removed, risk preferences
are irrelevant, and the producer’s problem is to
max
a
z(a, β, ε) (4.4)
which yields the vector of first-order conditions as
za(aˆ, β, ε¯) = 0 (4.5)
with the optimal choice aˆ. When uncertainty exists, then the first-order condition in (4.3)
can be expressed as
E[Uz(.)za(.)] = 0 (4.6)
Since Cov[Uz(.), za(.)] = E[Uz(.)za(.)] − E[Uz(.)]E[za(.)], the first-order condition under
uncertainty can be written as
Cov[Uz(.), za(.)] + E[Uz(.)]E[za(.)] = 0 (4.7)
To show the impact of risk we compare a∗, the solution under uncertainty, with aˆ. If
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zaε(.) ≥ 0 together with risk aversion, implies that the covariance term must be negative1.
As marginal utility (Uz(.)) is positive, satisfaction of the first-order condition requires that
E[za(a
∗, β, ε˜)] ≥ 0. If zaεε(.) ≤ 0, then Jensen’s inequality implies E[za(aˆ, β, ε˜)] ≤ 02. It
follows that E[za(a
∗, β, ε˜)] − E[za(aˆ, β, ε˜)] ≥ 0. As the only difference between the two
expectations is the evaluation of a, and because za(.) is decreasing in a (zaa < 0), then
a∗ < aˆ. In fact, because zaε(.) ≥ 0, that is, an increase in a renders the payoff function more
sensitive to the source of risk, the risk-averse producer will reduce sensitivity by decreasing
a. A parallel analysis of equation (4.7) shows that when zaε(.) ≤ 0 and zaεε(.) ≥ 0, then risk
aversion implies a∗ ≥ aˆ. Thus, the impact of the existence of uncertainty on optimal choice
by a risk averse individual depends on the second and third cross-derivatives of the payoff
function (zaε and zaεε).
4.2.3 Government Payments Impact on Agricultural Decisions un-
der Uncertainty
Now we look at marginal changes in the decision environment such as government payments,
as represented by an increase in β. Following Ormiston (1992), we differentiate the first-order
condition under uncertainty (equation (4.3)) partially with respect to a and β to obtain3
da∗
dβ
=
1
∆
∫ 1
0
A[z]zβ(.)Uz[.]za(.)dF (ε)− 1
∆
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaβ(.)dF (ε) (4.8)
1Note that if ε increases, za increases since zaε > 0, and also z increases since zε > 0 and so Uz decreases
since Uzz < 0 (risk aversion). Therefore, there is a negative relationship between Uz and za.
2If za is a concave function in ε (i.e. zaεε ≤ 0), then by Jensen’s inequality we can write:
E[za(aˆ, β, ε˜)] ≤ za(aˆ, β, ε¯)
because from the first order condition in (4.5) we have za(aˆ, β, ε¯) = 0, then we can write:
E[za(aˆ, β, ε˜)] ≤ 0.
3First-order equation under uncertainty, equation (4.3), was
Ω =
∫ 1
0
Uz[z(a, β, ε)]za(a, β, ε)dF (ε) = 0
By totally differentiating with respect to a and β, we have:
dΩ
da
=
∫ 1
0
Uzz[.]z2a(.)dF (ε) +
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaa(.)dF (ε) = 0
and
dΩ
dβ
=
∫ 1
0
Uzz[.]zβ(.)za(.)dF (ε) +
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaβ(.)dF (ε) = 0
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where A[.] = −Uzz[.]/Uz[.] is the absolute risk-aversion function defined earlier. Now we can
partition the effect of β on a∗ into three elements, the coupling impact, the wealth impact,
and the insurance impact (Hennessy, 1998).
4.2.3.1 Coupling Impact
The coupling impact is represented by the expression − 1
∆
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaβ(.)dF (ε) in (4.8) and has
the sign of zaβ(.) (note that Uz > 0 and ∆ < 0). If β acts to increase the marginal effect of a
on payoff z(.), then it will increase the producer’s disposition to use a. For example, a price
subsidy (on output or input) is coupled because this kind of government supports increases
directly the marginal effect of input on profit through higher output prices.
4.2.3.2 Wealth Impact
The wealth and insurance effects are presented in the first term on the right-hand side of
(4.8). If J(., ε) ≡ A[.]zβ(.), so the expression is Q ≡ 1∆
∫ 1
0
J(., ε)Uz(.)za(.)dF (ε). Integrating
by parts yields 1
Q ≡ 1/∆
[
J(., v)
∫ v
0
Uz(.)za(.)dF (ε)|v=1v=0 −
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0
Uz(.)za(.)dF (ε)
dJ(., v)
dv
dv
]
(4.9)
By the first-order condition (4.3) the first integral term equals zero. Then,
Q ≡ −
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0
1
∆
Uz(.)za(.)dF (ε)
dJ(., v)
dv
dv (4.10)
where v is used as the dummy variable of integration for the variable ε. To identify wealth
and insurance effects note that, if zaε(.) ≥ 0, the first-order condition (4.3) implies that the
Then, by implicit differentiation’s definition, we have:
da
dβ
= −dΩ/dβ
dΩ/da
= −
∫ 1
0
Uzz[.]zβ(.)za(.)dF (ε) +
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaβ(.)dF (ε)∫ 1
0
Uzz[.]z2a(.)dF (ε) +
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaa(.)dF (ε)
Since the denominator is the second-order condition under uncertainty which was called ∆(< 0), we can
write:
da
dβ
=
− ∫ 1
0
Uzz[.]zβ(.)za(.)dF (ε)
∆
−
∫ 1
0
Uz[.]zaβ(.)dF (ε)
∆
Defining A[.] = −Uzz[.]/Uz[.], equation (4.8) can be obtained.
1If f(x) is continuously differentiable and g(x) is continuous, integrating by parts’ definition requires∫
f(x)g(x)dx = f(x)
∫
g(x)dx−
∫
(f ′(x)
∫
g(x)dx)dx
.
70
expression
∫ v
0
Uz(.)za(.)dF (ε) (which is equal to E[Uzza] = Cov[Uz, za] +E[Uz]E[za]) is never
positive because of the positivity of marginal utility Uz(.) and because za(.) is negative at
low ε and increases to be positive at high ε. Since ∆ < 0, Q is positive if dJ(., v)/dv ≤ 0.
Differentiate to obtain
dJ(., v)/dv = zβ(.)Az[.]zε(.) + A[.]zβε(.) (4.11)
The first part of this expression is called the wealth effect because its negativity depends
upon the DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) property and the sign of zβ(.) (recall that
zε(.) ≥ 0). All other things equal, if β shifts the distribution of payoffs rightward (zβ(.) ≥ 0),
and if preferences are DARA (Az[.] < 0), then a increases.
4.2.3.3 Insurance Impact
The second part of equation (4.11), A[.]zβε(.), is the insurance effect. If the shift in β acts
to stabilize income, that is if zβε(.) ≤ 0 which insures that the support policy actually acts
to mitigate risk, then optimal a tends to increase. For example, if the government supports
producers through decoupled payments, such as payments based on the previous five years of
income (which are not based on the level of current output or prices), government payments
can lead to a profit distribution with higher mean and lower variance, and therefore increase
in optimal choice by producers. In this case, both wealth and insurance effects act to increase
optimal a. To remove the insurance effect, a decoupled program must be invariant to the
source of randomness i.e. zβε(.) = 0
1, while preferences must be constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) for the wealth effect to be absent i.e. Az = 0.
4.3 The Theoretical Model of Acreage Decisions
In this section, the optimal acreage decisions under uncertainty are derived and specified.
The three main channels affecting the optimum outlined in the previous section - price,
wealth and insurance impacts - are incorporated. Hence, the model is able to incorporate
the effect of government payments on acreage decisions by influencing these channels. First,
following Chavas and Holt (1990), optimal acreage choice for each crop as a function of initial
wealth, expected profits and variance of profits (profit distributions determinants) is derived.
1However, for many decoupled support policies, the magnitude of support is conditional on the evaluation
of risk source (ε).
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Then, properties of the optimal acreage decision including symmetry and homogeneity are
discussed. Since Chavas and Holt’s model does not address the insurance effect emphasized in
the literature, the symmetry restrictions provided by Chavas and Holt are extended in a way
such that the model has the potential to include explicitly the insurance effect in addition to
the wealth effect. Next, the optimal acreage choice for each crop is specified as a function of
total wealth i.e. initial wealth plus total profit (wealth effect), expected profit for individual
crops and their variances (coupling/price effect), and the variance of total profit (insurance
effect). Government payments are incorporated into the model through truncation of the
profit distributions. Finally, the expected signs for explanatory variables are analytically
derived based on the portfolio theory.
4.3.1 The Model
In this section, we modify Chavas and Holt’s (1990) expected utility model for acreage deci-
sions. Consider a farm household producing n crops, agricultural revenue is given by
R =
n∑
i=1
piyiAi (4.12)
where pi is the market price of the ith crop, Ai is the number of acres devoted to the ith
crop and yi is the corresponding yield per acre, i = 1, ..., n. The total cost of agricultural
production is
C =
n∑
i=1
ciAi (4.13)
where ci shows the cost of production per acre of the ith crop. In the present case, revenue
(R) is a risky variable because output prices p = (p1, ..., pn) and crop yields y = (y1, ..., yn)
are not observed by the household when production decisions are made. Input prices and per
acre costs (ci), however, are known at the time crop acreages are allocated.
The household faces the budget constraint
I +R− C = qG or I +
n∑
i=1
piyiAi −
n∑
i=1
ciAi = qG (4.14)
where I denotes exogenous income (initial wealth) and G is an index of household consump-
tion of goods purchased with corresponding consumer price index q, qG presents household
consumption expenditures. Initial wealth may be held in risky assets. Thus, following Chavas
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(1987), the initial wealth is also modelled here as random variable. The above equation
states that initial wealth (I) plus farm profit (R − C), which can be called total wealth
(I + R − C = W), is equal to consumption expenditures (qG). The constraint on acreage
decisions (or adding-up constraint) can be represented by
f(A) = 0 (4.15)
where A = (A1, ..., An).
Assume that the farm household preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstem
(v.N-M) utility function U(G) satisfying UG > 0. If the farm household maximizes expected
utility under competition, then the decision model is
max
A,G
E[U(G)]
s.t. I +
∑n
i=1 piyiAi −
∑n
i=1 ciAi = qG and f(A) = 0
(4.16)
where E is the expectation operator over the random variables. After substituting the budget
constraint into the utility function, the maximization problem is expressed as
max
A
E[U(I/q +
n∑
i=1
(pi/qyi − ci/q)Ai)] s.t. f(A) = 0, or
max
A
E[U(w +
n∑
i=1
piiAi)] s.t. f(A) = 0
(4.17)
where w = (I/q) denotes normalized initial wealth and pii = (pi/q)yi−(ci/q) shows normalized
profit per acre of the ith crop, and all prices are deflated by the consumer price index q.
In this setting, yields y, output prices p and initial wealth w are random variables with
given subjective probability distributions. Consequently, the expectation E is over the un-
certain variables y, p and w and is based on the information available to the household at
planting time.
If A∗ denotes the optimal acreage choice in optimization equation (4.17), then the La-
grange’s equation will be L = E[U(w + ΠA′)] + µ(f(A)) where µ > 0 and the first-order
conditions ( ∂L
∂A
= 0 and ∂L
∂µ
= 0) are written as1
E[UWΠ] + µfA = 0 (4.18)
1The bordered hessian for the second order condition being satisfied isH =
(
E[UWW (Π)2] + µfAA fA
fA 0
)
.
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f(A) = 0 (4.19)
where Π = (pi1, ..., pin) is assumed to be a random variable with mean Π¯ and variance-
covariance matrix σ, A′ = (A1, ..., An)′ and fA = ∂f/∂A is a (1 × n) of vector. We follow
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) and expand UW around expected wealth W , W¯
′ = w¯ + AΠ¯′.
First-order Taylor series expansion about mean wealth yields UW ∼= U¯W +
(
(w− w¯)+A(Π′−
Π¯′)
)
U¯WW , where U¯W and U¯WW are the first and second-order derivatives of the utility function
evaluated at the expected wealth W¯ . Substituting the Taylor series expansion into the first-
order condition (4.18) and rearranging terms yields1,
U¯W Π¯ + U¯WWAσ + µfA = 0 (4.20)
Therefore, optimal acreage choice in (4.17) depends on expected normalized initial wealth
w, expected normalized crop profits per acre p¯ii, as well as second moment
2 of the distributions
of normalized profits per acre, denoted here by σn×n and initial wealth σw (see also Chavas,
1987). Therefore, the optimal acreage decision can be written as A∗(w¯; Π¯;σ;σw).
4.3.2 Properties of the Optimal Acreage Decision
To ensure the robustness of the model’s results, in this section we focus on the theoretical
restrictions implied by (4.17), which can modify the empirical specification of the acreage
decision A∗(w¯; Π¯;σ;σw). Through the theoretical restriction channel, this dissertation makes
a contribution to the literature by incorporating the insurance effect (income stabilization)
emphasized in the literature, while ignored by Chavas and Holt model (1990), into our the-
oretical model. Based on the theoretical discussions regarding the role of insurance effect
in acreage decisions, the theoretical restrictions examined by Chavas and Holt (1990) are
extended, which enables the inclusion of this effect in the model’s specification.
1From (4.18),
E[UWΠ] ∼= E[(U¯W + ((w − w¯) +A(Π′ − Π¯′))U¯WW )Π]
then,
E[UWΠ] ∼= U¯WE[Π] + U¯WWA[E(Π′Π)− E(Π′)E(Π)]
then,
E[UWΠ] ∼= U¯W Π¯ + U¯WWAσ,
note that σ is crop profit variance-covariance matrix with order n× n.
2Note that since here we follow Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) and use only the first-order Taylor series
expansion for approximation of UW , the optimal acreage is a function of first and second moments and not
higher moments of the distributions of profits. In general Taylor series expansion, it is usually found that
because Uk/k! becomes smaller at a rather faster rate than moments i.e., Mk becomes larger as k increases,
terms beyond those involving the higher moments add insignificantly to the precision of the approximation.
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First, by considering the relationship between the wealth compensated and uncompen-
sated acreage decision functions, Chavas and Holt (1990) have shown that the acreage deci-
sion is affected by expected total wealth (wealth effect). However, the theoretical framework
provided by Hennessy (1998) suggests a role for an insurance effect in acreage decisions.
Hence, we should also consider the relationship between income stabilization compensated
and uncompensated acreage decision functions. Based on this modification, the model has a
specification different from the one by Chavas and Holt (1990), i.e. acreage response would
be a function of variance of total profit in addition to the expected total wealth, expected
individual crop profits and the variance-covariance of individual crop profits. The procedure
that shows total wealth and its variance should be included in the model is as follows.
Following Chavas (1987), consider the compensation function C defined implicitly as
follows
{V (w + C, .) = max
s.t.f(A)=0
E[U(w + C +ΠA′)] = U0}
where V denotes the indirect objective function and C is the certain amount of money
that must be given to (or paid by, if negative) the decision maker in order to keep him at a
particular level of utility U0. The compensation function, as defined in the above, is a function
of w¯, Π¯, σ, σw and U
0. The relationships between the uncompensated choice function A∗
and the compensated function Ac are defined as
Ac(w¯, Π¯, σ, σw, U
0) = A∗(w¯ + C(w¯, Π¯, σ, σw, U0), Π¯, σ, σw)
The above expression indicates how the compensation, C, influences optimal choices (acres).
By differentiating with respect to Π¯ and σ1, we have
(
∂Ac
∂Π¯
∂Ac
∂σ
)
n×n(n+1)
=
(
∂A∗
∂Π¯
∂A∗
∂σ
)
n×n(n+1)
+
(
∂A∗
∂C
)
n×1
.
(
∂C
∂Π¯
∂C
∂σ
)
1×n(n+1)
(4.21)
or in an expanded form, we have
1Note that Chavas and Holt (1990) consider only the differentiation with respect to Π¯ and do not take
into account another element σ in the choice functions.
75

∂Ac1
∂Π¯1
· · · ∂Ac1
∂Π¯n
∂Ac1
∂σ11
∂Ac1
∂σ12
· · · ∂Ac1
∂σnn
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
∂Acn
∂Π¯1
· · · ∂Acn
∂Π¯n
∂Acn
∂σ11
∂Acn
∂σ12
· · · ∂Acn
∂σnn
 =

∂A∗1
∂Π¯1
· · · ∂A∗1
∂Π¯n
∂A∗1
∂σ11
∂A∗1
∂σ12
· · · ∂A∗1
∂σnn
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
∂A∗n
∂Π¯1
· · · ∂A∗n
∂Π¯n
∂A∗n
∂σ11
∂A∗n
∂σ12
· · · ∂A∗n
∂σnn
+

∂A∗1
∂C
. . .
∂A∗n
∂C
 .( ∂C∂Π¯1 · · · ∂C∂Π¯n ∂C∂σ11 ∂C∂σ12 · · · ∂C∂σnn)
(4.22)
Levy and Markowitz (1979) have demonstrated that the mean-variance model is appro-
priate as a second-order Taylor series approximation to all risk-averse utility functions. In
order to determine
∂Aci
∂Π¯j
and
∂Aci
∂σij
(i, j = 1, ..., n), for simplicity the expected utility in the
above can be considered as having the form U = W¯ − 1
2
τσW , where W¯ is expected to-
tal wealth, τ shows the non-constant coefficient of risk aversion, i.e. τ(W¯ , σW ), and σW is
the variance of total wealth. One can define W¯ = w¯ + Π¯A′ = w¯ +
∑n
i=1 Π¯iAi, where ex-
pected total wealth is expected initial wealth, w¯, plus expected income from the market, and
σW = σw+AσA
′ = σw+
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij, where σ is a variance-covariance matrix of crop
profits.
If U0 is a particular level of utility which is intended to be maintained through the
compensation, when components of W¯ and σW changes, one can write U
0 = w¯ + C +∑n
i=1 Π¯iAi − 12τ(
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw). Thus, by taking the total differential, we have,
∂C
∂Π¯j
= −
(
Aj − 12τW¯Aj(
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
)(
1− 1
2
τW¯ (
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
) = −Acj (4.23)
and
∂C
∂w¯
= −
(
1− 1
2
τW¯ (
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
)(
1− 1
2
τW¯ (
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
) = −1 (4.24)
In addition, we can obtain,
∂C
∂σij
= −−
(
1
2
τAiAj +
1
2
τσWAiAj(
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
)(
1− 1
2
τW¯ (
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
) (4.25)
and
∂C
∂σw
= −−
(
1
2
τ + 1
2
τσW (
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
)(
1− 1
2
τW¯ (
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1AiAjσij + σw)
) (4.26)
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where τW¯ and τσW are partial derivative of τ with respect to total expected wealth and its
variance.
From equation (4.22), we have
∂Aci
∂Π¯j
=
∂A∗i
∂Π¯j
+
∂A∗i
∂C
∂C
∂Π¯j
=
∂A∗i
∂Π¯j
+
∂A∗i
∂w¯
∂w¯
∂C
∂C
∂Π¯j
(4.27)
Evaluating (4.23) and (4.24) at C = 0 and by substituting equations (4.23) and (4.24) into
(4.27), we have
∂Aci
∂Π¯j
=
∂A∗i
∂Π¯j
− ∂A
∗
i
∂w¯
A∗j (4.28)
Aci is the wealth compensated acreage decision, holding utility constant. The matrix of
compensated effects
∂Aci
∂Π¯j
in expression (4.28) is symmetric, positive semidefinite (Chavas,
1987). Expression (4.28) also indicates that the slope of the uncompensated function
∂A∗i
∂Π¯j
can
be decomposed as the sum of two terms: the compensated slope (or substitution effect)
∂Aci
∂Π¯j
which maintains a given level of utility plus the wealth effect (
∂A∗i
∂w¯
A∗j).
Further from equation (4.22), we have,
∂Aci
∂σij
=
∂A∗i
∂σij
+
∂A∗i
∂C
∂C
∂σij
=
∂A∗i
∂σij
+
∂A∗i
∂σw
∂σw
∂C
∂C
∂σij
(4.29)
Evaluating (4.25) and (4.26) at C = 0 and by substituting equations (4.25) and (4.26) into
(4.29), we have
∂Aci
∂σij
=
∂A∗i
∂σij
− ∂A
∗
i
∂σw
A∗iA
∗
j (4.30)
Aci is the insurance compensated acreage decision, holding utility constant. Expression
(4.30) indicates that the slope of the uncompensated function
∂A∗i
∂σij
can be decomposed as the
sum of two terms: the compensated slope,
∂Aci
∂σij
, which maintains a given level of utility plus
the insurance effect,
∂A∗i
∂σw
A∗iA
∗
j , which is emphasized in the literature (Hennessy, 1998) but
ignored by Chavas and Holt (1990).
Second, another theoretical restriction is a homogeneity condition which has been derived
by Chavas and Pope (1985) in the context of the expected utility model (4.17). In particular,
rewriting expression (4.15) as f(A) = A1 − g(A.) = 0, where A = (A1, A.), Chavas and Pope
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have shown that the following restriction holds at the optimum under any risk preferences
∂A∗
∂Π¯
.
∂f(A)
∂A
− ∂A
∗
∂w
.
∂f(A)
∂A
.A = 0 (4.31)
Consider the first-order conditions (4.18), we have fA = E[UWΠ]/µ and we know that
E[UWΠ] = Cov(UW ,Π) + E(UW )E(Π). Given µ 6= 0, substituting these conditions into
(4.31) yields
∂A∗
∂Π¯
(Π¯ + ϕ)− ∂A
∗
∂w
(Π¯′ + ϕ′)A = 0 (4.32)
where ϕ = Cov(UW ,Π)/E(UW ) is an (n× 1) vector.
Under risk neutrality, ∂A∗/∂w = 0 and ϕ = 0, implying from (4.32) that the acreage
decision function A∗ is homogenous of degree zero in p¯ij (or in output and input prices, p and
c),
∑n
j=1
∂A∗i
∂p¯ij
p¯ij = 0. This homogeneity restriction of classical production theory states that
production decisions are not affected by proportional changes in all input and output prices.
However, under risk aversion, ϕ 6= 0 and (4.32) implies that this homogeneity-like restriction
takes a different form. In other words, in general under uncertainty the classical result of
riskless production theory, which asserts that production decisions depend only on input-
output price ratios, does not hold. Pope (1988) has presented some empirical implications
of specific forms of risk preferences. In particular, under constant relative risk aversion1,
a positive scaling of wealth does not alter optimal decisions2. This implies that decision
functions are almost homogenous of degree one in initial wealth, degree one in mean returns
Π¯, degree two in moments of order two, and degree s in moments of order s of pi (See Pope,
1988 for details).
4.3.3 Incorporation of Government Programs into the Model
The acreage decision model (4.17) involves uncertainty about prices p and yields y. In this
section the influence of government programs on the subjective probability distribution of
profits Π is considered. The resulting truncation of the subjective probability distribution of
profits will affect expected profits (Π¯) as well as the second (σ) and higher moments of the
profit distribution. Thus, a support program will influence both profit expectations and the
1The coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined as τ = (w +
∑n
i=1 piiAi)(−UwwUw ), where (−UwwUw ) is the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
2According to Pope (1988), a function h(Z1, ..., ZN ), h : RN → R is said to be almost homogenous of
degree C1, ..., CN and zero respectively if h(λC1Z1, ..., λCNZN ) = λ0h(Z1, ..., ZN ) where λ ∈ R+, the positive
real line.
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riskiness of profit.
We consider the normal case since the effects of multivariate truncation are best un-
derstood in the context of a normal distribution (See Johnson and Kotz, 1972). Let Π =
(pi1, pi2, ...) be a vector of normally distributed random profits with mean E(Π) = Π¯ =
(pi1, pi2, ...) and variance σ = E(Π− Π¯)′(Π− Π¯), where E is the expectation operator. Now,
assume that each random profit pii, is truncated from below at a levelHi. Define the truncated
random profits
piTi =
Hi if pii < Hi,pii if pii ≥ Hi, i = 1, 2, ..., n
Consider the standardized random profit ei =
piTi −p¯ii
σ
1/2
ii
and define hi =
Hi−p¯ii
σ
1/2
ii
. The mean and
variance of ei are derived in Chavas and Holt (1990). The expected value of ei, is
e¯i = E(ei) = φ(hi) + hiΦ(hi) (4.33)
where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the standard normal density function and distribution function,
respectively. The second moments of ei, are given by
Mii = E(e
2
i ) = 1− Φ(hi) + hiφ(hi) + h2iΦ(hi) (4.34)
and if i 6= j,
Mij = E(eiej) = F (hi, hj)ρij + [(1− ρ2ij)/2× 3.14]1/2φ(Zij) + hiφ(hj)Φ(kij)
+ hjφ(hi)Φ(kji) + hihjΦ(hi, hj)
(4.35)
where F (hi, hj) = prob(pii ≥ Hi, pij ≥ Hj) = Φ(hi, hj)+1−Φ(hi)−Φ(hj), ρij = σij/(σiiσjj)1/2,
Zij = {(hi − 2pijhihj + hj)/(l − ρ2ij)}1/2, kij = (hi − ρijhj)/(l − ρ2ij)1/2 and Φ(hi, hj) =
prob(pii < Hi, pij < Hj). It follows that the mean, variance, and covariance of Π
T =
(piT1 , pi
T
2 , ...) are
p¯iTi = E(pi
T
i ) = p¯ii + σ
1/2
ii e¯i (4.36)
and,
σTii = E(pi
T
i − p¯iTi )2 = σii(Mii − e¯2i ) (4.37)
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and,
Cov(p¯iTi , p¯i
T
j ) = E(pi
T
i − p¯iTi )(piTj − p¯iTj ) = (σiiσjj)1/2(Mij − e¯ie¯j) (4.38)
The above expressions provide an analytical evaluation of the truncation effect of a support
program on the mean, variance, and covariance of commodity profits. These results will be
used to investigate the influence of government programs on crop acreage decisions. Figure 4.1
illustrates the effects of government programs on the mean and variance of commodity profit
distribution. When untruncated expected commodity profits are substantially above the
guaranteed income by government, the effect of government program on moments of the profit
distribution will remain at a minimum. However, when untruncated expected commodity
profits are either slightly above the guaranteed income or actually below the guaranteed
income, the effects on moments of the profit distributions will be more pronounced.
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Figure 4.1: The Effects of Government Program Truncation on Crop Profit Distribution
The above expressions show that to derive the truncated mean and variance-covariance of
profits we need an untruncated mean and variance-covariance of profits (Π¯, σ). The formula
for untruncated mean and variance-covariance of profits will be discussed in the next chapter.
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4.3.4 Model Specification and Hypothesized Signs on Parameters
As explained in part 4.3.1, the optimal acreage decision can be written as A∗(w¯; Π¯;σ;σw).
Using the first-order Taylor series expansion, the acreage equations can be specified as
Ait = a0 + (∂Ai/∂w¯)w¯t−1 +
n∑
j=1
(∂Ai/∂p¯ij)p¯i
T
jt +
n∑
k≥j
n∑
j=1
(∂Ai/∂σjk)σ
T
jkt + (∂Ai/∂σw)σw + υit
(4.39)
where p¯iT is the truncated mean of crop profits and σT shows the truncated variance-
covariance of crop profits. Using (4.28) and (4.30), it follows that equation (4.39) can be
expressed alternatively as
Ait = a0 + (∂Ai/∂w¯)w¯t−1 +
n∑
j=1
(∂Aci/∂p¯ij + ∂Ai/∂w¯Aj)p¯i
T
jt+
n∑
k≥j
n∑
j=1
(∂Aci/∂σjk + ∂Ai/∂σwAjAk)σ
T
jkt + (∂Ai/∂σw)σw + υit
(4.40)
Letting βij = ∂A
c
i/∂p¯ij and γijk = ∂A
c
i/∂σjk be the compensated slopes with respect to p¯i
and σ, respectively, then
Ait = a0 + αi(w¯t−1 +
n∑
j=1
Ajp¯i
T
jt) +
n∑
j=1
βijp¯i
T
jt +
n∑
k≥j
n∑
j=1
γijkσ
T
jkt + δi(
n∑
k≥j
n∑
j=1
AjAkσ
T
jkt + σw) + υit
(4.41)
where αi = ∂Ai/∂W¯
1 and δi = ∂Ai/∂σW . Note that in equation (4.41),
∑n
j=1Ajp¯i
T
jt is
equal to the truncated mean of total (farm) profit and along with initial wealth comprises
the wealth effect. This wealth effect shows the income-supporting attribute of government
policies, that is, higher average income arising from the support policy may affect producer
decisions.
∑n
k≥j
∑n
j=1AjAkσ
T
jkt is equal to the truncated variance of total profit and along
with initial wealth variability comprises the insurance effect. This insurance effect shows
the income-stabilizing attribute of government policies; that is, programs may affect optimal
decisions by reducing the variance of the farm crop portfolio. In the absence of a priori
information about functional form, equation (4.41) provides a local approximation to the
decision function A∗(.). Also, the symmetry of (4.28) implies that βij = βji, i 6= j. Thus,
1Note that ∂Ai/∂w¯ = ∂Ai/∂W¯ .∂W¯/∂w¯ and since ∂W¯/∂w¯ = 1 (because W¯ = w¯ + Π¯A′), therefore
∂Ai/∂w¯ = ∂Ai/∂W¯ .
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equation (4.41) is convenient for testing and/or imposing the symmetry restrictions (4.28).
Equation (4.41) can be used directly for an empirical analysis of acreage decisions.
Considering that the allocation of a given amount of land to different crops is similar to
choosing an optimal portfolio of assets, we use portfolio theory to determine the hypothesized
relationships (signs) between acreage of a given crop and each of the variables in equation
(4.41) including profits, variances and covariances. To do this, the general procedure by
which an optimal portfolio is chosen by an investor is first explained. Then, this procedure is
applied to the specific case with three products (which gives the same results as N products
case) and based on the derived equations the sign of the related variables can be determined.
For finding the optimal portfolio the utility function and efficient sets must be derived
in return and variance space. For determining the curvature of utility function, following
Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977), the utility of wealth can be written as a second-
order1 Taylor series expansion about a given level of wealth (say W0)
U(W ) = U(W0) + UW (W0)(W −W0) + UWW (W0)(W −W0)2/2! (4.42)
If the particular positive linear transformation of subtracting U(W0) and dividing by UW (W0)
are made, U(W ) is expressed as
U(W ) = (W −W0) + UWW (W0)
2UW (W0)
(W −W0)2 (4.43)
and the restriction UW > 0 necessities 1+2
UWW (W0)
2UW (W0)
(W −W0) > 0. Assuming a = cW 20 −W0,
b = 1−2cW0, c = UWW (W0)/2UW (W0), where c is negative for risk averse individual because
UWW is negative for risk averse individual, positive for risk preferrer and zero for risk neutral,
and σ = E(W 2)− [E(W )]2, then expected utility of wealth is
E[U(W )] = a+ bE(W ) + c[E(W )]2 + cσ (4.44)
For convenience, equation (4.44) is written as
U = a+ bE + cE2 + cσ (4.45)
1Assuming the derivatives beyond the second are sufficiently small to be ignored, we can use only the
second-order Taylor series expansion and the utility function approximation can be written in quadratic
form.
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The above equation implies a utility surface in the three dimensions, U , E and σ. For constant
values of U , the function can be represented by a series of isoutility contours or indifference
curves in (E, σ) space. Thus, setting U equal to some constant U∗, rearranging gives
σ = U∗/c− a/c− bE/c− E2 (4.46)
as the (E, σ) locus of all mean-variance combinations that yield the same level of utility. By
totally differentiating and dU∗ = 0, the decision maker’s tradeoff or substitution rate between
mean and variance is given by the slope of the isoutility curve, which is
dE/dσ = −c/(1 + 2cE) (4.47)
Since UW = 1 + 2
UWW (W0)
2UW (W0)
(W −W0) = 1 + 2c(W −W0) > 0, its expected value (1 + 2cE)
must be positive also. Hence, dE/dσ will be positive, zero, or negative within the relevant
range according to whether c is negative (for risk averse individual), zero (for risk neutral),
or positive (for risk preferrer). As is intuitively obvious, a risk averse decision maker will
need increases in mean value to compensate for increased variance if his utility is to remain
unchanged.
The second derivative of the isoutility curve is
d2E/dσ2 = [
2c2
(1 + 2cE)2
]dE/dσ (4.48)
The term in square brackets is always positive, and dE/dσ is positive or negative over the
relevant range according to whether c is negative or positive. Hence, for a risk averse in-
dividual the isoutility curves have positive slope and are convex (increasing slope i.e., the
tradeoff rate increases as σ increases), and for a risk loving individual the isoutility curves
have negative slope and are concave. The greater the degree of risk aversion or preference
(the greater |c| is), the steeper the indifference curves. The above relationships are shown
in figure 4.2 which illustrates the respective indifference curves for risk-averse, risk-preferrer
and risk-neutral decision makers.
After finding the curvature of utility function in return and variance space, to be able
to find the optimal portfolio, in this space the efficient set should also be identified. The
efficient set represents the combinations of investments that provide either the highest possible
expected return for any specified degree of risk or the lowest possible risk for any specified
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Figure 4.2: Isoutility Curves for U = a+ bE + cE2 + cσ
expected return. To do this, a set of two risky prospects, i and j, can be considered. This set
of prospect mix is called a portfolio. A portfolio with only enterprise i is a low risk portfolio,
and a portfolio that is composed only of enterprise j is a high risk portfolio. For any mixture
of i and j with Ai (Ai ≥ 0 and
∑
Ai ≤ A, i = 1, 2, ..., n) units of A (total acreage available)
devoted to i and Aj(= A− Ai) devoted to j, the expected profit and variance of profit are
E = Aip¯ii + (A− Ai)p¯ij (4.49)
σ = A2iσi + 2ρijσ
.5
i σ
.5
j Ai(A− Ai) + (A− Ai)2σj (4.50)
where p¯ii denotes the expected profit per unit of investment in prospect i, σi shows variance
of the per unit profit from prospect i, covariance of the per unit profits from prospects i and
j is σij = ρijσ
.5
i σ
.5
j , and ρij is correlation coefficient of the per unit profit from prospects i
and j.
In figure 4.3, points i(Aiσ
.5
i , Aip¯ii)
1 and j(Ajσ
.5
j , Ajp¯ij) respectively denote the portfolios
with all the units of acreage A devoted to i or to j. Note that the linear form of expected
profit equation implies that the proportionate holdings Ai/A in i and Aj/A = (A−Ai)/A in
j can be measured by the relative distance along the E axis taken inversely between the E
values for i and j. Thus point B(0,
p¯ijσ
.5
i +p¯iiσ
.5
j
σ.5i +σ
.5
j
· A) in figure 4.3 corresponds to the portfolio
with Ai/A = DB/DC, Aj/A = BC/DC.
For the case of perfect positive correlation (ρij = 1), equation (4.50) reduces to
σ.5 = Aiσ
.5
i + (A− Ai)σ.5j (4.51)
1i(x, y) denotes the coordinates of point i.
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Since p¯ii, p¯ij, σi, σj, and A are given, by rearranging (4.51) to give Ai in terms of σ
.5 (Ai =
(σ.5 − Aσ.5j )/(σ.5i − σ.5j )), and substituting into (4.49), one has
E = (
p¯ii − p¯ij
σ.5i − σ.5j
)σ.5 + (
p¯ijσ
.5
i − p¯iiσ.5j
σ.5i − σ.5j
)A (4.52)
then,
∂E/∂σ.5 =
p¯ii − p¯ij
σ.5i − σ.5j
(4.53)
Since p¯ii < p¯ij and σ
.5
i < σ
.5
j , the slope is positive. This shows E to be a linear function
of σ.5 and passing through the points i and j of figure 4.3. Hence, in figure 4.3 if i and j are
perfectly positively correlated, all portfolio mixtures of them lie on the straight line joining i
and j.
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Figure 4.3: The Relation between Correlation and Diversification
If i and j are uncorrelated (ρij = 0), from equation (4.50) one has
σ = A2iσi + (A− Ai)2σj (4.54)
which is always less than σ from (4.51) since 2ρijσ
.5
i σ
.5
j Ai(A−Ai) is always positive. Thus if
i and j are uncorrelated, their portfolio mixtures have lower variance than if they are perfectly
correlated. By rearranging (4.54) to giveAi in terms of σ
.5 (Ai =
2Aσj±
√
4A2σ2j−4(σi+σj)(A2σj−σ)
2(σi+σj)
),
and substituting into (4.49), one has
E =
2Aσj +
√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
2(σi + σj)
(p¯ii − p¯ij) + Ap¯ij (4.55)
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then
∂E/∂σ.5 =
2(p¯ii − p¯ij)σ.5√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
(4.56)
since p¯ii < p¯ij and all other terms are positive, then ∂E/∂σ
.5 < 0 and ∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 > 01.
Therefore, portfolio mixtures are shown by a decreasing convex curve joining points i and F 2
in figure 4.3. Further
E =
2Aσj −
√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
2(σi + σj)
(p¯ii − p¯ij) + Ap¯ij (4.57)
and
∂E/∂σ.5 =
−2(p¯ii − p¯ij)σ.5√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
(4.58)
since p¯ii < p¯ij and all other terms are positive, then ∂E/∂σ
.5 > 0 and ∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 < 03.
Therefore, portfolio mixtures are shown by an increasing concave curve joining points j and
F in figure 4.3. Indeed, the variance-reducing effect of diversification between uncorrelated
prospects is so strong that for a risk averse individual a mixture of them will always dominate
the pure prospect with the lower mean. This is shown in figure 4.3 by the negative slope near
1From (4.56) we can write,
∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 =
2(p¯ii − p¯ij)√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
− 8(p¯ii − p¯ij)(σi + σj)σ√
(4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ))3
Rearranging gives,
∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 =
2(p¯ii − p¯ij)√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
[1− 4(σi + σj)σ
4(σi + σj)σ − 4A2σiσj ]
Since p¯ii < p¯ij , the first part is negative and since
4(σi+σj)σ
4(σi+σj)σ−4A2σiσj > 1 (when 4A
2σiσj < 4(σi + σj)σ or
σ >
A2σiσj
σi+σj
), the second part in bracket is also negative. Therefore, ∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 > 0.
2Note that the coordinates of point F are determined by equating (4.55) and (4.57) i.e. 4A2σ2j − 4(σi +
σj)(A2σj − σ) = 0 which gives F (
√
A2σiσj
σi+σj
, Aσj
p¯ii−p¯ij
σi+σj
+Ap¯ij).
3For determining the sign, one can follow the same procedure as previous footnote. From (4.58) we can
write,
∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 =
−2(p¯ii − p¯ij)√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
+
8(p¯ii − p¯ij)(σi + σj)σ√
(4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ))3
Rearranging gives,
∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 =
−2(p¯ii − p¯ij)√
4A2σ2j − 4(σi + σj)(A2σj − σ)
[1− 4(σi + σj)σ
4(σi + σj)σ − 4A2σiσj ]
Since p¯ii < p¯ij , the first part is positive and since
4(σi+σj)σ
4(σi+σj)σ−4A2σiσj > 1 (when 4A
2σiσj < 4(σi + σj)σ or
σ >
A2σiσj
σi+σj
), the second part in bracket is negative. Therefore, ∂2E/∂(σ.5)2 < 0.
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i of the curve for ρij = 0.
If i and j are perfectly negatively correlated (ρij = −1), from equation (4.50) we have
σ.5 = ±(Aiσ.5i − (A− Ai)σ.5j ) (4.59)
By rearranging (4.59) to give Ai in terms of σ
.5 (Ai =
Aσ.5j ±σ.5
σ.5i +σ
.5
j
), and substituting into (4.49),
we have
E = (
p¯ii − p¯ij
σ.5i + σ
.5
j
)σ.5 + (
p¯ijσ
.5
i + p¯iiσ
.5
j
σ.5i + σ
.5
j
)A (4.60)
then
∂E/∂σ.5 =
p¯ii − p¯ij
σ.5i + σ
.5
j
(4.61)
since p¯ii < p¯ij and all other terms are positive, the slope is negative. Points i(Aiσ
.5
i , Aip¯ii) and
B(0,
p¯ijσ
.5
i +p¯iiσ
.5
j
σ.5i +σ
.5
j
· A) satisfy equation (4.60). A a result
E = (
p¯ij − p¯ii
σ.5i + σ
.5
j
)σ.5 + (
p¯ijσ
.5
i + p¯iiσ
.5
j
σ.5i + σ
.5
j
)A (4.62)
And
∂E/∂σ.5 =
p¯ij − p¯ii
σ.5i + σ
.5
j
(4.63)
since p¯ii < p¯ij and all other terms are positive, the slope is positive. Points j(Ajσ
.5
j , Ajp¯ij)
and B(0,
p¯ijσ
.5
i +p¯iiσ
.5
j
σ.5i +σ
.5
j
· A) satisfy equation (4.62). Thus with perfect negative correlation, it is
always possible to find a mixed portfolio with zero standard deviation. In this case, as shown
in figure 4.3, the curve for mixtures of i and j consists of two straight lines connecting each
of i and j with the zero variance combination depicted by point B.
In sum, the shape of an efficient set depends on the correlation between two crops profits
(or covariance terms). As discussed above, diversification often allows the variability of a
portfolio’s return to be significantly less than the variability of the individual components of
the portfolio1. As shown in figure 4.4, the degree to which producers can reduce their risk
1As a simple example, if there were two crops of equal mean and variance, the portfolio mean would
remain unchanged, but its variance would be
σ = [A2i + 2ρijAi(A−Ai) + (A−Ai)2]σi
Minimizing the variance ∂σ/∂Ai = (2− 2ρij)(2Ai− 1) = 0 gives Ai = 1/2 , which means that the variance is
minimized when the land is divided equally between the two crops because the variances are assumed equal,
and we have
σ =
1 + ρij
2
σi
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by diversifying their portfolio depends on the correlation between crop profits. The lower
the correlation between two crops profits, the greater the potential benefit to be obtained by
diversification (the more will be risk reduction effect of diversification). Combining crops with
perfect positive correlation or high positive correlation does not reduce risk in the portfolio.
Combining two crops with zero correlation reduces the risk of the portfolio. However, portfolio
risk cannot be eliminated. Combining two crops with perfect negative correlation could
eliminate risk altogether.
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Figure 4.4: The Effect of Different Degrees of Correlation on Efficient Portfolios
For N risky products, the same mathematical procedure as above can be followed to find
the efficient set. With many products, any portfolio inside a bullet-shaped region is feasible.
The minimum-variance boundary is the set of portfolios that minimize risk for a given level
of expected returns (on a graph, the minimum-variance boundary is an hyperbola). The
efficient frontier is the top half of the minimum-variance boundary.
The optimal portfolio for a farmer is the member of the efficient set that yields the highest
utility and determined by the tangency point between the efficient frontier (figure 4.3, note
that it is unusual to have risky prospects that are perfectly correlated. In general, we will
have −1 < ρij < 1, and it is the effect of this that leads to the general shape of the efficient
set as shown in figure 4.5.) and the farmer’s expected utility indifference curve (figure 4.2).
The tangency point indicates the highest level of expected utility the farmer can attain. For
the risk averse decision maker with isoutility curves U (1), U (2), and U (3) depicted in figure
4.5, optimal choice is obviously represented by the portfolio corresponding to the point C on
the efficient set. This gives him the highest achievable level of utility.
After the explanations about the optimal portfolio choice, without loss of generality this
which is less than the variance of each crop separately (if ρij < 1) and much less if ρij is negative.
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Figure 4.5: An Illustration of (E, σ) Portfolio Analysis (U (1) > U (2) > U (3))
procedure can be applied for a three-product case to determine the sign of variables such
as return, variance and covariance of individual products on the share of products in the
portfolio. Assume that producers choose the portfolio weights that maximize the expected
utility U with the common function (the utility function for profit is quadratic so that mean
and variance are the only moments relevant to the decision maker’s risky choice in maximizing
the expected utility)1:
U = W¯ − 1
2
τσW (4.64)
where W¯ is expected total wealth, τ shows the coefficient of risk aversion (τ > 0), while all
risk-averse farmers seek to avoid risk, different farmers have different levels of risk aversion
τ . Low values of τ are consistent with a higher tolerance for risk, while higher values for τ
equate to higher degrees of risk aversion. σW is the variance of total wealth. One can define
W = w + ΠA′ where total wealth W is initial wealth w and income from the market ΠA′.
1In using the mean-variance model instead of the more general expected utility models, as Anderson,
Dillon and Hardaker (1977) pointed out, if the returns from a risky portfolio are judged to follow a normal
distribution, mean-variance portfolio analysis is relevant even if the decision maker’s utility function is not
quadratic. The reason is that mean and variance-covariance completely specify the normal distribution, which
always has odd moments about the mean equal to zero, i.e., Mk(x) = 0 for k = 1, 3, 5, ..., and even moments
about the mean given by Mk(x) = (k − 1)(k − 3)(k − 5)...(3)(1)V k/2 for k = 2, 4, 6, ..., where V denotes the
second moment. In particular, M4(x) = 3M2(x) = 3V 2. Relevant to the assumption of normality is the
fact that, from the central limit theorem of mathematical statistics, the distribution of the sum of n random
variables approaches the normal distribution as n increases. Therefore, if profits are normally distributed,
the decision maker can rank alternatives using only two parameters, expected value and variance-covariance,
without concern to the higher moments of the distribution. Moreover, Levy and Markowitz (1979) have
demonstrated that the mean-variance model is appropriate as a second-order Taylor series approximation to
all risk-averse utility functions. Modeling acreage response as in this study is one such application of the
mean-variance theory that is being used in approximating expected utility as a function of expected profits
and variance-covariance of profits.
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Thus, we can write
U = w¯ + Π¯A′ − 1
2
τ(AσA′ + σw) (4.65)
where AσA′ = σT is variance of total profit.
In the three-crop case i, j, k the portfolio return is calculated as:
Π¯A′ = Aipii + Ajpij + Akpik (4.66)
where Ai, Aj, and Ak are the portfolio weights of crops i, j and k, respectively. These are
the weights that producers adjust to maximize utility. The expected returns are given by pii,
pij, and pik, respectively. The portfolio variance is calculated as:
σT = A
2
iσi + A
2
jσj + A
2
kσk + 2AiAjσij + 2AiAkσik + 2AjAkσjk (4.67)
where σij = σ
.5
i σ
.5
j ρij shows the covariance and ρij is i, j crops’ return correlation. The
standard deviations of crops are given by σ.5i , σ
.5
j and σ
.5
k . Portfolios are chosen by maximizing
expected utility subject to the constraint:
Max U = Aipii + Ajpij + Akpik − 12τ
(
A2iσi + A
2
jσj + A
2
kσk
+2AiAjσij + 2AiAkσik + 2AjAkσjk
)
s.t. Ai + Aj + Ak = 1
(4.68)
Substituting (1−Ai−Aj) for Ak into expected utility function U puts the problem in terms
of just two unknowns Ai and Aj:
Max U = Aipii + Ajpij + (1− Ai − Aj)pik − 12τ
(
A2iσi + A
2
jσj + (1− Ai − Aj)2σk
+2AiAjσij + 2Ai(1− Ai − Aj)σik + 2Aj(1− Ai − Aj)σjk
)
(4.69)
The optimal portfolio weight in i, Ai, can be found by setting ∂U/∂Ai = 0 and solving
for Ai which gives:
Ai =
pii − pik + τ(σk − σik)− τAj(σk − σik + σij − σkj)
τ(σi + σk − 2σik) (4.70)
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In this solution, the optimal portfolio weight in Ai is a function of Aj, which is also
unknown. Setting ∂U/∂Aj = 0 and solving for Aj results in:
Aj =
pij − pik + τ(σk − σjk)− τAi(σk − σik + σij − σkj)
τ(σj + σk − 2σjk) (4.71)
Assuming σi+ σk − 2σik = X, σj + σk − 2σjk = Y 1, σk − σik + σij − σkj = Z, substituting
Aj of equation (4.71) in equation (4.70), after some rearranging, leads to the following:
Ai =
[
pii − pik + τ(σk − σik)
]
Y − [pij − pik + τ(σk − σkj)]Z
τ(XY − Z2) (4.72)
Solving for ∂Ai/∂pii shows the impact of a change in own return, pii, on the optimal
portfolio weight of i and is given by:
∂Ai/∂pii =
Y
τ(XY − Z2) > 0 (4.73)
Since Y > 0, τ > 0 and (XY − Z2) > 02, then the effect of changes in own return on Ai,
∂Ai/∂pii > 0, is positive. The degree of the increase in portfolio weight is dependent upon the
variances and covariances of crop returns and the risk aversion of the individual producer.
The effect of changes in cross-returns on Ai, ∂Ai/∂pij and ∂Ai/∂pik cannot be signed.
The marginal impact of changes in σi on the optimal portfolio weight in i, is given by
solving for ∂Ai/∂σi:
∂Ai/∂σi =
−
([
pii − pik + τ(σk − σik)
]
Y − [pij − pik + τ(σk − σkj)]Z)(τY)[
τ(XY − Z2)]2 < 0 (4.74)
Since Y > 0, τ > 0 and
([
pii − pik + τ(σk − σik)
]
Y − [pij − pik + τ(σk − σkj)]Z) > 03, it
follows that the effect of changes in own variance on Ai, ∂Ai/∂σi < 0, is negative. The effect
1Since (σ.5i − σ.5k )2 = (σi + σk − 2σ.5i σ.5k ) > 0 and σik = σ.5i σ.5k ρik, −1 < ρik < 1, then X,Y > 0.
2The second-order-condition of the optimization problem in (4.69) implies
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2U
∂A2i
∂2U
∂AiAj
∂2U
∂AjAi
∂2U
∂A2j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0,
|H| =
∣∣∣∣−X −Z−Z −Y
∣∣∣∣ = −(XY − Z2) < 0 which gives (XY − Z2) > 0.
3Since Ai implies to the weight of crop i in portfolio, it should be positive (0 < Ai < 1). Thus, in
equation (4.72) the numerator should have the same sign as denominator. Since denominator is positive
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of changes in cross-variances on Ai, ∂Ai/∂σj and ∂Ai/∂σk cannot be signed.
To find the marginal impact of changes in ρik on the optimal portfolio weight in i, solve
for ∂Ai/∂ρik, which gives:
∂Ai/∂ρik =
2σ.5i σ
.5
k Y (Y − Z)
[
pii − pik + τ(σk − σik)
]− τσ.5i σ.5k Y (XY − Z2)
τ(XY − Z2)2
+
σ.5i σ
.5
k
[
(XY − Z2) + 2σ.5i σ.5k Z(Z − Y )
][
pij − pik + τ(σk − σkj)
]
τ(XY − Z2)2
(4.75)
This reveals the impact that a change in the i and k correlation will have on the optimal
weight in i. The marginal effect is determined by the variances and covariances of crop returns,
the risk aversion parameter of the individual producer, and the risk premiums (pii − pik and
pij − pik).
Although in the three-product case (or N products case) one can just determine the
expected sign for own return and variance, it is obvious that in the two crops case there is
expected sign for all variables because ∂Aj/∂pii is equal to −∂Ai/∂pii, ∂Aj/∂σi is equal to
−∂Ai/∂σi, and ∂Aj/∂ρij is equal to −∂Ai/∂ρij1.
Generally, regrading the expected sign of the variables in equation (4.41), it was shown
that the expected own-profit and its variance should have positive and negative impacts
respectively on acreage in each equation. The effect of expected cross-profits and other
elements of variance-covariance matrix on acreage decisions are not known a priori. Although
it is expected that the expected total wealth (wealth effect) and its variance (insurance effect)
have positive and negative impacts on acreage allocations with no constraint on total acreage,
the sign of these variables are not clear a priori when the total acreage is assumed to be fixed.
In sum, in this chapter, a contribution to the literature has been made through modelling
the farmers’ acreage decisions under uncertainty and deriving a measure inside the theoretical
framework to capture the insurance effect of government policies as well as the wealth effect.
By considering the relationship between income stabilization compensated and uncompen-
sated acreage decision functions, the expected utility maximization framework (under the
hypothesis that farmers are risk averse) developed by Chavas and Holt (1990) has been mod-
ified which enables the inclusion in our theoretical model of the insurance effect, emphasized
((XY −Z2) > 0), the numerator has the positive sign,
([
pii−pik+τ(σk−σik)
]
Y −[pij−pik+τ(σk−σkj)]Z) > 0.
1As shown in Appendix B, these results for the two crops case are also confirmed based on the first-order
conditions in equation (4.20).
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in the literature (Hennessy, 1998) but ignored in the Chavas and Holt model (1990). Hence,
the acreage response equation is specified as a function of expected crop profits, elements of
the variance-covariance matrix of profits, expected total wealth (initial wealth plus market
profit), and variance of total wealth. Furthermore, government payments are incorporated
into the model through truncation of the probability distribution of profits.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Framework and Results
This chapter presents the empirical model, data description and results. A system of nine
crop equations is provided and all the relevant elasticities of acreage allocation with respect to
the exogenous variables are estimated. If the coefficient of expected total wealth and variance
of total wealth variables are statistically significant (insignificant) in the whole system, the
whole-farm programs are (are not) production and therefore trade distorting and are not (are)
decoupled1. The statistically significant coefficients are then used to simulate the impact of
recent whole-farm programs—the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA), the Net Income
Stabilization Account (NISA) and the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS)—
on crop choices.
The empirical model applies the theoretical model derived in the previous chapter, equa-
tion (4.41), to estimate supply responses for spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye,
peas2, flax, canola, and hay in the prairie provinces of Canada by formally incorporating
the government’s grain policies. Farmers’ acreage decisions are estimated over 1971-2006
for individual provinces—Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Two specifications of the
acreage response model are examined in this study: an acreage level model and an acreage
share model. The share equations are specified to explain how the shares of total cropland
allocated to specific crops respond to the expected profits, profit risks, mean and variance
of total wealth, and other exogenous variables. The specification explicitly recognizes that
as the share of the combined cropland planted to one commodity, say wheat, increases, the
expanded wheat acreage has to come from cropland planted to competing crops, such as
barley, canola, or other field crops. In other words, the sum of the acreage shares equal one
1Despite meeting the WTO’s legal definition of decoupled payments.
2Time series data for other pulse crops like chickpeas and lentils were not available.
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(total cropland planted to all field crops is assumed to be fixed).
The empirical model treats all equations as a system of acreage allocation decisions under
risk. The linear acreage and acreage-share models (with acreage share (Si) of the crops in
each province as the dependent variable) have the following structure:
Ait = a0 + αi(wt−1 +
9∑
j=1
Ajp¯i
T
jt) +
9∑
j=1
βijp¯i
T
jt +
9∑
k≥j
9∑
j=1
γijkσ
T
jkt + δi(
9∑
k≥j
9∑
j=1
AjAkσ
T
jkt)+
ϕl + Ait−1 + υit
(5.1)
Sit = a0 + αi(wt−1 +
9∑
j=1
Ajp¯i
T
jt) +
9∑
j=1
βijp¯i
T
jt +
9∑
k≥j
9∑
j=1
γijkσ
T
jkt + δi(
9∑
k≥j
9∑
j=1
AjAkσ
T
jkt)+
ϕl + Sit−1 + υit and
10∑
i=1
Si = 1
(5.2)
where Ai is the acreage planted to the ith crop (1 = spring wheat, 2 = durum wheat, 3
= oats, 4= barley, 5= rye, 6= peas, 7= flax, 8= canola, and 9= hay; in acres), Si is the
share of combined acreage of spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola,
hay and summerfallow planted to the ith crop (1 = spring wheat, 2 = durum wheat, 3 =
oats, 4= barley, 5= rye, 6= peas, 7= flax, 8= canola, 9= hay, and 10= summerfallow), w
is normalized initial wealth ($),
∑n
j=1Ajp¯i
T
jt is the truncated mean of total (farm) profit ($)
and
∑n
k≥j
∑n
j=1AjAkσ
T
jkt is equal to the truncated variance of total (farm) profit ($), p¯i
T
j
is the truncated expected profits ($/acre) for jth commodity, σTjk is the truncated expected
variance-covariance of profits ($/acre) between jth and kth commodities, ϕl denotes provincial
dummies (l = 1, 2, 3) or fixed effects to control for persistent provincial factors. Ait−1 (or
Sit−1) is a lagged dependent variable for ith commodity and has been included to account for
inertia that is attributable to the cost of adjustment in switching from one crop to another1,
and υi is the error term.
1This could, to some degree, also reflect the effect of change in crop rotation practices on a specific rotation
crop.
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5.1 Data Description
5.1.1 Area, Yield, Price and Crop Costs
Assuming that aggregate behavior can be approximated by a representative farm household
making decisions according to the theoretical model described, the linear acreage equations
(5.1) and acreage share equations (5.2) will be estimated using aggregate data.
The acreage variables A1, A2, . . . , A9 (1= spring wheat, 2= durum wheat, 3= oats, 4=
barley, 5= rye 6= peas, 7= flax, 8= canola, 9=tame hay) measure acreage planted to each
crop (in acres) and were obtained from CANSIM table 001-0010 which provides time series
data on seeded area by crops at the provincial level. Yields y1, y2, . . . , y9 (tonne/acre) were
also obtained from CANSIM table 001-0010. The market prices p1, p2, . . . , p9 ($/tonne)
are average farm prices and were obtained from the Manitoba Agriculture, Food and Rural
Initiatives, Manitoba Agriculture Yearbook (various years); Alberta Agriculture and Rural
Development, the Agriculture Statistics Yearbook (various years); and Saskatchewan Agri-
culture, Food and Rural Revitalization, Agricultural Statistics (various years) 1.
Initial wealth is defined as the sum of value of capital stock in crop production (machinery
and equipment plus land and buildings) minus related debts. Data on value of machinery
and equipment and value of land and buildings from CANSIM table 002-007 and outstanding
farm debt from CANSIM table 002-0008 indicates that the value of land and buildings greatly
exceeds the other two series, and the other two series largely cancel out. For example, in 2006
the value of land and buildings was $ 10795, 23156 and 45968 million, value of machinery
and equipment was $ 3594, 8129 and 9059 million and total debt was $ 5805, 7024 and 10996
million in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively. Therefore, initial wealth (in
$) is constructed as the value of land and buildings in crop agriculture (Coyle, Wei and
Rude, 2008). This is calculated from total crop acres (CANSIM table 001-0010) multiplied
by the value per acre of farmland and buildings from CANSIM table 002-003 in Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and Alberta for different years.
In Manitoba, all items of costs of crop production2, in detail, for different crops c1, c2, . . . , c9
($/acre) were obtained, in responce to a request, from Manitoba Agriculture, Food and Ru-
ral Initiatives, Policy Analysis Branch, Crop Production Costs Guidelines (various years)
1Data on durum wheat prices were not available in Manitoba and Alberta. As an alternative, the durum
wheat to spring wheat price ratio in Saskatchewan was calculated. Then, durum wheat prices were constructed
based on the multiplication of this ratio by spring wheat prices in Manitoba and Alberta.
2It should be noted that we subtracted non-allowable costs like rent (land, building and machinery),
building/ machinery repairs, and property tax . . . from the respective calculated costs.
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for years 1982-2006. For years prior to 1982, the farm input price index1 in each year to
1982 farm input price index ratio was calculated. Crop costs were constructed based on the
multiplication of this ratio by crop costs in 1982. In Saskatchewan, detailed crop costs were
obtained, in responce to a request, from Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revi-
talization, Agriculture, Business and Development Branch, Crop Planning Guide (various
years)2, for the years 1985-20063. The same procedure as used for Manitoba was employed
when constructing the crop costs in Saskatchewan in missing years. In Alberta, detailed crop
costs were obtained, in responce to a request, from Alberta Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment, Crops Economics Unit for the years 1985-2006. For years prior to 1985, crop costs
were constructed based on the same method as was used for Manitoba.
To measure yield expectations, actual yields are regressed on a trend variable. The re-
sulting predictions are taken as expected yield as well as the adaptive expectation procedure
provided in equation (5.5). For expected farm price, an adaptive expectation scheme built
from lagged farm prices as shown in equation (5.4) was used, but in addition the empiri-
cal model in this study is forward-looking in that farmers are also assumed to base their
expectations on futures prices.
The planting-time crop futures price forecast was taken as the price of December crop
futures at planting time from 1979 to 20064. In the cases of spring wheat, oats, barley,
flax and canola5, the futures price were the price of December crop futures on or about
1The farm input price indices (index, 1986=100) were obtained from CANSIM table 328-0001. This table
provides a price index for all components of farm inputs at the provincial level for different years.
2Crop production costs are reported in different soil zones, black, brown, and dark brown. Since the crop
cost data in other provinces were available in only for the black soil zone, we used the black soil zone crop
costs in Saskatchewan.
3Tame hay production costs were not available in Crop Planning Guide. Hay production cost in 2006
was obtained from the publication Dryland Forage Production Costs, Fact Sheet Saskatchewan Ministry of
Agriculture, October 2007. A Saskatchewan hay cost to Manitoba hay cost ratio in 2006 was then calculated.
A time series of Saskatchewan hay production costs based on the multiplication of this ratio by hay production
cost in Manitoba for different years was then constructed.
4There was no data available on future prices for all crops before 1979.
5As announced by the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange (WCE) Press Release (September 1995), the canola
futures contract price reference point has changed from Vancouver to points in and around Saskatoon from
September 1996. In fact, it seems there is a structural change in the reported series data for canola futures
price (the reported futures price before 1996 are related to Vancouver as the delivery point while after 1996
they are related to Saskatoon). However, there is no direct and official information to adjust the data after
1996 so that they would be consistent with the data in the previous years. Therefore, to see how this change
in delivery points (from Vancouver to Saskatoon) may affect the results, the canola futures price data after
1996 was adjusted based on the approximate information on freight and storage costs. In this adjustment,
52.91 $/tonne (1.20 $/bushel) was added to the futures price in 1997 and from 1998 to 2006 this amount
was increased by 2.20 $/tonne (0.05 $/bushel) per year. Estimation results of the model indicate that this
adjustment has no significant effect on the coefficients in terms of sign and magnitude. Therefore, the results
of the model with data before adjustment for canola futures—which are official data—are reported.
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April 30th1, and are collected from the Canada Grain Council, the Canadian Grain Industry
Statistical Handbook (various years) and the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange, Statistical
Annual (various years). Since there was no future market for durum wheat, rye, peas and
hay, the expected price for these crops were constructed based on the futures price of the
commodity that have the highest correlation with these crops2. To allow for price differentials
across provinces, the futures prices were proportionally adjusted by provincial farm prices3.
Appendix C shows data descriptive statistics for acreage, yield, price, expected price (futures
prices), production cost and initial wealth variables.
5.1.2 Open Market Profit, Mean and Variance-Covariance
By assuming that both price (pi) and yield per acre (yi) are random variables (to reflect not
only price risk, but also production risk facing producers) and costs of production for the ith
crop (ci) are constant, the untruncated expected profit for ith crop can be derived as follows:
p¯ii = E(pii) = E(piyi − ci) = E(piyi)− ci = Cov(pi, yi) + E(pi).E(yi)− ci (5.3)
To analyze supply behavior under risk, assumptions about the expectations of prices
(E(pi)) and yields (E(yi)) are needed. Adaptive expectations can be used for the normalized
prices and yields. That is,
Et−1(pit) = αi + pi,t−1 (5.4)
where αi = E(pit − pi,t−1) as measured by the sample mean of the past differences between
observed prices and prices in the previous period. This computed mean is updated in each
period. The assumption stated in (5.4) that expected prices are a function of the average
price of the previous year has been successfully employed in previous research (e.g., Houck et
al., 1976; Chavas, Pope, and Kao, 1983). Similarly, adaptive expectations for the normalized
1Note that when data for December futures price were not available, we have used November or October
futures price.
2For example, hay farm prices were regressed on future prices of spring wheat, oats, barley, flax and canola.
The highest explanatory power was obtained from barley futures price, which had an R-squared equal to 0.80.
Next, A hay futures price was constructed by multiplying the hay farm price by the ratio of barley futures
price over its farm price. For the case of durum wheat, peas and rye, the highest explanatory power was
obtained from spring wheat, canola and spring wheat with R-squared 0.98, 0.70 and 0.98, respectively.
3In each province, the difference between the futures price obtained from the Winnipeg Commodity Ex-
change and farm prices were calculated and then the province that had the least difference in average (the
base province), has been given the collected futures prices. Next, futures prices for the other provinces were
constructed by multiplying the farm prices in the province by the ratio of futures prices over farm prices in
the base province.
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yields is
Et−1(yit) = α′i + yi,t−1 (5.5)
where α′i = E(yit − yi,t−1) as measured by the sample mean of the past differences between
observed yields and yields in the previous period. This computed mean is updated in each
period. The covariance measure used for normalized prices and yields is
Cov(pi, yi) =
3∑
j=1
ωj[(pi,t−j − Et−j−1(pi,t−j)).(yi,t−j − Et−j−1(yi,t−j))] =
0.5[(pi,t−1 − Et−2(pi,t−1)).(yi,t−1 − Et−2(yi,t−1))]+
0.33[(pi,t−2 − Et−3(pi,t−2)).(yi,t−2 − Et−3(yi,t−2))]+
0.17[(pi,t−3 − Et−4(pi,t−3)).(yi,t−3 − Et−4(yi,t−3))]
(5.6)
where ωj represents the declining weighting scheme. These measurements of covariance are
also consistent with those used previously in the literature (e.g., Sckokai and Moro, 2006;
Lin and Dismukes, 2007; Coyle, Wei and Rude, 2008). By calculating relations (5.4), (5.5),
and (5.6) and replacing into relation (5.3) the untruncated expected profits for ith crop
(i = 1, 2, ..., 9) in $/acre in each province (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta) over years
1971-2006 can be calculated1.
Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969) method is followed to calculate the untruncated crop
profit variance and covariance for the product of two random variables. Variance for this
bivariate profit distribution is (crop costs are assumed constant, resulting in gross revenue
and net revenue variance and covariance being the same),
σii =V ar(piyi − ci) = V ar(piyi) = E[piyi − E(piyi)]2 = [E(pi)]2V ar(yi) + [E(yi)]2V ar(pi)+
E[(pi − E(pi))2.(yi − E(yi))2] + 2E(pi).E[(pi − E(pi)).(yi − E(yi))2]+
2E(yi).E[(yi − E(yi)).(pi − E(pi))2] + 2E(pi).E(yi).Cov(pi, yi)− (Cov(pi, yi))2
(5.7)
If pi and yi are bivariate normally distributed, [(pi−E(pi))2.(yi−E(yi))2] = V ar(yi).V ar(pi)+
1Nine untruncated expected profits have been calculated over 1971-2006 for each province.
99
2(Cov(pi, yi))
2 and all third and higher moments are zero. The variance equation reduces to
V ar(piyi − ci) = [E(pi)]2V ar(yi) + [E(yi)]2V ar(pi) + 2E(pi)E(yi)Cov(pi, yi)+
V ar(yi)V ar(pi) + (Cov(pi, yi))
2
(5.8)
where V ar(pi) is price variance and V ar(yi) is yield variance and can be calculated as
V ar(pi) =
3∑
j=1
ωj[(pi,t−j − Et−j−1(pi,t−j)]2 = 0.5[(pi,t−1 − Et−2(pi,t−1))]2+
0.33[(pi,t−2 − Et−3(pi,t−2))]2 + 0.17[(pi,t−3 − Et−4(pi,t−3))]2
(5.9)
and
V ar(yi) =
3∑
j=1
ωj[(yi,t−j − Et−j−1(yi,t−j))]2 = 0.5[(yi,t−1 − Et−2(yi,t−1))]2+
0.33[(yi,t−2 − Et−3(yi,t−2))]2 + 0.17[(yi,t−3 − Et−4(yi,t−3))]2
(5.10)
Expression (5.9) states that the variance of price is a weighted sum of the squared deviations
of past prices from their expected values, with declining weights. These measurements of price
risk are also consistent with those used previously in the literature (e.g., Lin, 1977; Traill,
1978; Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Lin and Dismukes, 2007). When price and/or yield are not
bivariate normally distributed, (5.8) represents an approximation of variance of profits. The
amount of error introduced into variance calculations by using (5.8) instead of (5.7) depends
on the degree to which the price and/or yield distributions are non-normal, in combination
with the magnitude of price and yield variance.
The untruncated covariance of crop profit between two crops is
Cov(piyi, pjyj) = E(yi)E(yj)Cov(pi, pj) + E(pi)E(yj)Cov(yi, pj)+
Cov(yi, pj)Cov(pi, yj) + Cov(pi, pj)Cov(yi, yj)+
E(pi)E(pj)Cov(yi, yj) + E(yi)E(pj)Cov(pi, yj)
(5.11)
where Cov(pi, pj) is covariance between prices for crops i and j, with other covariances defined
in a similar manner and all covariances in relation (5.11) can be calculated using a relation
similar to (5.6). Relation (5.11) collapses to (5.8) when i = j. Thus, relation (5.11) could be
used to calculate each element of a n× n untruncated variance-covariance matrix (σ), where
n is the number of crops included in the analysis. Using relation (5.11), the untruncated
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covariance of cross-commodity profits between ith and jth crops (i = 1, 2, , 9) in each province
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta) over years 1971-2006 can be calculated1.
Untruncated expected total (farm) profit for crops (in $) is
E(
n∑
i=1
piiAi) = E[(p1y1 − c1).A1 + (p2y2 − c2).A2 + ...+ (pnyn − cn).An] =
E[(p1y1 − c1).A1] + E[(p2y2 − c2).A2] + ...+ E[(pnyn − cn).An] =
[E(p1y1)− c1].A1 + [E(p2y2)− c2].A2 + ...+ [E(pnyn)− cn].An
(5.12)
in which each term in square bracket has been calculated using relation (5.3)2 and n = 9 is
the number of crops. The untruncated variance of total (farm) profit for crops is
V ar[(p1y1 − c1).A1 + (p2y2 − c2).A2 + ...+ (pnyn − cn).An] =
A21[V ar(p1y1)] + A
2
2[V ar(p2y2)] + ...+ A
2
n[V ar(pnyn)] + 2A1A2[Cov(p1y1, p2y2)]+
2A1A3[Cov(p1y1, p3y3)] + ...+ 2A1An[Cov(p1y1, pnyn)] + 2A2A3[Cov(p2y2, p3y3)]+
2A2A4[Cov(p2y2, p4y4)] + ...+ 2A2An[Cov(p2y2, pnyn)] + ...+ 2An−1An[Cov(pn−1yn−1, pnyn)]
(5.13)
in which each term in square bracket has been calculated using relation (5.8) and (5.11)3.
5.1.3 Government Farm Programs Impacts on Mean and Variance-
Covariance of Profits
5.1.3.1 Crop-Specific Programs
As explained in the previous chapter, both expected profits and the corresponding elements
of the variance-covariance matrix are influenced by the existence of the government programs,
which truncates the profit distribution at the minimum profit level. Assuming a multivari-
ate normal distribution for profits, the computed expected profits, variances and covariances
1In our study, since the number of crops is nine, thirty six untruncated covariance of cross-commodity
profits and nine variance of profits over 1971-2006 for each province have been calculated.
2Note that in calculation of the untruncated expected total (farm) profit, the truncated expected profit
for individual crop was used.
3Note that in calculation of the untruncated variance of total (farm) profit, the truncated variance-
covariance matrix for individual crop was used.
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should be corrected for this truncation. The influence of government programs on the sub-
jective probability distribution of profits for each crop (pii = (piyi − ci)) is considered by
crop-specific programs, Crop Insurance, Agricultural Stabilization Act1, and GRIP, over the
period of our study. Therefore, a change in the government crop-specific support programs
induces changes in the expected profits and in their variability (variance-covariance matrix)
for each crop. Now, assume that each random variable profit (pii = (piyi − ci)) is truncated
from below at a level Hi (which is the higher guaranteed profit by crop-specific programs
2).
Expressions (4.36), (4.37), and (4.38) in the previous chapter provide an analytical evaluation
of the truncation effect of a crop-specific program on the mean, variance, and covariance of
commodity profits.
As an example, consider spring wheat (swh) in Saskatchewan in 1997. Untruncated ex-
pected profit p¯iswh and untruncated expected variance of profit σswh have been obtained
using relations (5.3) and (5.8), respectively. Guaranteed profits ($/acre) by Crop Insurance
and GRIP programs for spring wheat have been calculated and then the higher guaran-
teed profit ($/acre) in year 1997 has been chosen as truncation point Hswh. Then, hswh =
(Hswh−p¯iswh)
σ0.5swh
has been calculated. φ(hswh) =
1
(2pi)0.5
e−
(h2swh)
2 and Φ (hswh) has been calculated by
normsdist(hswh) in Excel which returns the standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion. Finally, the truncated expected profit and the truncated variance of profit for spring
wheat in Saskatchewan in year 1997 have been obtained by replacing (4.33) and (4.34) into
(4.36) and (4.37), respectively.
To calculate the truncated covariance between profits of spring wheat and, for example,
durum wheat (dwh), the untruncated covariance between spring wheat and durum wheat
profits σswh,dwh, the untruncated variances of spring wheat profit σswh and durum wheat σdwh
have been calculated using relations (5.11) and (5.8). Then, ρswh,dwh =
σswh,dwh
(σswh.σdwh)0.5
has been
obtained. Zswh,dwh=
{
(h2swh − 2ρswh,dwhhswhhdwh + h2dwh)/(1− ρ2swh,dwh)
}0.5
, and kswh,dwh =
hswh−ρswh,dwhhdwh
(1−ρ2swh,dwh)
0.5 , kdwh,swh =
hdwh−ρswh,dwhhswh
(1−ρ2swh,dwh)
0.5 have been calculated. φ(Zswh,dwh) is equal to
1
(2pi)0.5
e−
Z2swh,dwh
2 . Φ (kswh,dwh) and Φ (kdwh,swh) have been obtained using the normsdist(kswh,dwh)
and normsdist(kdwh,swh) in Excel. F (hswh, hdwh) is equal to Φ (hswh, hdwh)+ 1− Φ (hswh)−
Φ (hdwh) in which Φ (hswh, hdwh) has been obtained using binormal(hswh, hdwh, ρswh,dwh) com-
1Note that since the ASA is a price support program, the truncation formula were used for the parameters
of price distribution (instead of profit distribution). Then, the truncated expected price and the truncated
elements of variance-covariance matrix of prices were used for construction of the expected profit and elements
of variance-covariance matrix of profits (equations 5.3, 5.8, and 5.11).
2The calculation of guaranteed profit by crop-specific government support programs will be provided
below.
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mand in Stata which returns the joint cumulative distribution of the bivariate normal with
correlation ρ; cumulative over (-inf, hswh] and (-inf, hdwh]. Finally, the truncated covariance
between spring wheat and durum wheat profits in Saskatchewan in 1997 has been calculated
by replacing (4.35) into (4.38).
Therefore, using relations (4.36), (4.37) and (4.38), the truncated expected profit p¯iTj
(which in our case of nine crops would be nine individual profit variables), and the trun-
cated covariance of cross-commodity profits, σTjk (which in our case would be nine individual
variance variables and thirty six covariance variables), in equation (5.1) (or (5.2)) can be
constructed in each province over 1971-2006.
In what follows, we explain our method of data construction for guaranteed profit (and
guaranteed price under the ASA) by crop-specific programs:
Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA) The ASA provided payments to producers in
every province during periods of low commodity prices. It guaranteed farmers 90 percent of
a three-year moving-average price (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis, 2002). Mandatory support
was provided for cattle, hogs, lambs and wool; industrial milk and industrial cream; corn
and soybeans; and spring wheat, winter wheat, oats and barley. Among the crops in our
study, we calculated the support price in each year, from 1970 to 1976, for spring wheat,
oats and barley based on the 90 percent of the previous three-year average prices ($/tonne).
Since the ASA is a price support program, to capture the impact of government program,
the truncation formula were used for the parameters of price distribution (instead of profit
distribution). Then, the truncated expected price and the truncated elements of variance-
covariance matrix of prices were used for construction of the expected profit and elements of
variance-covariance matrix of profits (equations 5.3, 5.8, and 5.11).
Crop Insurance The payment mechanism in a Crop Insurance program is based on indi-
vidual yield coverage which means that a producer can get yield insurance up to a proportion,
usually 70 percent or 80 percent, of his or her own ten-year average yield (Schmitz, Furtan
and Baylis, 2002). It should be noted that all crop insurance contracts guarantee a price.
In each year, we calculated yield guarantee (tonne/acre) as the previous ten-year average
yield (y) for each crop in each province multiplied by 0.7. Price coverage ($/tonne) for each
crop has been obtained by request from Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (SCIC);
Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation (MCIC); and Agriculture Financial Services Corpo-
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ration (AFSC), Alberta; for the years 1970-2006. We constructed the guaranteed (gross)
profit based on the multiplication of yield guarantee by price coverage for each crop in each
province over 1970-2006. Then, we obtained the guaranteed profit ($/acre) by subtracting
the crop production costs from guaranteed gross profit.
Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) In GRIP, farmers were guaranteed a per-
acre return on whatever crop they grew. The program guaranteed producers their long-term
average yield. The guaranteed price was set by an indexed moving average price (Schmitz,
Furtan and Baylis, 2002). In each year (from 1991 to 1995), we calculated the previous fifteen-
year average yield (tonne/acre) for each crop in each province as the long-term average yield.
Price coverage ($/tonne) for each crop has been obtained by request from SCIC, MCIC, and
AFSC for the years 1991-1995. We constructed the guaranteed profit ($/acre) based on the
multiplication of the long-term average yield by price coverage (minus crop costs) for each
crop in each province over 1991-1995.
5.1.3.2 Whole-Farm Programs
The influence of government programs on the subjective probability distribution of total profit
is considered by whole-farm programs1, WGSA, NISA, AIDA/CFIP, and CAIS, over the pe-
riod of our study. The resulting truncation of the subjective probability distribution of total
profit will affect expected total profit as well as the variance of the total profit. Thus, gov-
ernment whole-farm programs will influence both total profit expectations and the riskiness
of total profit (variance). If we assume that each random variable total profit is truncated
from below at a level H (which is the higher guaranteed profit by whole-farm programs2),
expressions (4.36) and (4.37) in the previous chapter provide an analytical evaluation of the
truncation effect of a whole-farm program on the mean and variance of total profit3.
For example, consider Saskatchewan in 1995. The untruncated expected total profit and
the untruncated variance of total profit have been obtained using relations (5.12) and (5.13),
respectively. Guaranteed profit ($) by NISA program (in 1995, the NISA was implemented by
government) in 1995 has been calculated and then chosen as truncation point H. Then, h =
1Note that the whole farm programs will truncate the distribution of total profit in which the untruncated
total profit’s distribution parameters have been obtained through truncated individual crop profit parameters.
2The calculation of guaranteed profit by whole-farm support programs will be provided in below.
3Note that the truncation expressions in the previous chapter were not used to capture the effect of the
CAIS program. Under the CAIS the guaranteed profit is not a specific point and is defined in three different
tiers. The procedure to capture the impact of the CAIS is explained below.
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H−Π¯
σ0.5T
has been calculated. φ (h) = 1
(2pi)0.5
e−
(h)2
2 and Φ (h) has been calculated by normsdist(h)
in Excel which provides the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Finally, the
truncated expected total profit and the truncated variance of total profit in Saskatchewan
in 2005 have been obtained by replacing (4.33) and (4.34) in (4.36) and (4.37), respectively.
Therefore, using relations (4.36)and (4.37), the truncated expected total profit (
∑9
j=1Ajp¯i
T
jt)
and the truncated variance of total profit (
∑9
k≥j
∑9
j=1AjAkσ
T
jkt) in equation (5.1) (or (5.2))
can be constructed in each province for 1977-2006.
In what follows, we explain our method of data construction for guaranteed profit by
whole-farm programs:
Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA) In WGSA1, payments are based on produc-
ers’ eligible grain sales. Payment was made when aggregate net cash flow (cash receipts minus
cash variable costs) from eligible grain (wheat, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, canola and mustard
seed; from 1988 nine crops are added to the seven previously covered—triticale, mixed grains,
sunflower, safflower, buckwheat, peas, lentils, fababeans, canary seed) sales was less than the
average net cash flow over the previous five years (Schmitz, Furtan and Baylis, 2002). We
derived a net cash flow ($) for 1977-1990 as total crop receipts2 (
∑9
i=1 piyiAi) minus total
crop production allowable3 costs (
∑9
i=1 ciAi) in each province. The eligible net cash flow in
each province was constructed based on the previous five-year average net cash flow. In each
province, we used this eligible net cash flow as the guaranteed total profit ($) by WGSA for
1977-1990.
Note that under the WGSA a farmer should pay two percent of gross sales (Freeman, 2005)
to the stabilization fund (an amount that was matched by the federal government). Therefore,
we adjusted the truncated expected total profit under the WGSA. The adjusted truncated
mean of total profit is the initial truncated mean minus two percent of the untruncated mean
and two percent of the total cost.
Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) NISA pay-outs were made when the farmer’s
net income fell below 70 percent of the previous three-year average (Schmitz, Furtan and
Baylis, 2002). We derived net farm income ($) for 1991-2002 as total crop receipts4(
∑9
i=1 piyiAi)
1Since the pay-out trigger under the WGSA was based on the aggregate net cash flow of prairie grain
producers and the WGSA covered almost all crops in our study, we categorized it into whole-farm programs.
2Crop insurance proceeds (CANSIM table 002-0001) are added to total crop income as allowable income.
3Note that crop insurance premiums have been considered as allowable production costs in crop cost
calculations.
4Crop insurance proceeds are added to total crop income as allowable income.
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minus total crop production allowable costs1 (
∑9
i=1 ciAi) in each province. We calculated pre-
vious three-year average net cash flow. In each province, we used 70 percent of this net farm
income as the total profit guaranteed ($) by NISA over 1991-2002.
Note that under the NISA a farmer should pay up to three percent of eligible net sales
to a NISA account (and the federal and provincial governments generally make a matching
contribution to a NISA account for the individual). Therefore, we adjusted the truncated
expected total profit presented under the NISA. The adjusted truncated mean of total profit
is the initial truncated mean minus three percent of the untruncated mean.
Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA)/the Canadian Farm Income
Program (CFIP) In AIDA/CFIP, when producers’ net income fell below 70 percent of
their three-year, moving-average net income they become eligible for a pay-out (Schmitz,
Furtan and Baylis, 2002). Therefore, we used the same procedure as NISA for constructing
the guaranteed total profit ($) over 1998-2002.
Note that no premium was paid by the farmer under the AIDA/CFIP. However, partic-
ipation in NISA maximized benefits from the AIDA/CFIP. The current year’s government
contribution to NISA was deducted from the AIDA/CFIP program payment for all NISA-
eligible AIDA/CFIP participants. NISA participants received the government payment and
then had it deducted. AIDA/CFIP participants who were eligible but did not participate
in NISA had the deduction only2. Therefore, for the truncation, AIDA/CFIP program is
considered as the government program over 1998-2002.
Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) Payments are made when the
program year margin falls below the reference year margin. The reference margin is the
Olympic average of the last five years’ production margins, with highest and lowest years
dropped (CAIS Handbook, AAFC). The amount of government funds is determined by the
extent of margin decline. The program measures the extent of farmer decline using three tiers,
with Tier 1 representing the smallest decline and Tier 3 representing the largest decline. If
the program year margin is between 85-100 percent of the reference margin, government pays
fifty percent of the decline (Tier 1). If the program year margin is between 70-85 percent
of the reference margin, government pays seventy percent of the decline (Tier 2) in addition
1Note that crop insurance premiums have been considered as allowable production costs in crop cost
calculations.
2Note that it is assumed that farmers participated into the NISA program in order to maximize the benefits
from the AIDA.
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to the Tier 1. If the program year margin is between 0-70 percent of the reference margin,
government pays eighty percent of the decline (Tier 3) in addition to the Tier 1 and Tier
2 (See figure 2.3). In an unlikely case when production margin is negative, the government
pays sixty percent of loss.
We derived net margin ($) for 2003-2006 in each province as total crop allowable receipts
(
∑9
i=1 piyiAi) minus total crop production allowable costs (
∑9
i=1 ciAi) in each province
1. In
each year, we dropped the highest and lowest previous five-year margins and then calculated a
three-year average margin. For truncation of profit distribution in each year, the announced
payment calculation procedure by the CAIS was applied. Given the expected mean and
variance of untruncated profit distribution, we created 10,000 random numbers from this
normal distribution. After sorting these numbers, we identified the values above and below
the reference margin. Values above the reference margin were left unchanged but values
below the reference margin were adjusted based on the CAIS payment procedure (Tiers 1,
2, and 3). The mean and variance of the new series are considered as truncated expected
mean and variance. Note that the truncation formula presented in the previous chapter are
not appropriate here because the guaranteed profit by the CAIS is not a specific point and
is defined in three different tiers.
5.2 Estimated Results
5.2.1 Coefficients and Elasticities
As indicated earlier, the acreage response model treats farmers’ planting decisions for spring
wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola, hay in the three prairie provinces.
To have the most consistent estimation results, we estimate the model with different specifi-
cations and different data sets using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). We specify the
acreage equations in both acres level and share, equations 5.1 and 5.2. Moreover, each of
these equations is estimated using two sets of data: one contains adaptive expectations for
the expected prices and yields, the other one uses the future prices as the expected prices
and trend yield as the expected yield. Then, among the different estimations, we choose the
model where its results are more consistent with theoretical expectations and which has a
1To be allowable, income and expenses must be directly related to the primary production of agricultural
commodities. The CAIS Handbook provides some examples of allowable and non-allowable income and
expense items. For instance, crop insurance proceeds are considered as allowable income and crop insurance
premiums are considered as allowable expenses.
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higher R-square or lower Mean Square Error (MSE).
To have reliable and theoretically consistent estimations, three restrictions are imposed
(these restrictions are the same as what apply to the AIDS demand system across expenditure
share equations) that are implied by the theory. As inferred by expression (4.28), symmetry
restrictions require that individual crop cross-profit regression coefficients across the acreage
equations be equal; that is, β12 = β21, β13 = β31, ..., β19 = β91, β23 = β32, ..., β29 = β92, β34 =
β43, ..., β39 = β93, β45 = β54, ..., β49 = β94, β56 = β65, ..., β59 = β95, β67 = β76, ..., β69 =
β96, β78 = β87, β79 = β97, β89 = β98. Thirty-six symmetry constraints were imposed. As dis-
cussed in the theoretical framework, the acreage decision functions are almost homogenous of
degree one in initial wealth, degree one in mean returns, and degree two in moments of order
two. This means that if expected total wealth and expected crop profits are multiplied by λ
and elements of variance-covariance matrix and variance of total wealth are multiplied by λ2,
the acreage decisions would not change. If the acreage equations are estimated in logarithm
form, we can impose the homogeneity restriction on coefficients in each equation (sum of total
wealth and individual crop profits coefficients plus crop variance-covariance and variance of
total wealth coefficients is equal to zero). However, we are not able to estimate equations in
logarithm form because the covariance variables may be negative in the observations. The
homogeneity property can be maintained within the empirical model by normalization (due
to the specification of the variables) as it is common in the literature (Sckokai and Moro,
2006; Coyle, Wei and Rude, 2008). Therefore, we normalized the monetary variables by a nu-
meraire (a Tornqvist1 net return per acre index)2, where the elements of variance-covariance
matrix were normalized with the squared return of the numeraire. To maintain adding-up
restrictions (the sum of the shares for these ten category crops equals one or total cropland
is assumed to be fixed over time), we dropped one crop acreage equation, summerfallow3. In
fact, the share (acre level) for summerfallow was treated as a residual, which was not directly
estimated to avoid singularity in the disturbance covariance matrix.
1Tornqvist index is a discrete approximation to a continuous Divisia index which is a weighted sum of the
growth rates of the various components. The growth rates are defined as the difference in natural logarithms
of successive observations of the components and the weights are equal to the mean of the factor shares of
the components in the corresponding pair of years.
2Considering that studies in the literature specify their model for few crops instead of all major crops,
Tornqvist index is an index of the returns of crops which have been omitted from the model. In our study,
the equation omitted from the system is summerfallow acreage which is affected by the return and variance
of all major crops (included in the model) as well as expected total wealth and its variance. Therefore, we
have constructed Tornqvist index based on the net return of the nine major crops included in the model.
3Theoretically, this can be done when all regressors are identical across equations. Considering that
summerfallow acreage is affected by the same factors as other crops (Clark and Klein, 1992), this condition
holds in our system.
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The estimation of aggregate acreage response equations involves the use of cross section
(three provinces) data, therefore it is important to control for persistent provincial economic
(dis)advantages, including institutional differences and economic conditions. To solve this
problem, fixed effects of individual provinces are used in the model, thus we can be more
confident that our independent variable coefficients reflect their marginal impacts rather
than long-term structural effects related to economic endowments.
Different specifications have been employed1. We have estimated both acreage level and
acreage share equations specified in the equations 5.1 and 5.2 using data sets which contain
adaptive expectation procedure for the expected price and yield (See tables E.1 and E.2 in the
Appendix D). In the acreage level equation, the coefficient for the mean of own-profit has the
significant positive sign in all equations except for durum wheat and peas acreage equations
(but insignificant). The mean of own-profit has the expected positive sign for all crops in the
acreage share equations. The coefficient for the variance of own-profit has a negative sign in
spring wheat, barley, flax, canola and hay equations (only statistically significant in spring
wheat, canola and hay) in the acreage level equation. In acreage share equation, the variance
of own-profit is negative in spring wheat, oats, barley, flax, canola and hay equations although
it is statistically significant only in the canola and hay equations. In the acreage level (share)
equation, the wealth effect has a significant positive impact on spring wheat (and durum
wheat) and a significant negative impact on peas, flax and canola acres. The insurance effect
has positive impact on spring wheat and hay acres and it has negative impact on all other
crops although it is statistically significant only in the durum wheat and hay equations. In
the acreage share equation, the insurance effect has a significant positive impact on the spring
wheat and hay equations while it has a significant negative impact on the durum wheat and
canola equations. The null hypothesis of all beta coefficients for expected total wealth (wealth
effect) and variance of total wealth (insurance effect) being jointly zero are rejected.
We have estimated the acreage share equation using futures prices as the expected price
and trend yield as the expected yield (See table E.3 in the Appendix D). The results are, in
general, the same as the acreage level equation, base model, that will be discussed later.
Assuming separability, we have estimated a model (specified in the equation 5.1) of two
1The results of different specifications are provided in the Appendix D. Due to the space limitations, the
coefficients of covariance terms in each model have not been reported. To increase the degrees of freedom
and to avoid the high collinearity between covariance terms, we omitted insignificant covariance terms in
each equation. Although the adding-up restrictions require that all regressors are identical across equations,
omitting insignificant covariance terms maybe reasonable considering that there are many regressors that
suffer from high degree of collinearity.
109
sub-systems, cereal crops (spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye and hay) and non-
cereal crops (peas, flax and canola), in order to reduce the number of covariance terms in
each equation (See tables E.4 and E.5 in the Appendix D). The coefficients for the mean
of own profit and its variance have the expected signs in all equations except for durum
wheat (both mean and variance of profit coefficients), barley (mean of profit coefficient) and
rye (variance of profit coefficient) in the cereal system and canola (both mean and variance
of profit coefficients) in the non-cereal system. In the cereal system, the wealth effect has
a positive impact for the spring wheat, rye and hay acres and a negative impact for the
durum wheat, oats and barley acres, although it is only statistically significant in the spring
wheat and oats equations. In the non-cereal system, the wealth effect is negative for all three
crops. Although the insurance effect positively influences the spring wheat, barley and rye
acres and negatively affects the durum wheat, oats and hay acres in the cereal system, it
is only statistically significant in the durum wheat and hay equations. While the insurance
effect negatively affects the acreage allocated to all non-cereal crops, it is not statistically
significant. The null hypothesis of all beta coefficients of expected total wealth (wealth
effect) and variance of total wealth (insurance effect) being jointly zero are rejected for the
sub-system of cereal crops while they are not rejected for the non-cereal crops1. However,
when cereal and non-cereal crops acreage equations are estimated in one system of equations,
wealth and insurance effects are statistically significant in the non-cereal crops.
In another specification, we have estimated the system of acreage equations (specified in
the equation 5.1) as a function of the lagged total acreage2 (instead of the lagged dependent
variable), among other variables, as employed by Coyle (1993) and Coyle, Wei and Rude
(2008) (See table E.6 in the Appendix D). The coefficient for the mean of own-profit has
the expected positive sign in the spring wheat, oats, rye, flax and canola equations and it
is statistically significant only in the canola equation. Although the variance of own-profit
coefficient has the expected negative sign in the spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, peas, flax
and hay equations, it is only statistically significant in the spring wheat and flax equations.
The wealth effect leads to a increase in acreage for spring wheat, rye, peas and canola but
a decrease for oats and barley acres. The insurance effect positively influences the acreage
allocated to spring wheat while it negatively affects oats, barley and canola acres. The null
1Note that we did this test in a model based on the future prices and trend yield as the expected price
and yield respectively.
2Given that some crops may be substituted into rotations more easily than other crops, lagged total crop
acreage may have different impacts on different crop acreage allocations, the specification that contains the
lagged total acreage is employed.
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hypothesis of all beta coefficients of expected total wealth (wealth effect) and variance of
total wealth (insurance effect) being jointly zero are rejected. Since the previous studies in
the literature specify their model for few crops instead of all major crops, the lagged total
acreage shows variability over time. However, in our study, we have considered all major
crops in the model, therefore the lagged total acreage does not vary considerably over time
and therefore, in almost all equations, is not statistically significant. As a result, one can not
rely on the system of acreage equations conditional on lagged total acreage.
After the estimation of several potential models specified in the equations 5.1 and 5.2
(each of the acreage level and share equations with the adaptive expectations and the futures
price-trend yield), results from the acreage level model based on the futures price1-trend yield
are regarded as the base model due to their consistency with theoretical expectations, more
statistically significant coefficients and lower mean square errors. Note that the coefficients
related to the wealth and insurance effects are statistically significant in terms of adaptive
expectations and share acreage equations in all specifications.
McElroy (1977) suggested a system-wide measure of goodness of fit which has a similar
interpretation to the single-equation measure. Bewley (1985), however, has shown that this
system measure is biased towards unity when there are few degrees of freedom. An alternative
measure would be, 1− 1
1+LR/[T (n−1)] , where T is the number of observations, n is the number
of crops and the likelihood ratio, LR, is twice the difference between the log likelihood of the
base model and the log likelihood of the same dependent variables on a constant term only2.
For the base model the system-wide R-squared is 0.95.
According to the results of the base model, we should not worry about the heteroskedas-
ticity problem that potentially arises from the use of cross section data3. The system of
acreage equations is estimated by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), which estimates the
1Researchers generally agree that the most efficient way to predict prices is to use futures prices (Gardner,
1976; Choi and Helmberger, 1993). In particular, Gardner suggested the idea of using the futures price as
a measure of expected price, arguing that the price of a futures contract for next year’s crop reflects the
market’s estimate of next year’s cash price. Moreover, to address for the endogeneity of the expected prices,
Choi and Helmberger have estimated a simultaneous equations of futures price (as a proxy for the expected
prices), consumption demand and acreage response for soybeans. In future price equation, exchange rate,
fishmeal exports by the rest-of-world and lagged three-year moving average of soybean yields are exogenous
variables, among other variables. The results show that the ordinary and three-stage least squares estimates
of the acreage response function are essentially the same. In other words, little empirical support is found
for the view that in estimating acreage response functions, the expected price (as measured by the futures
price) should be viewed as an endogenous rather than an exogenous variable.
2The log likelihood for the base model is -8884.46 and for the model with the same dependent variables
on a constant term (i.e. a system of nine equations in which acreage for each crop has been regressed on a
constant term) is -14529.13.
3The seemingly unrelated regression estimator in Stata computes robust standard errors of residuals.
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equations initially by least square and then incorporates the estimated variance and covari-
ance matrix of residuals in the estimation of generalized least square (GLS). Nevertheless, we
have conducted a heteroskedasticity test in individual equations. According to the Breusch-
Pagan test, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected for all crops. P-values of
computed Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics in the spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, bar-
ley, rye, peas, flax, canola, and hay equations are 0.99, 0.28, 0.33, 0.24, 0.73, 0.20, 0.14, 0.94,
and 0.64, respectively. Hence, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected.
Also, on the basis of the Durbin h statistics, it might be concluded that there is no evidence
of serial correlation in the estimated model. The p-values for the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation in the spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax, canola and hay
equations are 0.11, 0.47, 0.72, 0.76, 0.80, 0.54, 0.63, 0.43 and 0.76, respectively. However,
when the estimated model comprises a consistent system of equations, single equation Durbin
h statistics can be misleading and alternative tests for autocorrelation should be sought. An
alternative test for autocorrelation could be based on a comparison of the likelihoods of the
static model with that of the autoregressive processes1. Such a likelihood ratio (LR) test (i.e.,
twice the difference in the log-likelihoods) is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared. With
the alternative hypothesis being autoregressive disturbances, the value of the LR statistic is
296.2, which is to be compared with the critical value, at the 5 percent level and with nine
degrees of freedom, of 16.92. It implies that the null of no serial correlation is rejected and;
therefore, lagged dependent variables are appropriate regressors.
The results of the acreage response model incorporating wealth and insurance effects are
given in table 5.1. Table 5.2 provides the estimated elasticities for expected crop profits and
variance of crop profits, expected total wealth, variance of total wealth and dependent lagged
variable. The overall fit of the resulting model is good, as indicated by the high R-squared
(0.95). In addition, the signs on the various variables are generally consistent with theory.
As anticipated, expected own profits in the spring wheat, oats, rye, peas, flax, canola and
hay equations have the expected positive signs and are statistically significant except for rye
and peas. As table 5.2 shows the acreage elasticity with respect to expected own-profit for
these crops are 0.18, 0.20, 0.06, 0.09, 0.60, 0.40 and 0.03, respectively. Durum wheat and
barley do not have the expected signs for expected own profits, but they are insignificant.
Although the variance of own profit variables have all the expected negative signs (except for
rye with a positive sign but insignificant), few of them for barley, flax and hay are statistically
1The log likelihood for the static model is -9032.56 and the autoregressive model is -8884.46.
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significant. As the variance of own profit elasticities in table 5.2 shows, elasticities are -0.02
for barley, -0.14 for flax and -0.05 for hay.
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The results in this study suggest that the individual effects of risk (individual crop’s
profit’s variance and covariance variables) on acreage response for major crops are not strong
and vary across commodities. In the spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley, rye, peas, flax,
canola, and hay equations approximately 65, 37, 20, 10, 5, 17, 70, 87, and 26 percent of risk
variables respectively are statistically significant. In a multi-output framework, one has to
judge the impact of risk on output as the impact of the variance-covariance matrix as a whole.
AWald test to see if beta coefficients of all individual risk variables in each equation are jointly
statistically significant suggests that risk does matter in farmers’ spring wheat, durum wheat,
oats, peas, flax, canola, and hay planting decisions1. However, in the cases of barley and rye,
the p-values are 0.45 for the former and 0.75 for the latter. Furthermore, the null hypothesis
that beta coefficients of all individual risk variables in the system of nine acreage equations
are jointly zero is strongly rejected, which shows the importance of capturing the impact of
individual risk through the variance and covariance matrix of individual crop’s profit in a
system framework.
1The null hypothesis that beta coefficients of all risk variables are zero in the spring wheat, durum wheat,
oats, peas, flax, canola, and hay acreage equations have p-values as follows: 0.00, 0.05, 0.00, 0.02, 0.01, 0.00,
and 0.00 respectively.
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The expected total wealth (initial wealth plus market return) variable is statistically
significant in the spring wheat, barley and peas equations (as can be seen in table 5.2,
acreage elasticity with respect to the expected total wealth are 0.18 in spring wheat, -0.22
in barley and -0.72 in peas). However, all beta coefficients of the wealth variable in the
system are jointly statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00. This means that the wealth
effect (income-supporting effect) is one of the factors that significantly affects the allocation
of acres among different crops. The weighted average of wealth variables for individual
crops, is estimated to be 0.011. A positive overall wealth effect is consistent with decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences2. In other words, an increase in wealth leads to
a decline in profit risk (including both yield and price risks) aversion and an increase in the
acreage planted to major field crops (note that the total acreage is constant). Regarding the
insurance effect, although the insurance variable is only statistically significant in the spring
wheat, peas, canola and hay equations (as illustrated in table 5.2, the acreage elasticities
with respect to variance of total profit are -0.08 in spring wheat, -0.24 in peas, 0.18 in canola
and 0.03 in hay), all beta coefficients of the variance of total wealth variable in the system
are jointly statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00, which indicates the importance of
considering this insurance effect (income-stabilizing effect) in the model. More importantly,
the results reveal that coefficients of expected total wealth (wealth effect) and variance of
total wealth (insurance effect) are statistically significant in the whole system, which implies
the whole-farm programs are production and therefore trade distorting and are not actually
decoupled, even if they satisfied the WTO criteria.
Dynamic Model: Short-Run Elasticities The need for a dynamic specification of the
supply function arises because in most cases farmers will not be able or willing to adjust their
production activities instantaneously in response to market conditions. Firstly, there may be
a psychological resistance to change, particularly if the change involves the adoption of new
techniques or the production of commodities which lie outside the scope of their traditional
practices. Even when farmers are innovative, the process of acquiring and assessing new
1Weights are the share of each crop acres in total acres during the period of study in the three provinces.
2Sandmo (1971) has examined the relationship between wealth effects and the nature of risk preferences.
In particular, a zero wealth effect corresponds to constant absolute risk aversion. In contrast, a non-zero
wealth effect corresponds to nonconstant absolute risk aversion. In the single-product case, Sandmo has
shown that a positive wealth effect in supply response implies decreasing absolute risk aversion. To the
extent that Sandmo’s result holds in the multiproduct case, this study indicates that farmers are decreasingly
absolute risk averse. This is also a maintained hypothesis in much of the economic literature (e.g., Arrow,
1965).
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information has costs and takes time and this will give rise to delayed responses. Secondly,
partial adjustment to market forces may be due to institutional factors. For example, short
run responses may be hampered by farm tenure or other contractual arrangements, by the
market infrastructure, by the availability of farm credit, and so forth.
Finally, the technical characteristics of agricultural production may constrain the process
of adjustment in the short run. As with industrial firms, farmers in the short run have a fixed
capacity in terms of land, buildings and capital equipment and this will impede expansion in
response to rising product prices. Another feature of agricultural production which hampers
supply responses in the short run is crop rotation. An arable farmer, who is locked into a
specific rotational pattern of production in order to reduce the incidence of pests and disease
or to replenish soil nutrients, cannot immediately take advantage of market opportunities as
they arise.
Therefore, due to inertia, institutional factors or technical considerations, the full ad-
justment which producers would seek to make in their production activities in response to
changing market conditions, will not be instantaneous but will be spread over several periods.
Given a set of prices and other signals, the farmer will determine the equilibrium or long run
level of output and although this desired position cannot be attained at once, he will strive
towards that goal in each production period. However, because market conditions continu-
ally change, the producer must continually revise the long run position and may in fact never
attain it. Consequently, framers are reacting not just to current levels of the explanatory
variables in the supply function but also to their levels in past periods; the supply function
is dynamic (Colman and Young, 1989).
To make a dynamic model which controls for the cost of adjustment in switching from
one crop to another, the lagged dependent variable was included in the acreage response
model as an explanatory variable. Beta coefficients for the lagged dependent variable suggest
that producers in the prairie responded to market signals and government programs fairly
slowly and differently across crops. In the case of flax, producers completed their response
at a rate of 31 percent within a year, while for barley producers completed their response
at a rate of nearly 64 percent within a year. In this setting we are able to calculate the
short run acreage elasticities with respect to wealth and insurance effects in addition to the
contemporaneous elasticities reported in table 5.2. In fact, the short run acreage elasticities
represent farmers’ reaction to wealth and insurance effects after accounting for adjustments
over time to constraints (psychological, institutional and technical) which limit the ability
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Table 5.3: Contemporaneous and Short-Run Elasticities
con. elas. exp. tot. w. sr elas. exp. tot. w. con. elas. var. tot. w sr elas. var. tot. w
swh acre 0.1813 0.3703 -0.0839 -0.1713
dwh acre -0.0391 -0.0445 0.0566 0.0645
oats acre -0.2101 -0.6020 0.0892 0.2555
barley acre -0.2261 -0.3529 -0.0040 -0.0063
rye acre 1.2118 2.1312 -0.0894 -0.1573
peas acre -0.7267 -1.3959 -0.2463 -0.4731
flax acre -0.1767 -0.5986 0.0147 0.0500
canola acre 0.0470 0.0886 0.1791 0.3379
hay acre 0.0379 -1.0802 0.0378 -1.0768
Notes: con.=contemporaneous; sr=short-run and elas.=elasticity
to immediately respond. Table 5.3 shows the short-run elasticities of acreage responce with
respect to expected total wealth and its variability1. As expected the short run elasticities
are larger than the contemporaneous ones. For example, in the case of spring wheat, the
acreage elasticity with respect to the expected total wealth (variance of total wealth) has
increased from 0.18 (-0.08) to 0.37 (-0.17).
5.2.2 Simulations and the Risk Effects of Government Whole-Farm
Programs
The estimated acreage response results reported above provide a basis for analyzing the effects
of government direct payments on acreage planted to major field crops in the prairies. In
this study, the effects of government direct payments on acreage decisions are determined
by finding the difference in total profit distribution parameters without government direct
payments, and total profit distribution parameters with government direct payments. Then,
using the estimated significant coefficients for expected total wealth and variance of total
wealth one is able to calculate the acreage effects of direct payments. Specifically, one wants
to determine the effects of whole-farm programs, WGSA (1977-1990), NISA (1991-2002) and
CAIS (2003-2006), on the plantings of major field crops in the prairie provinces.
Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3 in the Appendix C show values of parameters used in the sim-
ulation analysis of the effects of WGSA for 1977-1990, NISA for 1991-2002 and CAIS for
2003-2006 on acreage allocation, in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Specifically, these
tables present the parameters of the total profit distribution with (truncated distribution)
and without (untruncated distribution) the WGSA, NISA and CAIS as the whole farm pro-
grams2. Table 5.4 shows the truncation effect of government payments on the mean and
1Note that short run elasticity=contemporaneous elasticity/(1-lagged dependent variable coefficient).
2Note that under the WGSA a farmer should pay two percent of gross sales (Freeman, 2005) to the
stabilization fund (an amount that was matched by the federal government). Therefore, for simulation the
truncated expected total wealth presented in table D.1 over 1977-1990 has been adjusted. The adjusted
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Table 5.4: Truncation Effect on the Mean and Variance of Total Wealth
Without Program (Untruncated) With Program (Truncated)
exp. tot. w. var tot. w. exp. tot. w. var tot. w.
(avg 1977-1990) Trun. Point via WGSA
MN 687.39 168490.96 426.76 763.16 94813.38
SK 1987.36 727828.83 1446.77 2130.18 468735.47
AB 1584.90 772365.78 990.47 1735.16 441247.74
(avg 1991-2002) Trun. Point via NISA
MN 871.12 197668.42 626.77 961.07 108737.55
SK 2711.22 886608.53 1876.73 2823.98 563886.55
AB 2088.04 988304.02 1395.88 2228.03 573596.24
(avg 2003-2006) Trun. Point via CAIS
MN 878.68 135576.35 857.25 969.88 80847.42
SK 1883.70 1014397.39 2133.86 2237.90 595643.61
AB 2068.66 312511.06 1930.01 2305.55 172506.64
Notes: exp. tot. w=expected total wealth; var tot. w=variance of total wealth; Trun.=Truncation; MN=Manitoba;
SK=Saskatchewan; AB=Alberta; Expected total wealth and the truncation point are in million dollars and variance
of total wealth is in thousand billion.
variance of total wealth in average during the years that the WGSA, NISA and CAIS pro-
grams have been implemented. For example, the truncation of CAIS on total (farm) profit
distribution raises the expected farm profit in Saskatchewan to 2237.90 million dollar (on
average over 2003-2006), up from 1883.70 million dollar in the absence of CAIS. Meanwhile,
the truncation of CAIS lowers the variance of farm profit to 595643.61 thousand billion, down
from 1014397.39.
Tables 5.5 (in million acre), 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 (in percentage) present the simulation results
for crops in which the coefficients of the expected total wealth (wealth effect) and total profit
variability (insurance effect) are statistically significant (spring wheat, barley, peas, canola
and hay). As it can be seen, the source of effects of the WGSA, NISA and CAIS on farmers’
planting decisions in the prairie vary among crops, they affect spring wheat and peas acres
through both wealth and insurance effects, barley through the wealth effect and canola and
hay through the insurance effect. Table 5.5 shows the average of changes in acreage (in million
acre) due to the implementation of the WGSA, NISA and CAIS programs. For example,
truncated mean of total profit is initial truncated mean minus two percent of untruncated mean and two
percent of total cost. Moreover, under the NISA a farmer should pay up to three percent of eligible net sales
to a NISA account (and the federal and provincial governments generally make a matching contribution to a
NISA account for the individual). Therefore, for simulation the truncated expected total wealth presented in
table D.2 over 1991-2002 has been adjusted. The adjusted truncated mean of total profit is initial truncated
mean minus three percent of untruncated mean. Under the AIDA/CFIP no premium was paid by the farmer.
However, participation in NISA maximized benefits from the AIDA/CFIP. The current year’s government
contribution to NISA was deducted from the AIDA/CFIP Program payment for all NISA-eligible AIDA/CFIP
participants. NISA participants received the government payment and then had it deducted. AIDA/CFIP
participants who were eligible but did not participate in NISA only had the deduction. Therefore, for the
truncation, the AIDA/CFIP program is considered as the government program over 1998-2002, although we
called the NISA as government program over 1991-2002.
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under the the CAIS (2003-2006), spring wheat acreage increased as a result of insurance
effect on average by 243,133.5, 708,997.4, 369,040.3 acres in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta respectively, while canola acreage decreased by 211,001, 615,296.5, 320,268. In this
case, the different signs for insurance effect across equations can be interpreted as follows.
The producer, who uses diversification to reduce his portfolio risk, is diversifying less as a
result of government programs which stabilize producer’s farm profit. After stabilizing farm
profit through government programs, the producer decides to allocate more acres to spring
wheat, which is a more agronomically suitable crop for dryland cultivation than canola, which
was normally planted as an option to reduce the risk associated with the crop portfolio. In
other words, the risk-reducing effect of government payments tend to offset the risk-reducing
effect of diversification.
Table 5.5: Simulation of Acreage Changes due to WGSA, NISA and CAIS (in million acre)
Spring wheat Barley Peas Canola Hay
MN (avg 1977-1990)
Acreage planted 4.5783 1.6981 0.1313 1.1026 1.5213
WGSA wealth effect 0.0050 -0.0029 -0.0014 - -
WGSA insurance effect 0.2386 - 0.0477 -0.2071 -0.0454
SK (avg 1977-1990)
Acreage planted 15.9145 3.7099 0.1863 3.0017 1.9860
WGSA wealth effect 0.0077 -0.0044 -0.0021 - -
WGSA insurance effect 0.5193 - 0.1038 -0.4507 -0.0989
AB (avg 1977-1990)
Acreage planted 6.3688 5.6547 0.0568 2.8916 4.2195
WGSA wealth effect 0.0096 -0.0055 -0.0026 - -
WGSA insurance effect 0.5472 - 0.1094 -0.4749 -0.1042
MN (avg 1991-2002)
Acreage planted 3.9403 1.2287 0.1717 2.1020 2.0301
NISA wealth effect 0.0063 -0.0036 -0.0017 - -
NISA insurance effect 0.3053 - 0.0610 -0.2649 -0.0581
SK (avg 1991-2002)
Acreage planted 12.5998 4.2414 1.3924 5.1277 3.1667
NISA wealth effect 0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0008 - -
NISA insurance effect 0.5128 - 0.1025 -0.4450 -0.0976
AB (avg 1991-2002)
Acreage planted 6.1825 5.1982 0.4254 3.7011 5.4399
NISA wealth effect 0.0076 -0.0044 -0.0021 - -
NISA insurance effect 0.5823 - 0.1164 -0.5053 -0.1109
MN (avg 2003-2006)
Acreage planted 2.9636 0.9765 0.1239 2.5273 2.4222
CAIS wealth effect 0.0090 -0.0051 -0.0025 - -
CAIS insurance effect 0.2431 - 0.0486 -0.2110 -0.0463
SK (avg 2003-2006)
Acreage planted 9.5896 4.5537 2.5341 6.1042 4.9470
CAIS wealth effect 0.0350 -0.0200 -0.0096 - -
CAIS insurance effect 0.7090 - 0.1418 -0.6153 -0.1350
AB (avg 2003-2006)
Acreage planted 5.5285 4.7217 0.6190 3.9279 6.4013
CAIS wealth effect 0.0234 -0.0134 -0.0064 - -
CAIS insurance effect 0.3690 - 0.0738 -0.3203 -0.0703
128
As the table 5.6 shows, WGSA has considerably increased the acreage allocated to spring
wheat through both the wealth and insurance effects in the prairie provinces. The insurance
effect, however, appears to dominate. Spring wheat acres expanded during 1977-1990, on
average by 5.32 percent in Manitoba, 3.31 percent in Saskatchewan and 8.74 percent in
Alberta. An expansion in acreage can also be seen in the case of peas due to both the wealth
and the insurance effect. Based on the results, peas acreage has considerably increased by
36.33, 55.72 and 192.72 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively due to
the insurance effect1, although it has slightly decreased by 1.04, 1.13, and 4.63 percent due
to the wealth effect.
Table 5.6: Simulation Results of WGSA (Whole-Farm Program over 1977-1990)
Spring Wheat Barley Peas Canola Hay
MN-WGSA Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.11 -0.17 -1.04 - -
Insurance Effect 5.21 - 36.33 -18.78 -2.99
Total Effect 5.32 -0.17 35.29 -18.78 -2.99
SK-WGSA Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.05 -0.12 -1.13 - -
Insurance Effect 3.26 - 55.72 -15.01 -4.98
Total Effect 3.31 -0.12 54.60 -15.01 -4.98
AB-WGSA Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.15 -0.10 -4.63 - -
Insurance Effect 8.59 - 192.72 -16.42 -2.47
Total Effect 8.74 -0.10 188.09 -16.42 -2.47
In contrast, in the period of WGSA implementation—1977-1990— the acreage planted to
barley, canola and hay has decreased, the former through the wealth effect and the latter two
through the insurance effect. The insurance effect of WGSA led to a considerable decline in
canola acreage, on average by 18.78 percent in Manitoba, 15.01 percent in Saskatchewan and
16.42 percent in Alberta.
As table 5.7 shows, NISA has considerably increased the acreage allocated to spring
wheat in the prairie provinces 2. During 1991-2002, spring wheat acres increased on average
by 7.91 percent in Manitoba, 4.09 percent in Saskatchewan and 9.54 percent in Alberta.
1Note that peas acreage comprises only one percent of total acreage in the Prairie provinces which allowed
for the large percentage increases. Theses large responses are not feasible for wheat given the total acreage
constraint.
2In our methodology, we have assumed that the 70 percent of the previous three year average net income
is guaranteed by the government under the NISA, while the payment mechanism shows that the maximum
withdrawal from NISA account is equal to the minimum of the difference between actual income and guar-
anteed income and the total amount available in the NISA funds. Under this condition, it is clear that there
might be some situations under which the money in the NISA funds was not enough to cover the guaranteed
income. Due to the lack of the micro data, it has been assumed that there was always enough money in
the funds. Therefore, the effects for NISA might be overestimated in this study and should be interpreted
cautiously.
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Although both the wealth and insurance effects have a statistically significant role in the
acreage increase for spring wheat, the insurance effect is the major reason for the acreage
response. Our results suggest that barley acres have decreased through the wealth effect as
a result of NISA implementation. This effect, however, is small (0.29, 0.04 and 0.08 percent
in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively). The decrease in acreage can also be
seen in the case of canola, however, this reduction is due to the insurance effect. Based on
the results, canola acreage has considerably decreased by 12.60, 8.68 and 13.65 percent in
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively.
Table 5.7: Simulation Results of NISA (Whole-Farm Program over 1991-2002)
Spring Wheat Barley Peas Canola Hay
MN-NISA Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.16 -0.29 -1.00 - -
Insurance Effect 7.75 - 35.55 -12.60 -2.86
Total Effect 7.91 -0.29 34.55 -12.60 -2.86
SK-NISA Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 - -
Insurance Effect 4.07 - 7.36 -8.68 -3.08
Total Effect 4.09 -0.04 7.30 -8.68 -3.08
AB-NISA Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.12 -0.08 -0.49 - -
Insurance Effect 9.42 - 27.37 -13.65 -2.04
Total Effect 9.54 -0.08 26.88 -13.65 -2.04
In the period of NISA implementation, peas acres have significantly increased through the
insurance effect; on average by 35.55 percent in Manitoba, 7.36 percent in Saskatchewan and
27.37 percent in Alberta. The data on acres show that the acreage planted to peas increased
in the prairies during the 1991-2002 period, and therefore the insurance effect of NISA could
be a reason for this increase—in addition to factors such as its profitability. Note that
acreage for peas during 1981-1990 period was on average 119,390, 114,203 and 103,96 acres
in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta respectively. During the NISA implementation, these
values increased to 171,697.3, 1,392,411.2, 425,396.7 (See table 5.5). A decrease in acreage
due to the insurance effect can be seen in the case of hay. Based on the results, hay acreage
has slightly decreased by 2.86, 3.08 and 2.04 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta,
respectively.
As the table 5.8 shows, the effect of CAIS on acreage decisions has a similar pattern to that
of NISA, although its magnitude is different. As can be seen, CAIS has considerably increased
the acreage allocated to spring wheat through both the wealth and insurance effects in the
prairie provinces. Spring wheat acres expanded during 2003-2006, on average by 8.51 percent
in Manitoba, 7.76 percent in Saskatchewan and 7.10 percent in Alberta. An expansion in
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acreage can also be seen in the case of peas. This increase in the acreage for peas is attributed
to both the wealth and the insurance effects. Based on the results, the acreage planted with
peas has considerably increased; by 37.24, 5.22 and 10.89 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan
and Alberta, respectively.
Table 5.8: Simulation Results of CAIS (Whole-Farm Program over 2003-2006)
Spring Wheat Barley Peas Canola Hay
MN-CAIS Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.30 -0.53 -1.99 - -
Insurance Effect 8.20 - 39.23 -8.35 -1.91
Total Effect 8.51 -0.53 37.24 -8.35 -1.91
SK-CAIS Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.36 -0.44 -0.38 - -
Insurance Effect 7.39 - 5.59 -10.08 -2.73
Total Effect 7.76 -0.44 5.22 -10.08 -2.73
AB-CAIS Effect %
Wealth Effect 0.42 -0.28 -1.03 - -
Insurance Effect 6.68 - 11.92 -8.15 -1.10
Total Effect 7.10 -0.28 10.89 -8.15 -1.10
In contrast, in the period of CAIS implementation—2003-2006—the acreage planted to
barley through the wealth effect, canola and hay through the insurance effect have decreased.
The insurance effect of CAIS led to a considerable decline in canola acreage, on average by
8.35 percent in Manitoba, 10.08 percent in Saskatchewan and 8.15 percent in Alberta. In
general, CAIS has affected spring wheat acres in Manitoba and Saskatchewan more than the
NISA and the WGSA, while NISA has increased acreage planted to spring wheat in Alberta
more than the CAIS and the WGSA. CAIS has also affected barley acres in all three provinces
more than two other programs. Peas, canola and hay acres have been primarily affected by
the WGSA followed by the NISA and CAIS (except for peas and canola acres in Manitoba
and Saskatchewan, respectively, for which CAIS has a larger effect than NISA).
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Chapter 6
Concluding Comments
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
The shift of the farm subsidies toward programs classified as being non-actionable in the
WTO’s URAA raises the question of their true impact on production and trade—are they
decoupled? The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether Canadian whole
farm programs, which are considered non-actionable based on the WTO criterion, are actu-
ally decoupled. To accomplish this objective, a theoretical and empirical framework which
consider the risk effects of these types of programs is developed.
The concept of decoupling and a brief history of government direct payments in the
U.S., the EU and Canada are presented in chapter two. It first describes the ambiguity
surrounding decoupling. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have provided two prominent operational
definitions of decoupled payments. The WTO provides the ex ante definition and defines
decoupled support policies as payments that are financed by taxpayers and are not related
to current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility criteria are defined by a
fixed, historical base period. The OECD defines decoupling in terms of policy effects. A policy
is fully decoupled if it does not influence production decisions of farmers receiving payments.
The OECD discusses, however, the government payments can affect the production decisions
through some indirect channels. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine a fully decoupled
agricultural policy and the OECD introduces a degree of decoupling. Thus, programs that
are considered decoupled by the WTO criteria could fail to be decoupled on the OECD
criteria. In this dissertation, decoupled payments refer to programs that fit the WTO ex ante
definition. The major channels through which decoupled payments could affect production are
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then presented. In general, decoupled payments may indirectly influence farmers’ decisions.
Therefore, the implementation of decoupled programs calls into question the appropriateness
of the current definition of the Green-Box payments in the WTO.
Chapter three provides a review of the literature in two parts. The first part presents
studies pertaining to modeling farmers’ acreage decisions. The second part reviews the stud-
ies concerning measurement of the effects of decoupled payments on acreage decisions. In
general, reviewing the literature pertaining to acreage response shows that future prices, or
adaptive expectations, and the weighted three-year moving average of variances are the prox-
ies most commonly used for the expected prices and expected variance-covariance of prices,
respectively. Moreover, since single commodity studies fail to incorporate all alternative uses
of land, the importance of considering risk in a multicrop framework and taking account of
cross-commodity risk effects are emphasized.
The literature addresses six major channels through which decoupled payments could
affect production. They ease credit constraints faced by farmers (when capital market are
imperfect); they affect the labour allocation decisions of farm households (when labour mar-
ket are imperfect); they alter land values, rents and land prices or influence the entry and
exit decisions of farmers; they influence farmers decisions through expectations about future
payments; and they may affect the risk faced by farmers. In the latter case, Hennessy (1998)
developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of agricultural income support policies
under uncertainty. He showed that for decoupled payments which tend to increase expected
profit as well as reduce the variability of profit, decreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient
to ensure an increase in production. He introduced two effects of decoupled payments that
would not arise in a certain world: the wealth effect and the insurance effect. The former
means that the higher average income arising from the support policy may affect producer
decisions. The latter refers to the income-stabilizing attribute that may affect optimizing
decision. In general, the literature clearly shows that support policies that are decoupled
in a deterministic world can affect the decisions of the risk averse producers when there is
uncertainty. However, theoretical studies on the impact of decoupled payments on acreage
response lack a detailed theoretical model of how acreage decisions will be affected by sta-
bilizing the farm profit as well as the higher expected profit. In particular, since Canadian
farm income stabilization and support policy has moved toward a whole farm approach that
targets net income and uses a moving average mechanism to temporally smooth income, it
possesses income-supporting and income-stabilizing attributes. The existing literature con-
133
trols for the wealth effect through changes in average total income arising from government
supports, however the insurance effect is captured only through an ad hoc measure. Given
the nature of Canadian whole farm programs which attempt to stabilize producers’ income,
to examine empirically the whole farm programs, a model is needed to capture the insurance
effect arising from these programs.
In chapter four, this gap in the literature is addressed by modelling the farmers’ acreage
decisions under uncertainty and deriving a measure inside the theoretical framework to cap-
ture the insurance effect of government policies as well as the wealth effect. Based on the
theoretical discussions regarding the role of the insurance effect in acreage decisions, by
considering the relationship between income stabilization compensated and uncompensated
acreage decision functions, the expected utility maximization framework (under the hypoth-
esis that farmers are risk averse) developed by Chavas and Holt (1990) is modified. This
modification allows us to include an insurance effect in our theoretical model. In sum, the
theoretical framework shows that acreage allocated to each crop can be specified as a function
of the expected profits from each individual crop, elements of the profit variance-covariance
matrix, as well as expected total wealth and its variance. These latter capture the wealth
and insurance effects of support programs. Government payments are incorporated into the
model through truncation of the probability distribution of profits. Specifically, the whole-
farm programs truncate the total (farm) profit distribution, which affect the expected total
wealth and variance of total wealth.
Regrading the expected sign of the variables in the acreage equation, using portfolio
theory, it was analytically shown that the expected own-profit and its variance should have
positive and negative impacts on acreage in each equation, respectively. The effect of expected
cross-profits and other elements of the variance-covariance matrix on acreage decisions are
not known a priori. Although it is expected that the expected total wealth (wealth effect)
and its variance (insurance effect) have positive and negative impacts on acreage allocations
with no constraint on total acreage, the sign of these variables are not clear a priori when
the total acreage is assumed to be fixed.
In chapter five, the theoretical model devised in chapter four is applied to measure the ef-
fect of government programs on acreage decisions for major farm crops in the prairie provinces
of Canada over the period 1970 to 2006. After estimation of several potential model specifi-
cations (each of the acreage level and share equations with the adaptive expectations and the
futures price-trend yield), results from the acreage level model based on the futures price-trend
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yield are regarded as the base model due to their consistency with theoretical expectations,
more statistically significant coefficients and lower mean square errors. We should note that
the coefficients related to the wealth and insurance effects are statistically significant in all
specifications in terms of adaptive expectations and share acreage equations. Within the em-
pirical model, a system of nine crop equations, for spring wheat, durum wheat, oats, barley,
rye, peas, flax, canola and hay, over 1982-2006 is provided and all the relevant elasticities
of acreage allocation with respect to the exogenous variables are estimated. Based on the
estimated results, the coefficients of expected total wealth and variance of total wealth were
statistically significant in the whole system, which implies that the whole-farm programs are
production and therefore trade distorting and are not actually decoupled even if they satisfy
the WTO criteria.
The estimated statistically significant coefficients (for expected total wealth and variance
of total wealth variables) were then used to simulate the impact of the WGSA, NISA and
CAIS programs. The WGSA, NISA and CAIS programs have increased the acreage allocated
to spring wheat and peas while they have decreased the acreage for barley, canola and hay
in the prairie provinces. Under the WGSA during 1977-1990, acres allocated to spring wheat
increased, mostly through the insurance effect, on average by 5.32, 3.31, and 8.74 percent in
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, respectively. During 1991-2002, spring wheat acres
increased on average by 7.91 percent in Manitoba, 4.09 percent in Saskatchewan and 9.54
percent in Alberta under the NISA. Under the CAIS, spring wheat acres expanded dur-
ing 2003-2006 by 8.51 percent on average in Manitoba, 7.76 percent in Saskatchewan and
7.10 percent in Alberta. Under the WGSA program, acres planted to peas considerably in-
creased, through the insurance effect, by 36.33, 55.72, and 192.72 percent in in Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta, respectively. In the NISA period, peas acres increased on average
by 35.55 percent in Manitoba, 7.36 percent in Saskatchewan and 27.37 percent in Alberta.
Based on the results, under CAIS the acreage associated with peas production increased by
39.23, 5.59 and 11.92 percent in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively. The
results suggest that canola acreage considerably decreased—by 18.78 percent in Manitoba,
15.01 percent in Saskatchewan, and 16.42 percent in Alberta—under the WGSA implemen-
tation. Acres planted for canola decreased by 12.60, 8.68 and 13.65 percent in Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and Alberta, respectively under the NISA, while the reductions are 8.35, 10.08
and 8.15 percent under the CAIS. In general, our estimates confirm that the size and the
direction of the acreage effect of direct payments are strongly influenced by the insurance
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effect. Therefore, for the whole farm programs, the total impact of the effects related to risk
is important.
6.2 Lessons Learned, Policy Implications and Caveats
of the Study
This study has endeavoured to answer the following questions:
1. Have Canadian whole farm programs, which are considered as decoupled based on the
ex ante WTO definition, actually been decoupled from production?
2. What impacts have government programs had on cropping patterns in the Canadian
Prairies?
The theoretical model developed in this thesis and empirical evidence enable us to learn
some important lessons related to decoupled payments in general, and Canadian agricultural
programs in particular.
The theoretical model developed in this dissertation has shown that it is essential to cap-
ture the insurance effect of payments assumed to be decoupled as well as the wealth effect. In
an expected utility maximization framework, when the relationship between income stabiliza-
tion compensated and uncompensated acreage decision functions as well as average income
compensated and uncompensated acreage decision functions is considered, the variability of
farm profit as well as the average of farm profit will also play a role in acreage decisions
by the farmer. This leads to the conclusion that policies that are assumed to be decoupled
(which tend to reduce the variability of profit as well as to increase expected profit) are not,
in fact, decoupled. The underlying reasons are wealth and insurance effects1.
In this work, an effort has also been made to shed some light on the expected sign of
variables in acreage equation. Using the portfolio theory, it was analytically shown that we
can have an expectation only for the sign of the expected own-profit and its variance, the
former has positive impact and the latter has negative impact on acreage in each equation.
The effect of other variables on acreage decisions are not known a priori.
The empirical model estimated in this dissertation has shown that the size and the di-
rection of the acreage effect arising from the Canadian whole-farm programs are strongly
1Note that when contingent markets are easy and cheap to use and sufficiently rich, then separability in
the manner of Holthausen (1979) will omit insurance and wealth effects.
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influenced by the insurance effect which supports the evidence available in the literature; for
example in Hennessy (1998) and Sckokai and Moro (2006). As our results are derived from
a more general representation of the acreage decisions, the parameters are estimated based
on panel data observations and their statistical significance is quite satisfactory (particularly
for the insurance effect), this general result seems quite robust. In general, the size of the
wealth effect is quite small, while the insurance effect is always significant. Thus, the em-
pirical results reveal that for the Canadian whole-farm programs the impact of the effects
related to risk is important. Particularly, the results show the inherent difficulty in divorcing
the stabilization effect received by Canadian whole-farm programs from farmers’ production
decisions.
Another important lesson relates to the impact of cross-crop effects. Our results show
that cross effects can be important not just for market effects, but also for expected wealth
and wealth variability. For example, since the risk-averse producer uses diversification to
reduce his portfolio risk, she/he is diversifying less as a result of government programs which
stabilize producer’s farm profit. In fact, after stabilizing producer’s farm profit by government
programs, the producer decides to allocate more acres to wheat—agronomically the crop
most suited to dryland farming in the Canadian Prairies—at the expense of canola which
was planted as means to reduce the risk associated with a farmer’s portfolio of crops. The
conclusion is that the government programs have affected the cropping patterns in the Prairie
provinces.
In addition, the results may have an important lesson for the WTO negotiations regard-
ing the current definition of the Green Box payments. The current Green Box provisions
have no doubt promoted the agricultural reform process. These measures have been of great
assistance to highly-subsidizing countries in shifting from mechanisms that support prices to
mechanisms that are expected to be more transparent and less trade-distorting. By providing
relatively comprehensive theoretical and empirical frameworks, the results of this disserta-
tion, however, indicate that the supposedly decoupled payments (as a part of Green Box
subsidies) could have significant impact on acreage decisions through wealth and insurance
effects and, consequently they may distort production and trade. It is clear that further
research, using the same theoretical and empirical frameworks, needs to be done on the effect
of decoupled payments and other elements of the Green Box subsidies (safety net programs,
structural adjustment assistance, regional assistance and environmental aids) on production
and investment across different countries. Nevertheless, the results of this dissertation can
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be considered as a hint that as a result of risk effects of government programs, programs
that qualify as non-actionable cannot ensure that there are no or at most minimal distorting
effects on production and trade.
Indeed, the major WTO Members have shifted their domestic support from restricted
Amber Box to non-restricted Green Box measures, so as to avoid further reduction of their
agricultural support. Trade, however, is likely to remain considerably distorted. If further
studies also confirm the results of this thesis regarding the risk effect of the Green Box
subsidies including the decoupled payments, there is a need to reevaluate the eligibility criteria
of the current definition of the Green Box subsidies. Current eligibility criteria do not take
into account the farmer’s response under uncertainty and are typically based on the market
effects of policies. When defining the domestic policy measures that are exempted from
the reduction commitments, the risk components of different measures should be taken into
account since the size of the risk effects, especially the insurance effect, is relevant.
Obviously, as the analysis indicates, there is no fully decoupled agricultural support mea-
sure in theory or in practice. However, the WTO Members can present their proposals about
the criteria and mechanism of the Green Box payments including decoupled programs based
on their experience and then choose the one with greatest degree of decoupling. This could
limit the supports to payments based on the new criteria, or at least limit the Green Box
payments to a specific percentage of the value of total agricultural production.
The empirical model employed to study the acreage effect of government programs has a
number of caveats. Assuming that aggregate behavior can be represented by a representative
farm household making decisions, the acreage function is specified to use aggregate data.
Due to the unavailability of data, this study used provincial level data in measuring farmers’
acreage decisions. If panel data at the farm level including production costs data were
available, it would possibly estimate acreage effect of government programs more accurately,
because actual decisions are made at the farm level. The analysis could also be expanded to
include a richer set of risk responses than acreage adjustments alone. For example, input use
and output supply response under risk may be incorporated with acreage response.
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Appendices
Appendix A
The Expected Utility Theory
Here, decision making under uncertainty in a general case is presented as a background and
starting point. This section outlines the main concepts in the literature pertaining to risk
and uncertainty to inform the analysis in the remainder of chapter four. Expected utility
theory and risk aversion are the two main concepts that are discussed. The expected utility
hypothesis states that the individual assigns a utility value to each mutually exclusive activity
with an associated probability distribution that is an outcome of a decision. Therefore,
maximizing the expected utility of consequences is equivalent to the problem of selecting the
action that induces the most preferred probability distribution. Risk aversion is a fundamental
feature of the problem of choice under uncertainty and the expected utility model allows us
to capture it by assuming concavity of the utility function.
Consider a representative firm that wants to make future investment plans. Let A rep-
resent the set of all possible actions available to the firm, and let S represent the set of all
possible states of nature. The specific action chosen by the firm and the particular state of
nature that is realized determine the outcomes that the firm cares about. In other words,
consequences are random variables as given by the function c : S × A → C, where C is the
set of all possible consequences. For example, C could be the set of all possible commodity
bundles as in standard consumer theory, in which case C = Rn+ . Alternatively, if it is mone-
tary outcomes that are of interest to the decision makers, then one can put C = R. Suppose
for simplicity that the set C is finite, and that there are N possible consequences. Given
an objectively known probability for each state of nature, then choosing a particular action
will result in a probability distribution (a lottery) over outcomes. Formally, one can define a
lottery as a probability list L ≡ (p1, p2, ..., pN) such that pi is the probability that outcome
ci ∈ C will arise. If an outcome is certainly going to happen, then the probability is one, and
when an outcome cannot happen at all, the probability is zero (pi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i pi = 1).
In this setting, primitive preferences are represented by a preference relation  (preferred
to or indifferent to) defined over the set of all possible lotteries L . Assuming that this relation
is rational (complete and transitive) and satisfies a specific continuity assumption, then all
lotteries can be ranked by a function V : L → R in the sense that, for any two lotteries L
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and L′, we have L  L′ ⇔ V (L) ≥ V (L′). As the underlying assumption is that the decision
maker is concerned only with the ultimate consequences, in this setting compound lotteries
are always equivalent to the corresponding reduced lottery. Thus, a gamble that gives lottery
L with probability α and lottery L′ with probability (1− α) is equivalent to a simple lottery
whose probabilities are given by the mixture αL+ (1− α)L′ .
To get the expected utility model, a further assumption is required, namely the indepen-
dence axiom (Samuelson, 1952). This condition requires that, if we consider the mixture of
each of any two lotteries L and L′ with another lottery L′′, the preference ordering on the two
resulting lotteries is independent of the particular common lottery L′′. That is, for any L, L′
and L′′, and any α ∈ (0, 1) , L  L′ ⇔ αL + (1− α)L′′  αL′ + (1− α)L′′. In other words,
what does not happen or is impossible has no effect on the level of preferences between two
possible states of nature. One may note that an equivalent assumption in the standard choice
problem of consumer theory would be very restrictive (there is no reason to assume that a
consumer’s preferences over various bundles of goods one and two should be independent of
the quantities of the other goods she/he will consume), which is why it is seldom made in that
context. However, the independence assumption is quite natural because of a fundamental
feature of decision problems under uncertainty i.e. consequences are mutually exclusive1.
The independence axiom, coupled with the other standard rational choice assumptions,
has the remarkable implication that there exists a utility function defined over consequences,
U : C → R, such that L  L′ ⇔ ∑Ni=1 piU(ci) ≥ ∑Ni=1 p′iU(ci) where again, pi is the
probability that consequence ci will attain under L and p
′
i is the probability that consequence
ci will attain under L
′. In other words, with the independence axiom, the utility function
over lotteries can always be represented as the mathematical expectation of a utility function
defined over consequences, that is V (L) = E[U(c)] where E[.] is the mathematical expectation
operator2. Note that, the utility function V (L) is linear in probabilities. The function U(c)
is usually called the von Neumann-Morgenstern (v.N-M) utility function. This v.N-M utility
function U(c) is monotonically increasing and is cardinal in a way that it is defined up to an
increasing linear transformation (that is, if U(c) represents the preference relation, then any,
Û(c) ∼ α + gU(c) with g > 0, provides an equivalent representation of this relation). When
1Despite its theoretical appeal, the empirical validity of the independence axiom has been questioned. Some
examples are the Allais Paradox (Allais, 1953) and Machina’s Paradox (Machina, 1987). These paradoxes
limit expected utility as a model of preferences. They may look analogous to the Giffen Paradox in the
aggregate investigation of markets, but expected utility is still pervasive in economics.
2The strength of the expected utility representation is that it preserves the very useful expectation form
while making the utility of monetary lotteries sensitive not only to the mean but also to the higher moments
of the distribution of the monetary payoffs.
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the consequences of interest are defined by continuous random variables with joint cumulative
distribution function F (c), the expected utility theorem implies that V (F ) =
∫
U(c)dF (c).
In conclusion, in the expected utility model the problem of selecting the action that induces
the most preferred probability distribution reduces to that of maximizing the expected utility
of consequences.
Risk Aversion
In many economic settings (including decision making under uncertainty), individuals seem
to display aversion to risk. The expected utility model allows us to capture the notion of
risk aversion, which is a fundamental feature of the problem of choice under uncertainty.
This notion is made precise when the consequences that matter to the decision maker are
monetary consequences, such that the v.N-M utility function is defined over wealth, U(W )
where W ∈ R is realized wealth. The choice problem under uncertainty can be thought
of as a choice among distributions (lotteries), with risk-averse firms preferring distributions
that are less risky. Specifically, a decision maker is said to be risk averse if, for every lottery
F (W ), he/she will always prefer (at least weakly) the certain amount E[W ] to the lottery
F (W ) itself, i.e., U [
∫
WdF (W )] ≥ ∫ U(W )dF (W ) (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964). By Jensen’s
inequality, however, this condition is equivalent to U(W ) being concave. Thus, concavity of
the v.N-M utility function provides the fundamental feature of risk aversion.
Given the representation of risk aversion in terms of the concavity of U(.), one can then
say that firm 2 is unambiguously more risk averse than firm 1 if there exists an increasing
concave function ψ(.) such that U2(W ) = ψ(U1(W )), where Ui denotes the utility function of
firm i, i = 1, 2 (in other words, if U2(.) is more concave than U1(.)). For measuring changes
in the degree of risk aversion of a given firm with the level of wealth, two standard measures
of risk aversion are used: the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion A(W ) and
the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion R(W ) (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964). As
concavity of U(W ) is equivalent to risk aversion, the degree of concavity of U(W ), as captured
by U ′′(W ), is used to measure the degree of risk aversion. Given that U(W ) is defined only
up to an increasing linear transformation, we need to normalize by U ′(W ) > 0 to obtain
a measure that is unique for a given preference ordering. Thus, the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion is defined as A(W ) ≡ −U ′′(W )/U ′(W ). Absolute risk aversion is useful for
comparing the attitude of a firm towards a given gamble at different levels of wealth. It
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seems natural to assume that firms will become less averse to a given gamble as their wealth
increases i.e., A(W ) is a decreasing function of W which is called decreasing absolute risk
aversion (DARA).
However, sometimes it is interesting to inquire about the attitude of risk-averse decision
makers towards gambles that are expressed as a fraction of their wealth. This type of risk
preference is captured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion R(W ) ≡ WA(W ). Unlike
the case of absolute risk aversion, there are no a priori reasons for any particular behavior
of R(W ) with respect to W . Sometimes non-increasing relative risk aversion (NIRRA) is
assumed, implying that a firm should not become more averse to a gamble expressed as a fixed
percentage of its wealth as the level of wealth increases. Utility functions for which A(W ) and
R(W ) are constant are also interesting in applied analysis. The constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function is given by U(W ) = −e−αW , where α is the (constant) coefficient of
absolute risk aversion. The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is given
by U(W ) = (W 1−g)/(1 − g) if g 6= 1, and by U(W ) = log(W ) if g = 1, where g is the
(constant) coefficient of relative risk aversion.
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Appendix B
The Expected Sign for Own Return and Variance in the Two-Crop
Case
Consider a risk-averse farmer with two crops, crop 1 and crop 2, from equation (4.20) or the
first-order conditions we can write,
U¯W p¯i1 + U¯WW
(
A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1)
)
+ µfA1 = 0 (B-1)
and
U¯W p¯i2 + U¯WW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)
+ µfA2 = 0 (B-2)
For the case of two crops, from equation (4.15) or acreage constraints, there is another first-
order condition for optimization in (4.17) as ∂L
∂µ
= f(A) = 0. By totally differentiating, we
have,
fA1dA1 + fA2dA2 = 0 (B-3)
then, by substituting fA2 = −fA1dA1/dA2 into (B-2) one has,
U¯W p¯i2 + U¯WW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)− µfA1dA1/dA2 = 0 (B-4)
which gives fA1 = dA2/dA1
(
U¯W p¯i2 + U¯WW (A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2))
)
/µ and by substituting it
into (B-1) we have
U¯W p¯i1 + U¯WW (A1σ1 +A2Cov(pi2, pi1)) + dA2/dA1
(
U¯W p¯i2 + U¯WW (A2σ2 +A1Cov(pi1, pi2))
)
= 0
(B-5)
then,
dA2
dA1
= − p¯i1 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1)
)
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
) (B-6)
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d2A2
dA21
=
[− U¯WW
U¯W
(σ1 +
dA2
dA1
Cov(pi2, pi1))
][
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)][
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]2 +[
U¯WW
U¯W
(dA2
dA1
σ2 + Cov(pi1, pi2))
][
p¯i1 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1)
)][
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]2 =
− U¯WW
U¯W
σ1
[
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]
+ 2 U¯WW
U¯W
Cov(pi1, pi2)[
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]2
[
p¯i1 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1)
)]− U¯WW
U¯W
σ2
[
p¯i1+
U¯WW
UW
(
A1σ1+A2Cov(pi2,pi1)
)]2[
p¯i2+
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2+A1Cov(pi1,pi2)
)][
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]2
(B-7)
then,
d2A2
dA21
=
− U¯WW
U¯W[
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]3 ·(
σ1
[
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]2
+ σ2
[
p¯i1 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1)
)]2
− 2Cov(pi1, pi2)
[
p¯i1 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1)
)][
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)])
(B-8)
d2A2
dA21
=
− U¯WW
U¯W[
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]3 ·(
σ.51
[
p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(
A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)
)]− σ.52 [p¯i1 + U¯WWUW (A1σ1 + A2Cov(pi2, pi1))]
)2
(B-9)
The second-order condition for the expected utility to be maximized requires that the
acreage possibility frontier, f(A), to be concave (fAA < 0). Therefore, for having a general
solution, the isoutility curve (combination of two acreage crops that maximise expected utility
of profit) in A2 − A1 space must be convex which requires that d2A2dA21 > 0. Since for a risk-
averse farmer U¯WW
U¯W
< 0, positivity of d
2A2
dA21
requires that denominator, p¯i2 +
U¯WW
UW
(A2σ2 +
A1Cov(pi1, pi2)), in (B-9) or in (B-6) to be positive which implies to
dA2
dA1
< 01 and therefore
1Because of symmetry the positivity of p¯i2 + U¯WWUW (A2σ2 + A1Cov(pi1, pi2)) implies to the positivity of
p¯i1+ U¯WWUW (A1σ1+A2Cov(pi2, pi1)) and therefore numerator and denominator in (B-6) are positive, i.e.
dA2
dA1
< 0.
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isoutility curves in A2 − A1 space are decreasing and convex.
Considering equation (B-6), when own crop expected profit (variance) increases, the slope
of isoutility curve increases (decreases) in each point and therefore A1 increase (decreases)
and A2 decreases (increases). When competing or substitute crop 2’s expected profit increases
(p¯i2), the slope of isoutility curve decreases in each point and therefore, A1 decreases and A2
increases. When profit variability for substitute crop 2 increases, the slope of isoutility curve
increases in each point and, therefore, A1 increases and A2 decreases.
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1: 1979-2006 Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
MN SK AB MN SK AB
swh acre 3891413 13600000 6068779 769779 3043714 617859
dwh acre 181572 4011186 742761 107616 913717 222995
oats acre 724486 1615364 1567506 199070 490948 210666
barley acre 1438710 3981066 5345905 386015 669760 567444
rye acre 118172 340671 198585 65133 150597 70805
peas acre 140689 1013013 286750 46348 1002321 254686
flax acre 666228 890505 79987 235666 408888 47532
canola acre 1699940 4185984 3282571 705446 1703722 856371
hay acre 1828038 2885723 4937379 405295 1105993 1053451
tonne/acre
swh yield 0.908 0.763 0.958 0.172 0.138 0.161
dwh yield 0.864 0.754 0.872 0.171 0.171 0.210
oats yield 0.954 0.837 1.002 0.197 0.142 0.109
barley yield 1.172 0.998 1.189 0.199 0.156 0.156
rye yield 0.841 0.691 0.834 0.155 0.152 0.155
peas yield 0.818 0.736 0.964 0.173 0.160 0.156
flax yield 0.477 0.452 0.545 0.094 0.077 0.081
canola yield 0.570 0.510 0.564 0.112 0.076 0.104
hay yield 1.525 1.113 1.476 0.340 0.296 0.383
$/tonne
swh price 147.393 150.772 146.606 29.401 30.956 30.165
dwh price 163.572 172.513 172.209 37.321 38.809 38.732
oats price 112.553 108.564 109.582 27.365 27.150 30.867
barley price 106.080 113.884 107.425 23.279 22.508 23.186
rye price 105.299 101.192 102.624 33.373 31.430 28.474
peas price 187.732 177.711 183.660 29.985 26.596 33.810
flax price 279.772 280.362 281.101 67.323 68.494 62.372
canola price 299.117 299.391 300.944 54.258 53.713 51.728
hay price 58.268 71.962 73.863 9.935 15.390 15.785
swh exp. price 134.666 137.249 133.161 29.524 28.127 26.207
dwh exp. Price 149.410 157.688 157.399 39.217 41.459 41.364
oats exp. Price 117.494 112.968 113.810 31.206 28.000 27.977
barley exp. Price 111.365 119.425 113.910 24.091 22.550 30.530
rye exp. Price 112.593 109.105 110.639 37.699 37.340 33.897
peas exp. Price 207.536 196.295 203.169 52.087 47.966 55.175
flax exp. Price 304.350 303.622 304.123 65.664 60.981 51.877
canola exp. Price 334.744 335.034 337.554 43.835 42.890 46.425
hay exp. Price 62.881 77.059 79.153 19.503 22.064 22.433
$/acre
swh cost 57.202 49.669 62.903 6.925 12.809 13.723
dwh cost 66.426 51.240 36.963 8.632 17.026 8.181
oats cost 50.624 49.507 51.450 4.777 14.951 11.393
barley cost 53.694 55.783 62.475 5.137 24.662 13.876
rye cost 53.969 47.791 45.195 4.789 9.759 10.631
peas cost 66.745 60.543 76.113 6.479 15.511 15.585
flax cost 47.703 46.838 66.466 6.471 16.517 13.986
canola cost 75.947 61.263 77.107 23.752 21.095 16.808
hay cost 60.866 54.025 29.474 5.341 6.028 7.010
$
initial wealth 4850000000 11100000000 13200000000 1120000000 1950000000 4200000000
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Appendix D
Parameters used for Simulation
Table D.1: Parameters used for Simulation of the WGSA Effect
Without Program (Untruncated) With Program (Truncated)
exp. tot. w. var tot. w. exp. tot. w. var tot. w.
MN
1984 900738895.6 8.24457E+16 906586728.3 7.56028E+16
1985 886811400.9 1.14728E+16 886813524.9 1.1471E+16
1986 640983403.7 8.48395E+15 644286492.5 7.37207E+15
1987 302838033.4 9.23049E+16 516723403.3 1.55106E+16
1988 603287689.7 7.92075E+16 646650994.4 4.90425E+16
1989 795223808.4 4.55789E+17 910597417.5 2.70165E+17
1990 681820641.2 4.49733E+17 830426795.4 2.3453E+17
SK
1984 2450827698 1.53725E+17 2467566550 1.30621E+17
1985 2327371709 6.69814E+17 2467541337 3.96644E+17
1986 1997395224 7.71041E+17 2147584379 4.56855E+17
1987 1106076268 1.91624E+17 1480511094 2.26037E+16
1988 1711507640 1.17078E+17 1727862753 9.78695E+16
1989 2306533807 1.42423E+18 2392312239 1.10614E+18
1990 2011823857 1.76729E+18 2227896738 1.07042E+18
AB
1984 1925082365 1.02737E+17 1927415566 9.91571E+16
1985 2016479405 2.61642E+17 2030081142 2.34649E+17
1986 1497560737 2.14438E+18 1843166660 1.07909E+18
1987 849346971.1 6.13754E+17 1200610429 1.86409E+17
1988 1176240700 2.45917E+17 1268773846 1.40027E+17
1989 1824504808 6.34748E+17 1884667310 4.87731E+17
1990 1805108865 1.40338E+18 1991437701 8.61676E+17
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Table D.2: Parameters used for Simulation of the NISA Effect
Without Program (Untruncated) With Program (Truncated)
exp. tot. w. var tot. w. exp. tot. w. var tot. w.
MN
1991 741519305.1 5.31182E+17 940768159.8 2.43978E+17
1992 771410293.2 2.74185E+17 895500297.3 1.37644E+17
1993 813526975.3 2.60064E+17 918809310.1 1.40844E+17
1994 823931212.5 2.63123E+17 889913642.1 1.74277E+17
1995 980639380.4 3.04908E+17 1064041599 1.90295E+17
1996 1425503051 1.13558E+17 1427013340 1.10962E+17
1997 1130267944 7.60226E+16 1166527152 4.9966E+16
1998 1008048940 1.88175E+17 1104711277 9.78299E+16
1999 674749689.7 1.08237E+17 867612697.2 2.38895E+16
2000 724780396.7 1.6287E+17 815815221.1 8.40999E+16
2001 599593273.9 6.17659E+16 679656568.3 2.52351E+16
2002 759426752.6 2.793E+16 762445273.7 2.58305E+16
SK
1991 2208020801 1.81198E+18 2440486484 1.06907E+18
1992 2171680741 1.2725E+18 2446787314 6.28069E+17
1993 2167936409 4.90186E+17 2236252576 3.53559E+17
1994 2502182206 4.87152E+17 2525775613 4.2623E+17
1995 2995732579 2.37246E+17 2996882447 2.34167E+17
1996 4300902887 5.63412E+17 4302068183 5.58386E+17
1997 3686124343 6.91479E+17 3736442371 5.55666E+17
1998 3192252267 3.16269E+18 3572633741 1.68124E+18
1999 2485352690 9.74568E+17 2703894942 5.085E+17
2000 2499969517 3.50522E+17 2524293139 2.99397E+17
2001 2164067181 8.63996E+16 2181381612 6.9771E+16
2002 2160371898 5.11164E+17 2220832000 3.82581E+17
AB
1991 1771121907 2.34612E+18 2196229291 1.06682E+18
1992 1751442586 2.52285E+18 2126738128 1.26869E+18
1993 1704314391 1.03256E+18 1840845340 6.73491E+17
1994 1750689776 6.63659E+17 1866518147 4.23972E+17
1995 1943826114 3.00897E+17 1980443601 2.37283E+17
1996 2938445770 7.86216E+17 2987742233 6.41389E+17
1997 2442267772 2.35346E+18 2776303622 1.23912E+18
1998 2461164477 1.1368E+18 2611223812 7.2901E+17
1999 2153600839 4.759E+17 2201058193 3.7301E+17
2000 2076976804 5.95834E+16 2077313142 5.9106E+16
2001 1804542362 8.69642E+16 1813794771 7.6716E+16
2002 2258146082 9.46287E+16 2258183259 9.45474E+16
Table D.3: Parameters used for Simulation of the CAIS Effect
Without Program (Untruncated) With Program (Truncated)
exp. tot. w. var tot. w. exp. tot. w. var tot. w.
MN
2003 805583935.4 4.96862E+16 868945383.3 2.3305E+16
2004 1045004161 4.89117E+16 1055070316 4.14797E+16
2005 695705724.4 1.0157E+17 870766146.4 3.32329E+16
2006 968443139.1 3.42138E+17 1084750406 2.25372E+17
SK
2003 2169324714 1.78273E+18 2464470913 1.04098E+18
2004 2317663861 1.54337E+18 2572602566 1.00949E+18
2005 1014741009 4.03575E+17 1708525774 1.78104E+17
2006 2033085133 3.27909E+17 2205996059 1.53994E+17
AB
2003 2164334019 5.06479E+17 2222388056 3.62756E+17
2004 3146658844 2.49629E+17 3151843809 2.51028E+17
2005 1483725809 2.68791E+17 1859095904 4.98831E+16
2006 1479905355 2.25145E+17 1988876533 2.63592E+16
156
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